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3Abstract
Political parties are ideal subjects for the study of power because they are specific sites
in which it is produced and organised, fought over, captured and lost.  However, the
literature on political parties largely lacks an explicit and systematic theorisation of
power as it is exercised and operates in them.   As a result, the study of parties has not
kept up with developments in theoretical approaches to power and power relations. For
example, the failure to recognise how power works through constituting subjects who
are empowered as effective agents with appropriate skills and capacities is a major
lacuna in the literature. Parties are not only electoral machines or vehicles for personal
ambition: they are organisations, complex relations of individuals, rules and rituals.  An
approach to power in parties should reflect this.
To this end, I develop a five-dimensional framework of power which I use to account
for political parties in all their complexity. My aim is to introduce some of the more
nuanced and sophisticated insights of political theory to the analysis of political parties
without dismissing the benefits of some of the more established ways of looking at
power.  Power is therefore approached as a rich, multi-dimensional concept, derived
from diverse intellectual traditions, including behaviouralist, structuralist and
Foucauldian accounts.  My framework encapsulates individual agency, the strategic
mobilisation of rules and norms, rationalisation and bureaucracy, the constitution of
subjectivities and the micro-level discipline of bodies.  Theory is employed in
conjunction with original interview and archive research on the British Labour Party to
construct an account of how power operates in party settings.  This provides a unique
and, I argue, much richer perspective on the exercise and operation of power in political
parties than has been offered before.
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9Introduction: Dimensions of Power
All politics is in some sense a manifestation of power struggles. Max Weber argues that
the importance of politics is that it strives ‘to share power or… to influence the
distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state’ (Weber 1948
[PV], 78). In democratic states, the primary vehicle for these struggles is the political
party. Therefore it is not surprising that, from the earliest studies of political parties,
how power and organisation interact has been of major concern.  For two early
twentieth century pioneers of the study of parties, the very emergence of party
organisation in the first place had problematic effects in terms of power: for Ostrogorski
(1970 [1902]), the transformation of parliamentary parties into mass organisations,
although a practical response to the expanding franchise, undermined the deliberative
freedom of parliamentary elites, making them into mere agents of the organisation and
its members (Ostrogorski 1970 [1902], 386).  Conversely, Michels (1962 [1915]) argues
that the growth of organised parties actually supported the power of elites at the expense
of members, crushing the democratic hopes of the masses under the grinding wheel of
oligarchy.  Many other studies since then have sought to explain how, as parties have
developed, power relations within them have changed: the ‘mass party’ of the twentieth
century was naturally oligarchic according to Duverger (1959, 151).  Kirchheimer
(1966) and Epstein (1967) argued that professionalised media age parties had begun to
throw off their memberships altogether, becoming even more centralised and elitist.
More recently, Katz and Mair (1995) have suggested that the party at elite level has
become interpenetrated with the state itself, whilst the relationship with the party on the
ground has become one of virtual mutual autonomy.
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The works I have briefly outlined above have all played an important role in the
academic analysis of party organisation. However, whilst all these studies are
concerned in some way with the ‘distribution’ of power in parties, particularly in terms
of the relative power of members and leaders, the majority of these and other studies
have failed to address explicitly or adequately the question of power as a dynamic force
that has many different dimensions to it. Political parties are sites in which the exercise
of power can be observed in conflicts over policy and preferences, and in the means that
actors use to secure their interests and maintain dominant positions. But power also
works in political parties in less observable, but highly effective ways.  It produces and
constitutes political actors through the rituals and practices of everyday party life and it
controls and disciplines them through routinised organisational imperatives and the
fine-grained disciplinary techniques of surveillance and normalisation.  Illuminating the
sheer variety of its modes of operation in political parties requires a sustained
theoretical analysis of power in that context and its application to real-world examples.
This is the task that I undertake in this thesis.
Summary of the Core Thesis
This thesis seeks to answer four questions. Firstly, in what different ways is power
exercised in a political party? Secondly, how can it adequately be theorised? Thirdly,
how best can this theory be tested? And fourthly, what contribution does this make to
a) the understanding of power in political parties in particular; b) the debates about
political power generally?  I answer these questions as follows:
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1.  In what different ways is power exercised in a political party?
Power needs to be conceptualised in a way that accounts for the full complexity of its
exercise in party organisation.  My thesis is that, in theoretical terms, power in political
parties needs to be understood not simply as a property of agents or a function of
hierarchy but also as strategic, routinised, constitutive and disciplinary.  I propose five
dimensions to power’s exercise in a political party, in which power can be understood in
the following different ways:
i. as a capacity of individual agents which is exercised in interpersonal
relations in the pursuit of specified interests;
ii. as a property mediated by organisational norms and rules, and amplified
by instituting, reforming or reinforcing them in such a way that it limits
the scope of conflict, thus securing the power of certain groups over
others;
iii. as an impersonal, bureaucratic control which is engendered by parties as
continuously administered organisations.  Power becomes detached from
agents whilst at the same time constraining, disciplining and excluding
them through organisational imperatives;
iv. as a productive, empowering force that constitutes subjectivities through
the day-to-day habits and rituals of party life, producing willing subjects
who are effective party actors;
v. as micro-level discipline that is propagated and reproduces itself through
fine-detailed techniques of control and normalisation, focused inter alia at
the level of the body.
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These five dimensions of power’s exercise – agentic, strategic, bureaucratic,
constitutive and disciplinary – are brought together by the thesis into a single
framework that provides the basis for an analysis of power in political parties
2.  How can power adequately be theorised?
In answering the second question, I draw on existing debates about power and its
exercise in political contexts, especially the so-called ‘community power debates’
beginning with Dahl’s critique of the ruling elite model of power (Dahl 1957; 1958),
and Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) modifications of Dahl’s approach, which are
famously defined by Lukes (1974; 2005) as the first two of three ‘faces’ of power.
From these and similar works I draw material which supports the agentic and strategic
dimensions of power’s exercise in political organisation.  I then build on and extend the
understanding of power beyond the concerns of these debates by drawing on a series of
theoretical resources that enable me to develop a framework in which five dimensions
of power interact.  In particular, I use:
 theories that emphasise the more impersonal machine-like power of
organisation, drawn from Weber’s theory of bureaucratic power;
 theories that conceive power as structural and constitutive of subjectivity,
inspired by Althusser’s brand of structural Marxism;
 an understanding of power derived from Foucault that envisages it as dynamic,
detailed and capillary force that operates independently of both structure and
agents.
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My aim is to show how these modes of power operate within not just the political as
such, but within political parties specifically.  I will contend, moreover, that it is
impossible to appreciate how modern parties operate without taking all five of these
dimensions into account.  My framework therefore offers an important addition to the
conventional analysis of the political party.
There is inevitably a tension that exists in a framework that seeks to bring together such
diverse understandings of a concept like power.  How, for example, can it be accepted
that power is a property of autonomous agents on the one hand, whilst also agreeing that
individual subjectivity is constituted by power on the other? In this case there is a
danger of becoming entangled in debates about structure and agency.  I do not wish to
dwell on those debates in the abstract.  Central to my argument is that one cannot fully
comprehend power relations (especially in political parties) by rejecting or neglecting
the capacities of agents, but nor can the full effect of power be understood without also
considering the forces that bear upon and shape individuals as subjects with agency.
Thus, whilst I do not expect to resolve the very deep controversies that underlie this
theoretical debate, part of the task of this thesis is to use these tensions in a creative
way. My purpose is to argue that power is a multi-dimensional concept in which the
agentic and structural operate at different levels of power.
3.  How best can this theory be tested?
Overall the thesis offers a theoretical analysis of power in political parties and my
principal purpose is to add to the understanding of power in this specific context.  I am
therefore not only concerned with advancing coherent theoretical claims; I also want to
test them.  I do so through the examination of a particular case-study: the development
of the British Labour Party during the 1980s and 1990s.
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That a political party is a locus of power struggles and power relations in its own right is
what makes it such a suitable site for a study of power and this is particularly so for
labour and socialist parties because of their history of organisation.  Socialist parties
‘were the first to try and organise the masses, to give them a political education, and to
recruit from them the working-class elites’ (Duverger 1959, 24-25) as a means of
countering the wealth and power of the established parties of the ruling classes. Thus
parties of the left can be a fruitful source of analysis, as writers like Michels, Duverger,
Panebianco (1988) and their successors have demonstrated.  In this sense, then, I am
continuing in their tradition.
The 1980s and 1990s is a period of the party’s history which provides an opportunity to
identify the key forces at work in the party’s ‘renewal’. It was a time during which
Labour underwent a transition from what was regarded as a ‘sick’ party – divided,
chaotic and apparently destined for oblivion (Whiteley 1983, 1) – to an apparently
‘slick’ and disciplined electoral machine. Drucker argued in 1979 that the Labour Party
should be seen ‘not simply an instrument for acquiring and using power – not simply a
vote gathering machine designed for policy-making and implementation’ but as an
organisation with ‘a life of its own’ (Drucker 1979, vii).  However, the problem for
party leaders who were concerned with acquiring and using power was that the Party’s
‘life’ and ethos, its culture of oppositionism (Ibid., 37) and distrust of leaders (Ibid., 92-
5), was a barrier to making their ambitions political realities. Thus the history of the
Labour Party is in large part a history of struggle between the requirements and logics
of the pursuit of power and the practices, politics and traditions of a movement. The
upheavals and struggles after defeat in 1979, and before eventual return to power in
1997, were to change the party fundamentally at many different levels: in terms of its
organisation, its culture, its members and activists, its policies and practices.  The result,
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at least for a time, was to reorient the party away from being ‘an opposition party’ with
‘a real stake … in remaining out [of office]’ (Drucker 1979, 37) and becoming one with
a taste and desire for power, with an ambition and determination to ‘win, and win
again.’ (Gould 1999, xvii).
A crucial aspect of my research has therefore been to collect and analyse empirical
material.  This has been gathered from three main sources: interviews (with both grass
roots activists and party elites), archival research, and biographical and contemporary
accounts of politicians and journalists. This approach, which combines theory with
qualitative empirical research, suits my overall aims because I want to examine how
different conceptualisations of power can be applied in multiple dimensions to the same
setting. The process of change and reform that the party and its members were subject
to illuminates how different dimensions of power come into play, sometimes in tension,
sometimes complementing or supporting one another.  These dynamics allow me to
explore the salience and effects of these different dimensions of power in specific
situations.  For example, reforms made to the party’s decision-making processes (which
I will discuss at different points later in the thesis) demonstrate how power works in
multiple dimensions: decision-making in the party was characterised by antagonistic,
public confrontation between activists and leaders, and changes in the rules were seen as
crucial to short-circuiting that, thus demonstrating how power’s strategic dimensions
can be exercised in response to problematic exertions of individualistic power. Reform
of policy-making led to greater centralisation and the routine exclusion of certain voices
from the decision-making process, bringing a more bureaucratic dimension into play.
Looked at yet another way, the practices of routines like policy-making have a
constitutive quality, reinforcing particular norms and producing certain kinds of
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activists. Therefore, altering them is likely to have some significance for the culture of
the party and the attitudes and beliefs of those participating in it.
4.  What contribution does this make to: a) the understanding of power in political
parties in particular; b) the debates about political power generally?
To the understanding of power in political parties, I contribute an explicit theoretical
focus on the nature and operation of power therein. A general problem in the existing
literature is that the concept of power remains underdeveloped in the specific context of
political parties. Underlying assumptions about power tend to emphasise it as a
property of elites or a problem of agents and their preferences. As I demonstrate in the
following chapter, although it is possible to elicit a number of different underlying
approaches to power from an examination of the existing literature, an explicit
theoretical reflection on the concept of power in the particular context of parties is
lacking. This is probably because most of those who write about political parties are
not theorists, whilst political theorists have very rarely focused their attention on
political parties. The argument I have developed over time in response to these lacunae
is that a more sophisticated and complex understanding is needed.  This accommodates
the way that power can also be discerned in the quiet corners, in mundane, everyday
practices that breathe life into organisational dynamics and which are saturated with
forms of power that operate below the radar of ‘conventional’ political science.
To do this, I bring together different approaches to power in a unique multi-dimensional
framework that has been specifically designed for the analysis of power’s exercise in
party organisation.  This focuses on action and strategic behaviour, but also on
administration, the regular practices of party life, and more detailed methods of control
that are rarely noticed in the mainstream party literature.  Inversely, such an approach
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also adds to the debate about power in general precisely because it focuses on
organisational power.  This is important for two reasons: firstly, because most of us are
part of and interact with organisations every day of our lives. The world, Stewart Clegg
(1989) has suggested, is ‘increasingly dominated by large complex organisations’ in
which ‘mechanisms of discipline, which are more mediated, more formalised and more
routinised’ have become increasingly important means of order and control (Clegg
1989, 35).  Secondly, the struggle for power exists on two levels in party politics: the
political party is at the same time both a locus of power and a vehicle for the pursuit of
power. As von Beyme has put it, the main purpose of party organisation ‘is and will
remain to achieve power in the state’ (von Beyme 1985, 73). It follows, therefore, that
to understand how power works within political parties is itself vital for understanding
how political power operates more generally and widely within and across the political
apparatus.
Lukes’ ‘Three Dimensional’ Approach
Before setting out the theoretical framework, it is important to address one of the most
important previous attempts to approach power as a multi-dimensional concept: Steven
Lukes’ seminal work Power: A Radical View (Lukes 1974; 2005) [PRV].  Lukes was
specifically engaged in what have become known as the ‘community power debates’
(Clegg 1989, 13).  He entered into what was essentially a methodological discussion
about power that had originated in Robert Dahl’s behavioural conceptualisation (Dahl
1957; 1961; 1968).  At the same time, however, Lukes’ analysis was also a response to
the debates within Marxism in the 1970s about structure and agency in which he sought
to retain ideas of impersonal structures in the works of writers like Louis Althusser
(2008 [1971]) and Nicos Poulantzas (1978) but without surrendering the idea of agency
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that he saw as crucial to power.  His approach, therefore, was to make a ‘radical
critique’ of behaviouralist conceptualisations which provided the basis for a ‘three-
dimensional’ approach to power.
Dahl’s argument was that an exercise of power can only be said to have occurred when
there is clear evidence of one actor securing interests over those of another, which is
expressed in the formula: ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do
something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl 1957, 202-3).  Bachrach and Baratz
(1970) later modified Dahl’s theory, arguing that power had a ‘second face’ in which
some (usually elite) actors exercise power in a less obviously visible or confrontational
way to prevent the interests of others from being addressed, thus protecting their own
position.  This was the debate into which Lukes entered and took a step further.  His
‘radical view’ argues that power has yet a ‘third face’ which is exercised by keeping
potential issues out of politics altogether so that conflicts of interest do not even arise.
This is achieved by
shaping … [people’s] perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such
a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either
because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they
see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely
ordained and beneficial  (Lukes 1974, 24).
The exercise of power may therefore be more indirect, identified in the shaping of
preferences.  Thus A ‘also exercises power over B by influencing, shaping or
determining his very wants’ (Lukes 1974, 23). Lukes illustrates this by using an
example of a steel company attributed with the decisive influence on ‘clean air’ policy
in a U.S. city, despite not intervening publicly or privately, nor pronouncing upon the
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subject (Lukes 1974, 42-45).  In this example, local politicians fail to do anything about
pollution despite it clearly being in their ‘objective’ interest to do so.  This is because,
for Lukes, interests are not entirely subjective: people’s ‘wants may themselves be a
product of a system which works against their interests’ (Ibid., 34).  Therefore, although
a conflict of interests is still a precondition of power’s exercise, Lukes argues that it
may be latent because this third dimension of power prevents conflict from becoming
manifest in the first place by suppressing ‘real’ interests.  That, for Lukes, is the genius
of power’s ‘hidden face’.
There are many problems with the idea of ‘real’ interests in particular.  Hay has argued
that the process of ascribing ‘real’ interests is irredeemably a matter of perception (Hay
2002, 181) and Lukes himself, in the second edition of PRV, has acknowledged that the
concept is problematic (Lukes 2005, 146-8).   However, the real problem with Lukes’
approach is that he failed to free his argument from the presuppositions of the debate
initially set in train by Dahl’s ‘intuitive idea’ about A affecting B, meaning his approach
is not as radical as he claims, as Peter Morriss has argued (Morriss 2006, 128).  For
Lukes, the constraints under which individual agents operate may run insidiously deep
and be more difficult to counter than some other approaches suggest, but power is still
at its core centred on the relationship between two or more parties whose interests are
opposed to one another (whether they are aware of it or not).  Underlying his conception
of power is the core idea that A affects B in some way (Lukes 1974, 33).  Even in his
own substantial criticisms of his earlier work in the second edition of PRV, Lukes
retains the idea that power is ineluctably connected to personal responsibility (i.e. that
the reason people are powerless is because they are dominated by other people).  This
very focus on the exercise of power is, for Morriss, representative of a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of power and powerlessness, which might be more to do
20
with the way in which society itself is structured and not directly attributable to one
person or another (Morriss 2002, 41-42). For Lukes, therefore, power is still a
phenomenon of interests and conflict, even when interests are hidden and conflict is
latent.  But Lukes’ moral concern with fixing responsibility means that he both confuses
ideas of power as a capacity and power as domination and ignores the real effects of
structural power, which ‘unduly limit[s] the critical force of his theory’ (Hayward 2006,
157).
In my framework, then, Dahl’s work and Bachrach and Baratz’s work are very
influential on my analysis of the first two dimensions of power. From Lukes, I retain
and employ a sense in which power operates to silence conflict and manipulate
perceptions of self-interest, and the idea that power can operate simultaneously on a
series of different levels. But I also depart from Lukes approach and instead move on
from notions of interests, conflict and agency and open up not just one, but three
additional dimensions of power that are relevant to organisational contexts: one which
picks up on Weberian concerns regarding the anonymous power of rationalised
organisation and the role it plays in structuring, defining and directing the actions of
both the powerful and the powerless; another which identifies a constitutive power in
the practices of everyday life in parties, like meetings; and a further dimension in which
activity is controlled in fine detail through technologies of organisation, surveillance
and normalisation.  In the next section I set these out as a five-dimensional theoretical
framework of power which lies at the heart of my thesis and underpins the analysis of
political parties that follow.
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Setting Out the Theoretical Framework
Below I set out a theoretical framework of power that will also act as a topographical
‘map’ allowing the reader to navigate the rest of the discussion.  I have developed this
framework with specific regard to the operation of power in an organisational context;
specifically, political party organisation.  It conceives of the exercise of power as
operating in five distinctive ‘dimensions’ but it also suggests a trajectory in which
power appears in increasingly subtle ways that are progressively less identifiable as
modes of power as conventionally defined by mainstream political science. Beginning
with a dimension that focuses on power as a property of agents, power in this grid
becomes progressively more detached and impersonal, as it is turned upon individuals
in more insidious ways.  Thus it is mediated through rules and values which are subject
to manipulation and control; it is inherent in the anonymous functioning of organisation;
it is constitutive in shaping and producing subjectivity; it disciplines and controls bodies
at a microscopic level of  detail.  This framework is summarised in Table 0.1 below.
The table sets out a brief description of each dimension of power, its distinguishing
characteristics, what kinds of questions need to be asked in order to identify it and
examples of how it might be identified in a political party setting. In the rest of this
section, following the table I summarise each dimension of power in more depth, in
particular outlining its theoretical origins and characteristics.
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Dimension of Power Description Characteristics Identification / Questions Examples
Individualistic Power
[IP]
Centred on individuals and their
preferences, power is exercised when
an actor is able to secure interests at
the expense of those of others.
Agentic, rational, causal,
decision-oriented, voluntarist,
resource-dependent.
Identify key issue(s) over which there is
clear conflict; examine parties involved and
decision outcomes.   Who was involved?
Who prevailed? What resources did victors
use?
Leaders rewarding and punishing
through control of patronage;
deploying resources to overcome
a rival in conflict.
Strategic Power
[SP]
Actions are mediated by rules and
norms, power is exercised by their
control and manipulation and by the
ability to set and control the agenda.
How rules used to gain and maintain
advantage.
Conflict-oriented, subject to
rules, mobilisation of bias (via
norms, rules and their
manipulation).
Identify unheard conflicts / grievances; use
of process and rules to block or engineer
defeat.  Who is disfavoured?  How is power
perpetuated by rules and their
manipulation?
Alteration of rules, manipulation
of decision-making procedures,
formal and informal barriers
preventing access to influential
positions.
Bureaucratic Control
[BC]
Rational, impersonal, routinised
power; works against agentic and
strategic power by subsuming
individuals under rules. Associated
with control and obedience of an
automated, mechanised kind.
Process-oriented; anonymous
and routine; formal and
conservative; constrains,
disciplines and excludes; driven
by organisational imperative.
Exploration of key party procedures: how
do key party functions become formalised?
How do bureaucratic responses to
problems impose control and discipline?
How does this impact on the freedom to
act politically?
Formal centralisation and
intervention; rule-based ‘non-
political’ disciplinary mechanisms
or decision-making processes
with exclusionary effects;
administrative jobs and routines.
Constitutive Power
[CP]
A ‘structural’ force which constitutes
subjectivity and reproduces power
through the everyday material
practices of party life.
Immanent in practices;
constitutive, positive and
empowering.
Examines practices and habits of party life.
How do they constitute loyal political
actors with appropriate skills and
capacities?
Meetings as repetitive, structured
rituals of communication;
developing capacities through the
‘career structure’; training
potential representatives.
Disciplinary Control
[DC]
Power as a micro-level phenomenon
which works in detailed practices and
knowledge and surveillance to
discipline and control in fine detail.
A relation rather than a property;
produces disciplined, effective
agents through fine-grained
control of conduct and
normalisation.
What technical solutions are applied to
problems of organised political action?
How are bodies exposed to surveillance,
inscribed and marked?  What is the
disciplinary effect of these processes?
Management of campaigning
activity through timetables and
audits etc.; application of
marketing and presentational
techniques.
Table 0.1: The Framework of Power
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The First Dimension: Individualistic Power [IP]
The first dimension of power, which I designate Individualistic Power, is predicated on
the notion of individual actors, each with an independent and unified set of conscious
preferences.  It is exemplified by behaviouralist conceptions of power, most notably
advanced by Robert Dahl (1957, 1961, 1968), who argued that the exercise of power
should be understood as an inter-personal act. Power is exercised in this dimension
when an actor is able, using whatever resources are available, to secure his or her
interests at the expense of those of others. One subjected to power is forced, cajoled or
otherwise convinced (through incentivisation or persuasion) to submit to that actor’s
interests. This form of power has seven characteristics:
1. It is agentic and rational.  It is the property of a sovereign individual and it is
exercised in pursuit of identifiable coherent interests translated into conscious
(rational) goals.
2. It is a causal relation in that one individual (A) causes another (B) to act in a
certain way.  It cannot be exercised alone, but by one actor on another.  It is
therefore an interpersonal act.
3. It is conflict-oriented.  For an exercise of this type of power to occur, the
interests of one individual must prevail over those of another.  In other words, ‘A
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would
not otherwise do’ (Dahl 1957, 202-3).
4. Power is therefore decision-oriented (a conflict with a clear outcome) and thus
observable, which makes it empirically available for the political scientist to
identify.
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5. Agents are autonomous individuals with the ability to make choices.  The ability
to choose whether to exercise power or not is essential to this notion.  Power is
therefore voluntarist in nature.
6. Power and resources which are used in its exercise should not be confused with
each other.  The possession and use of certain resources give some individuals
the ability to get their way over others, but to equate them with power is to
commit the ‘vehicle fallacy’ (Dowding 1996, 58).
7. Power is episodic. It is observable because it is absent and present at different
times and thus distinguishable from non-power.  Because it is possible to see
that power has been exercised, it is also be possible to see that it has not been.
The Second Dimension: Strategic Power [SP]
The second dimension of power I identify in my framework draws on Peter Bachrach
and Morton Baratz’s ‘second face’ of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1970) and E.E.
Schattschneider’s understanding of organisation as the ‘mobilisation of bias’
(Schattschneider 1960).  This dimension of power employs these ideas as a way of
recognising that agents are not entirely autonomous.  Actions take place within, and are
therefore mediated by, organisational contexts.  In other words, individuals are subject
to rules and norms of conflict. These rules and norms are not neutral, but a means by
which some individuals or groups exercise power in more hidden ways.  It suggests that
power tends to be in the hands of those who set and control agendas and who can
employ and manipulate rules and procedures in their own favour.  Because it is
concerned therefore with means rather than ends, I call this dimension of power
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Strategic Power.  It explains why some groups are able to maintain power and ensure
that others are disfavoured.  Its characteristics are as follows:
1. For power in this second dimension to be exercised, the interests of one group
must prevail over another.  Therefore, like Individualistic Power, it is conflict-
oriented and associated with agents and identifiable interests.
2. However, this sort of power is mediated through organisation and so securing, or
even expressing, those interests is subject to organisational rules and procedures.
3. The ability of an actor to secure interests is therefore dependent not just on
prevailing in confrontation with others, but also on the ability to prevent others
from being in a position to secure theirs at his or her expense.
4. Power is therefore dependent on the ability of actors to control or manipulate
aspects of the decision-making process so as to suppress grievances, prevent
conflict, or control the scope of conflict.
5. Identifying power’s exercise therefore requires analysis to be focused on the
structure of decision-making arenas, the formal and informal rules-of-the-game
in which power is embedded and in whose favour they operate.
This second dimension of power therefore includes Bachrach and Baratz’s ‘second face’
as an important tactic for exercising power before overt confrontation occurs, but it
expands it to take into account extensive ways of using organisational structures and
norms to foreclose oppositional manoeuvres.  The structure and constitution of
decision-making arenas, who designs them, what the rules are, who sets and controls
them need to be analysed in order to identify modes of organisational advantage that can
be used to institutionalise an actor’s power.  These mechanisms may be used in ways
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that are not necessarily recognisable as a personal strategy and exercises of power are
consequently more difficult to identify and challenge.
The Third Dimension: Bureaucratic Control [BC]
As permanent organisations with continuous administration, parties (like any other
organisation) must be rationally organised and rule-governed in order to realise their
goals.  But the ‘machine-like’ functioning of bureaucracy exemplifies an impersonal,
routinised form of power that subsumes individuals under rules. It is a form of power
intimately associated with control and obedience, but of an automated, mechanised
kind. This is the kind of bureaucratic power that Max Weber (1948; 1978) and his
followers have described in considerable detail.
It is important to distinguish this third dimension of power, which I describe as
Bureaucratic Control from the power associated with agents or strategy.  Whilst
Strategic Power is a means by which powerful actors can use organisation and thus act
to secure and maintain their own position, Bureaucratic Control (once set in train)
closes off such possibilities. It is about how decisions (and problems) become
structured and determined by the relentless routines and imperatives of bureaucracy. It
has the following characteristics:
1. Power is not a matter of conflict, but of process.  It is exercised anonymously in
the functions and routines of organisation (e.g. through disciplinary procedures,
decision-making processes).
2. Power is unequal, constraining all but disadvantaging some more than others.
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3. Power is conservative. It perpetuates inequality by giving considerable unequal
power to elites whilst suppressing the ability for radical or novel positions to be
advanced.
4. It is also, therefore, exclusionary, ruling out certain voices, ideas and
interventions (often as a by-product of its procedures and routines).
5. Power stifles and restricts agency. Organisational imperatives, once set in train,
take precedence over and overwhelm individual action.
The Fourth Dimension: Constitutive Power [CP]
While a certain kind of power closes off agency and constrains individuals, another is
constitutive of them. The fourth dimension of power directs attention towards the party
not at the level of agents or institutions, nor as a bureaucratic process, but rather as a
means by which a ‘dominant ideology’ is reproduced and reinforced.  This kind of
power operates as a ‘structural’ force that shapes and produces the sort of subjectivity
that is congenial to a certain project.  In this context, it affects the party activist’s sense
of him or herself as such.  This dimension draws on a particular aspect of Louis
Althusser’s work; in particular, On Ideology (Althusser 2008 [1971]), in which he
argues that ideology is not just about ideas but also concerns everyday material rituals
and practices.  Through these the status quo is reproduced because it is embedded in
familiar daily activities (this is an idea also taken up by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu
regarding the habits and gestures sedimented in a bodily ‘habitus’). Its characteristics
are as follows:
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1. Constitutive Power is immanent in conduct and patterns of behaviour in the
everyday material practices of party life, in which subjectivities – different kinds
of political actor – are constituted and the party structure is reproduced.
2. It is positive and constitutive.  It empowers individuals, endowing them with
skills and capacities to act within its scheme, reinforcing and reproducing the
party structure but also acting as a subtle form of control.
Rituals and practices, including the performance of roles and shared repertoires, have
ideology embedded in them which they reproduce at the level of everyday life in terms
of what is familiar, taken for granted and repeated.  Such rituals and repetitions are
ideological in the sense, too, of reproducing the status quo; like Bureaucratic Control,
this mode of power also therefore tends to privilege conservative forces by sedimenting
‘the way things are done’ beneath a level where they are reflected on or challenged.  As
far as I am aware, political parties have not previously been looked at from this
particular point of view; yet, as my analysis shows, this can be an important way in
which a party resists change and excludes mavericks.
The Fifth Dimension: Disciplinary Control [DC]
In the first four dimensions I have set out, power becomes increasingly pervasive yet
invisible.  It becomes gradually more anonymous and subtle as it moves away from
overt confrontation between specific actors and towards a constitutive kind of
empowerment.  Michel Foucault, however, offers a vision of power that, whilst having
some similarities with Althusser’s ideas and, I will argue, some overlap with Weber’s
too, operates quite differently from the other dimensions of power.  It is not a stable or
fixed property of any kind (whether of individuals, organisation or structure), or
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possessed according to institutional roles.  Instead, it should be understood as a kind of
‘strategic force’ that flows freely and tactically (in this respect it is not unlike
Machiavelli’s view of power as a continuous negotiation by diverse actors within a
complex and shifting field of forces). In works like Discipline and Punish (1977) and
Power/Knowledge (1980), power is construed as a complex field of forces where micro-
powers work directly to constitute bodies and subjectivities at the quotidian level.  It
emerges in day-to-day relations, in specific detailed practices, in often banal events and
routines.  Discipline for Foucault develops in an ad hoc way in response to
unpredictable exigencies, and operates in the minutiae of relations and behaviour in
ways that might not ordinarily be noticed as power. Strictly speaking, what is being
referred to here is not power as such, but power relations.  Its characteristics are as
follows:
1. Power produces disciplined actors who are effective and ‘empowered’ through
detailed techniques and strategies of control, where it develops some capacities
and dampens others.
2. Disciplinary strategies include the application of technical knowledge to
problems of organising resources of time, space and people, for example in the
coordination of a local election campaign.
3. The site and focus of power is the body and its conduct, which is trained and
surveyed at a micro-level and its gestures and appearance carefully articulated
and configured in accordance with the disciplinary strategies highlighted above.
4. Disciplinary power ‘normalises’ agents through surveillance, judgement,
ranking and classification; because actors believe they are visible all the time,
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they adjust their behaviour accordingly, meaning that discipline is conducted at
a detailed level by subjects themselves upon themselves.
Having summarised the five dimensions of power in my framework, I will look more
closely at how it should be used to research power in parties.  However, before doing
so, scholars of parties may be aware of some of the resonances aspects of the framework
have with varieties of ‘new institutionalism’.  Given that institutionalism is an approach
commonly applied to the study of parties and political institutions of all kinds, it is
important to briefly address these theories.
Institutionalism and Power
Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor point out that the three ‘new institutionalisms’,
especially the ‘historical’ and ‘sociological’ varieties (the third being ‘rational choice’
institutionalism), were (like Bachrach and Baratz’s and Lukes’ approaches to power)
developed to some extent in response to behaviouralism.  These independent but linked
theories were, and remain, a means of explaining in different ways institutions and their
relationship with behaviour and how institutions originate and change (Hall and Taylor
1996, 936).  All institutionalists, ‘see institutions as rules that structure behaviour’
(Steinmo 2008, 126) and this has echoes of power in it.  Indeed, they argue that ‘all
institutional studies have a direct bearing on power relations’ and can be said in some
way to be an attempt to explicate a multi-dimensional approach to power (Hall and
Taylor 1996, 940-1). The emphasis, for example, in historical institutionalism on the
effect of the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy, on the asymmetries of
power associated with institutions and the emphasis on path dependence that gives rise
to unintended consequences (Ibid., 938) echo concerns addressed by Strategic Power
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and Bureaucratic Control. Sociological institutionalism is more concerned with the role
institutions play in framing how people see the world.  According to this view,
institutions transmit cultural practices, informal symbols, and scripts through habitual
action (Steinmo 2008, 126-7).  This has strong resonances with Constitutive Power,
arguing that although people may be purposive or goal-oriented, rational action is itself
socially constituted (Hall and Taylor 1996, 947-9).
Teresa Kulawik has more recently proposed a further development which integrates
institutionalism and discursive analysis from a feminist viewpoint (Kulawik 2006, 263).
She takes the view that institutions are ‘constituted by discursive struggles and can be
understood as sedimented discourses’ (Ibid., 268).  They should not be understood as
structures imposed on political actors from without as much as ‘constructs internal to
actors which they change and create’ (Ibid., 268). In other words, an institution is a
process which actors perform and, in doing so produce identities.  It is a process that
demonstrates some similarities with Disciplinary Control since, according to Louise
Chappell, it is a highly gendered process which is dominated by a masculinist ‘logic of
appropriateness’ (Chappell 2006, 227) which shapes acceptable behavioural norms and
identities.
However, despite these important resonances and echoes, my dimensions of power are
performing a different task from these accounts of institutionalism.  Whilst they focus in
differing ways on rules and processes that explain the development of institutions and
their relationship to behaviour, my objective is to understand how power operates
within a context like a political party.  Whilst rules and processes are in some sense
constitutive of some of these dimensions of power (especially Strategic Power and
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Bureaucratic Control), they are of interest to this thesis for what they constitute rather
than for themselves.  Nonetheless, I acknowledge the importance that these approaches
can play in understanding political parties in general.
Using the Framework to Research Power: Strategies of Investigation
The five dimensions of power I have described comprise the framework of power I find
operative within political parties. The framework acts as a topographical map in which
power’s contours and terrain can be explored.  It provides a theoretical basis for tracing
the different dimensional attributes of power I have identified through exploration of the
party’s activities, rules, functions and practices.  The strategies with which I will
investigate each of these dimensions of power will differ because the assumptions
underlying a particular concept of power also dictate how that form of power is to be
identified and located. Power ranges from the relatively straightforward and visible to
the more obscured, and so the kinds of questions that need to be asked in order to
identify it vary too.
The first dimension of power is relatively simple to investigate. Individualistic Power
is associated with a behaviouralist approach that attempts to apply the observational
methods of natural science to social and political phenomena.  It requires the
identification of a key issue over which there is a clear conflict of interest.  From here,
the parties involved can be examined and the decision outcomes identified.   Power can
be attributed by asking who prevailed and what resources they used to do so. An
obvious example of this would be how leaders reward and punish through control of
patronage.
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The approach to uncovering Strategic Power, on the other hand, requires a deeper
analysis of decisions by accumulating a list of who participates in decisions both openly
and behind the scenes and by studying the rules-of-the-game and decision-making
processes themselves.  The purpose of this is to understand the prevailing mobilisation
of bias that is reflected in them (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, 47-48).  This clearly
involves more than simply taking decisions at, say, a party conference at face value.
The analyst needs to understand the formal and informal context in which decisions are
made.  Following that, there are three routes that may be followed: the first is to
identify conflicts or grievances that for one reason or another have been excluded or
hidden from official channels or public view; the second is to try and identify how
processes and rules have been used or altered either to deny all or some of those
grievances an airing or to engineer their defeat; a third looks to identify where covert
bargaining and negotiation have been used to prevent defeat or secure positions.  The
object here is to identify who has been put at a disadvantage and which voices fail to be
heard in public arenas. In other words, how is power perpetuated by the norms and
rules of decision-making and their manipulation? Examples include changing
procedures to exclude certain voices, or using rules like referencing back, and
compositing.
The investigation of Bureaucratic Control is associated with a Weberian organisational
analysis.  It means exploring a more impersonal, routinised power and adjusting the
focus of attention towards the exploration of key party procedures and how formal
rationality takes over the functions for which they were designed.  The kinds of
questions that will be helpful in guiding investigation include: how do key party
functions, such as discipline and policy-making, become proceduralised and
formalised?  How does this impact on the freedom to act and take properly political (as
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opposed to technical) decisions?  How do bureaucratic responses to problems impose
formally rational control and discipline?
The starting point for exploring Constitutive Power is the regular, repeated practices of
party life, such as regular party meetings, practices of accountability and policy-making.
These can all be described as rule-based and repetitive actions and structured rituals in
which ideology is embedded, and through which subjectivities are formed and
communicated. Analysis is concerned with how, through these rituals and practices,
certain social and political ideals are transmitted, and how they shape beliefs and
political subjectivities. This take on power is more abstract and associated with
ideological critique, being somewhat less amenable to empirical investigation than other
approaches.
Finally, to identify power as Disciplinary Control, the focus of analysis shifts again, this
time to the micro-level technical problems of political organisation.  Disciplinary power
is traced by examining the techniques and knowledges applied to everyday, often
mundane, problems.   What is their disciplinary effect; how do they create appropriately
empowered subjects?  It means examining how political actors are trained, surveyed and
examined down to very fine detail.  It includes things like how style of behaviour,
gestures, dress, performances, especially in terms of ethnicity and gender, are adjusted.
Thus individuals become ‘normalised’ and disciplined subjects of power. This focus
on detail requires a genealogical approach which eschews the idea of grand schemes or
motive forces and focuses on the mundane, yet myriad and complex points at which
power emerges.  Examples of where investigation should be focused include the
regulation of activity through timetables and monitoring, or guidance on how to present
oneself in public or on television.
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Additional Methodological Issues: Analysing Empirical Data
As I have already mentioned in setting out the core thesis, I am not only concerned with
advancing the theoretical claims, but with testing them. Following the development of
the initial five-dimensional framework, a second stage of my research was to collect and
analyse empirical data in order to test it (by data I do not mean a set or series of
quantitative items, but refer instead to a ‘body of experience’ (Holliday 2002, 69)). The
data has been gathered from three main sources: interviews, archival research, and
biographical and contemporary accounts. Conducting data analysis is a process of
making ‘sense’ of this body of experience: for example, by organising and sifting
interview transcripts and notes and allowing common themes and patterns to emerge
from the data, but also by examining the sub-texts of interviews through the
interpretation of actions and performances, events, asides in interviews and so on.  By
use of coding techniques (Ryan and Bernard 2003), themes derived from the interviews
were drawn together and used to elicit and interpret common experiences of power
among activists and also among party elites.  This approach is thus used as a kind of
heuristic with which to enhance and strengthen the theoretical framework.  The data
gathered from these sources has also provided me with material and evidence to support
and illustrate my theoretical claims.
Approach to Interviews
My approach to interviews lies between what Silverman (2001) calls an ‘emotionalist’
and a ‘constructionist’ one.  That is, I accept that an interview is a unique situation in
which a narrative and its meaning are constructed between interviewer and interviewee,
whilst at the same time arguing that the experiences of the interviewee have meaning for
him or her and require understanding and interpretation by the interviewer.  In short, it
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is a process in which questions are framed (consciously or otherwise) and in which
answers are constructed around the narrative of the respondent, but within an overall
framework set by the interviewer. In this context, it is the experience and the
respondent’s memory of it that I wish to examine. Two main types of interviews were
carried out with two sets of subjects:
1. Extensive, detailed interviews with ten former party activists (of whom I initially
knew very little).  With these subjects, I conducted semi-structured interviews
centred on general themes, which were designed to elicit stories of their
experiences of party life. Where I did have some biographical information I
prompted them.  Interviews were recorded and transcribed.
2. Shorter, more focused interviews with ten MPs or former MPs and three party
officials of whom I had a great deal more advance knowledge.  These interviews
were also semi-structured but focused around specific events they were or may
have been witness to. Interviews were not recorded but extensive detailed notes
were taken.
The purpose of the interviews was to explore and test the five dimensions of power in
my theoretical framework (as detailed in the grid below), thus the basic interview
schedule [see Appendices] was built around these themes. I wanted to find out how
effective it is to approach political parties from the perspective of these five interlocking
modes of power by using them to identify the workings of power within the Labour
Party. The first and second types of power, as I have suggested, are reasonably
straightforward to identify in this way.  The other three dimensions, however, do not so
easily lend themselves to identification by such methods, at least not directly.  The
object here, then, was to look for clues and patterns that are then subjected to
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interpretive work rather than any ‘hard evidence’.  In any case, the purpose of the
interviews was not to produce ‘scientific’ evidence to prove or refute a conjecture, so
much as to locate and identify empirical information that can shed further light on the
theory of power in political parties that I have advanced. Thus a central function of the
analysis of the interview data was the interpretation of experience in the light of my
framework of power.
Interview subjects were not asked directly about power, since I wanted to avoid
standard narratives about the concept.  I also wanted as far as possible to circumvent the
dangers associated with framing questions, and therefore their answers, in those
particular terms.  Themes and evidence about the exercise and operation of power
would emerge from interviewees’ own interpretation of situations, the stories they told,
the experiences they recounted and opinions they expressed. For ease of identification,
the quotation of interview material is indicated in the text by the use of italics.
Structure of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is divided into seven chapters.  In the first, I conduct a review of
some of the key literature on political parties.  The purpose of this is not to cover
everything ever written on the subject.  Such an undertaking would be impossible.
Instead, I review some of the most influential texts on political parties using the five-
dimensional framework of power I have set out in this introductory chapter; in so doing
I draw out the key assumptions made about power in the literature and identify short-
comings and lacunae in it. As well as establishing what the literature actually says, or at
least implies, about power, I also draw attention to what it does not say.  This then sets
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the scene for the following five chapters, each of which is dedicated to one of the
dimensions of power in the framework.
In each chapter, beginning with Individualistic Power, I conduct four tasks.  Firstly, to
discuss the key attributes or ingredients of that particular dimension (its component
parts if you will) and where I have derived them from (it is important to be aware of the
distinction between ontological and methodological concerns here) and highlight what
is particularly important and useful in it as far as this thesis is concerned.  Secondly, I
examine more closely how it actually works: in what locations and functions of parties
can it be identified; in what scenarios and situations?   In answering these questions I
also identify what further kinds of questions should be asked when seeking to identify
the dimension of power in question, and point to work in which it may explicitly or
implicitly have been used before.  Thirdly, I test the dimension’s explanatory scope by
providing examples of it in operation. For each case I set out a brief description and
then apply each of the key attributes as succinctly as possible.  Then a brief analysis is
conducted of its strengths and weaknesses as part of the framework of power, in other
words, what it can do and cannot do. Finally, I will draw some interim conclusions and
demonstrate how the aims of the chapter have been achieved. In the final, concluding
chapter I demonstrate how I have achieved what I have set out to do and reflect back on
my overall approach, its strengths and weaknesses. The main task of this chapter,
however, is to demonstrate in detail how the framework supports the thesis, how it
meets the shortcomings and gaps identified in the review and its implications for wider
debates about power in parties and other contexts.
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One: Power in the Party Literature
I have proposed that power should be understood in the context of party organisation as
operating in five different ‘dimensions’ which I set out in the previous chapter and in
the tabular representation of the framework [Table 0.1].  This framework can be used as
a ‘map’ with which to navigate the argument that runs through this thesis: that power is
a multi-dimensional concept that operates and is exercised in different ways and
different levels at the same time.  Power may be individualistic, a property of individual
agents deployed in the pursuit of individual interests [Individualistic Power]; it may be
mediated through rules and norms which are subject to strategic manipulation and
control by powerful actors [Strategic Power]; it is an inherent property of the
anonymous functioning of organisation that disciplines, excludes and controls
[Bureaucratic Control]; it is constitutive, shaping and producing subjectivity through
day-to-day rituals and practices [Constitutive Power]; it disciplines and controls bodies
at a microscopic level of  detail [Disciplinary Control].  I have also argued that this
framework is necessary because power as it is understood in the context of the political
party literature is under-theorised.  It is incumbent upon me to demonstrate this last
claim, and this is the key task of this chapter.
Overview
This chapter consists of an analysis of the key theoretical texts on parties. They have
been selected on the basis of their influence on the study of political parties as
organisations.  Political scientists will therefore recognise the selection as something of
a ‘roll-call’ of seminal texts on parties, which have ‘had a profound impact on how
political scientists talk about these institutions’ (Ware 1996, 8).  Some that scholars
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might expect to see in such a roll-call, like Kirchheimer (1966) and Sartori (1976) are
not included here because my specific concern is with those studies that have
particularly useful things to say about the way in which parties are organised. My
choice of literature is also guided in part by which contributions include decisive or
distinctive approaches (both implicit and explicit) to the specific issue of how power
operates within parties.  Five authors in particular concern me here: the first is Robert
Michels (1962 [1915]), whose study of the oligarchal tendencies of party organisation
has never quite lost its significance to the academic study of parties; the second,
Maurice Duverger (1959), whose fleshing out of the ‘mass party’ as an ideal-type is
now almost mythical, spawned a still-ongoing project charting the development of party
organisational types; the third, Angelo Panebianco (1988), developed a detailed model
of a new type of party appearing in the late twentieth century which he dubbed the
‘electoral-professional party’; the fourth (and in fact a pair), Katz and Mair (1995) have
argued that the progression of party types has reached a new apogee with the
appearance of the ‘cartel party’, elitist and dislocated from grass-roots activists and the
population at large.  These first four authors are all especially significant because they
are amongst the main texts that are cited and used to structure and frame the study of
party organisation in many detailed empirical studies (see, for example, Scarrow 1996,
Chapter 1; Wolinetz 1998; Luther and Müller-Rommel 2002, 6; Montero and Gunther
2002; Hloušek and Kopeček 2010) to introductory texts for students (such as Webb
2000a, 152-154; Heffernan 2003, 125-134; Budge et al 2007, 373; Driver 2011, Chapter
2).
The fifth author on my list, von Beyme (1985), is most famous for his classification of
parties into different Familles Spirituelles or ideological types.  However, he also has
distinctive things to say about party organisation and in particular about the role, loyalty
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and discipline of members (von Beyme 1985, Chapter Three).  In conjunction with the
specific literature on party discipline, which addresses some similar concerns, this fills a
gap in which reasons why voluntary members are willing to subordinate themselves to
party discipline are addressed.
These five key authors have been chosen for three overlapping reasons: firstly, because
of the great influence they have had (and still have) over research on parties and party
organisation; secondly, because they are texts that have become a part of the
‘firmament’ that are often paid respect but rarely subject to close scrutiny, so they merit
some re-examination; thirdly, because they are all texts that have become famous for
one particular line of argument (e.g. the proposal of a certain party type), but they have
been neglected for what else they might contribute to the understanding of parties. In
different ways, they each say something directly or indirectly about how power operates
in parties and this is where my particular focus will be, rather than what they say about
party typology or development as such.  My analysis reveals that each takes a more or
less explicit understanding of power which I elicit and reflect upon below.  But it also
shows that each of these accounts of political parties is deficient in foregrounding some
(and often just one) modes of power while neglecting others.  A lot of this literature,
explicitly or implicitly, applies political theory from elsewhere to parties, including elite
theory, rational choice and cultural theories, for example. Part of my task here is to
shed light on this through the lens of my five-dimensional framework of power, and test
the validity of these theories as a means of exploring power in political parties.
The chapter deals with each on a broadly chronological basis.  I begin with Michels,
who wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century, because his is a foundational text
in the study of political parties.  I then consider Duverger, Panebianco and Katz and
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Mair in that order because they represent the trajectory of the orthodox evolutionary
approach to party organisational development (Koole 1996, 519).  I deal with von
Beyme outside of this chronology however because he is not normally included in this
‘progression’ of party types and I examine his work in conjunction with a specialist
(and mostly quite recent) literature on party discipline. Von Beyme raises particular
issues about power in relation to party loyalty and how it operates in different
dimensions at different levels of the party which is reflected in this specific literature.
As I discuss each text, I draw out the main assumptions and assertions about power
underlying them, and then analyse them in the light of my framework of power.  I will
argue that, although there are a range of helpful lessons that can be drawn about power
from these texts, the concept of power in the context of political parties remains
theoretically under-developed in its own right. This can be remedied by the application
of the multi-dimensional framework I have proposed.  Applying this framework to a
real-world case, drawn from original research, will provide a unique perspective on the
exercise of power in political parties in all its complexity.
Michels and the Iron Law of Oligarchy
One of the most influential theorists of political parties has been, and remains, Robert
Michels.  His book, Political Parties was first published in 1911 (and in English in
1915) and his theory of the Iron Law of Oligarchy still resonates strongly today.
Michels was strongly influenced by Max Weber and the classical elite theory of
Gaetano Mosca (whom he encountered in Turin) and Vilfredo Pareto.  These three
intellectual associations encouraged his interest in political elites and underlined a
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growing disenchantment with his syndicalist beliefs, which informed his most important
piece of work.
In this work, Political Parties (1962 [1915]), Michels recognised the emancipatory
potential of organisation.  Democracy and liberation is, he argues, impossible without it.
If a democratic political party is to achieve its aims, it must be successful in winning
power and maintaining it.  This is unlikely without efficient organisation: indeed,
Michels argued that it is absolutely necessary; it is ‘the weapon of the weak in their
struggle with the strong’ (Michels 1962 [1915], 61) and ‘an absolutely essential
condition for the political struggle of the masses’ (Ibid, 62).  It is also inevitable, he
said: the sheer number of tasks involved in running a successful democratic political
party necessarily entails a strong bureaucracy.  However, at the same time, the tragic
logic of organisation is that it is the means by which the perpetual subjugation of the
weak is guaranteed.  Power ‘is always conservative’ Michels argued (Ibid., 333), and
the product of organisation is always an elite, an oligarchy, concerned only with the
perpetuation of its own position.  For Michels, this was not a product of individual
ambition, but structural. Oligarchy was a tendency inherent in organisation itself, rather
than a product of who controls or originates it. Organisation is ‘the source from which
the conservative currents flow over the plain of democracy’ (Ibid., 62); power in
organisational terms ‘proceeds in a natural cycle: issuing from the people, it ends by
raising itself above the people’ (Ibid., 75).  For Michels, the fact that this tendency
towards oligarchy has a hold over even the most democratic or radical political parties
gives it the status of an ‘Iron Law’, because
the appearance of oligarchal phenomena in the very bosom of the
revolutionary parties is a conclusive proof of the existence of
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immanent oligarchal tendencies in every kind of human organisation
which strives for the attainment of definite ends (Michels 1962 [1915],
50).
The key determinants underlying this process are, according to Michels, to be found in
the interaction of the five elements inherent in the pursuit of power in democracies.
Firstly, the mass party needs to develop a wide base of popular support which lends it
legitimacy and sources of finance.  This is particularly crucial, Michels recognised, for
emancipatory and radical parties (like early socialist parties) since it is less likely (and
perhaps less desirable) that they would benefit from access to wealthy patronage.
Secondly, to play the game of democratic politics, the political party needs to be ‘a
fighting organisation … and must as such conform to the laws of tactics’ (Ibid., 78).
Consulting the rank and file over every question would be too slow and cumbersome
process: a fighting organisation needs a hierarchical structure in order that it can
respond speedily to the ‘problems of the hour’.  Democracy, Michels argues, is ‘utterly
incompatible with strategic promptness’ (Ibid., 79). Thirdly, the party organisation is
concerned with the goal of controlling of government, an even larger bureaucratic
machine: to do so it needs to ‘secure a sufficiently vast and solid organisation in order
to triumph over the organisation of the state’ (Ibid., 335).  The party therefore needs to
strengthen and extend its position and bureaucratic organisation. Fourthly, efficient
administration requires the professionalisation and technical specialisation of roles.  A
bureaucratic division of labour means party experts have access to knowledge the rank
and file find hard to challenge, and, through training, develop skills ordinary members
do not have.   As the party organisation grows and takes on more functions, rank and
file members have to cede ever more authority to trained, salaried officials who have the
requisite skills and capacities to give the job their full attention. Fifthly, in order control
45
and direct the growing bureaucracy, a (strong) professional leadership appointed by the
membership of the party is needed.  Though democratic in intent, the appearance of
professional, specialist leadership at the head of a large bureaucratic political party is
‘the beginning of the end’ for democracy (Ibid., 73).  It sets in train a dislocation
between the directing minority and the ordinary member.  The former becomes
‘indispensable’ (Ibid., 109-111) which begins to undermine the democratic control by
the latter.  Inequalities of power therefore grow between those at the top and the rest.
Michels' analysis, therefore, was that for mass parties of the working class, the
development of bureaucratic organisation went hand-in-glove with the pursuit and the
maintenance of power.  At the same time, he argued, the very pursuit of its goals by
such means makes it unlikely that its emancipatory purpose will ever be achieved
because the dominance of an oligarchy is an inevitable outcome of the structural logic
of organisation.  The appearance of a professional, technocratic (and therefore
increasingly middle-class) leadership elite at the head of a large bureaucracy means that
the party becomes ever more remote from the concerns of working people: their chief
concern becomes the defence and perpetuation of their own position in the party and
elevation to government. The party bureaucrats meanwhile, as professionals
themselves, are (like the leaders) dependent upon the party machine for their living.
They are thus quite naturally inclined to be loyal to the organisation itself and its
leadership rather than those it was meant to serve.  Thus they become more interested in
maintaining the status quo than in providing radical alternatives.  The inherent
conservatism that is produced by this process undermines freedom and radicalism and
‘mechanism becomes an end in itself’ (Ibid., 190).  Bureaucracy thus reinforces the
power of leaders at the expense of the rank-and-file (and the wider population): a
process which is ‘directly proportional with the extension of the organisation’ (Ibid.,
46
71).  This is why for Michels bureaucracy ‘is the sworn enemy of individual liberty, and
of all bold initiative in matters of internal policy’ (Ibid., 191).
The Importance of Michels and Criticisms
Michels’ theory, as I have mentioned above, is a foundational text on political parties
and has been extremely influential in the century since it has been written.  In his
introduction to the Free Press edition, Seymour Lipset described it as ‘one of the
twentieth century’s most influential books … a classic of Social Science’ (Lipset 1962,
20).  The Iron Law of Oligarchy ‘has been absorbed by modern social science, even
distinguished as a classic contribution, and it requires no detailed elaboration’ (Scaff
1981, 1280).  Indeed, it is not hard to find works on political parties that refer to the
importance of Michels’ arguments (see for example: Duverger 1959; Sartori 1976, 71;
Minkin 1978, 4-5; Panebianco 1988; Shaw 1988; Scarrow 1996; Wolinetz 1988, 6;
Müller and Strøm 1999), and there are others on which his ideas have been influential
without explicit acknowledgement.  At the very least it is regarded as a necessary text to
engage with, even when its claims are treated with scepticism, as they often have been.
Hands (1971), for example, has criticised Michels strongly for failing adequately to
define fundamental terms like ‘democracy’, ‘oligarchy’ and ‘organisation’ or use them
in a consistent manner. However, Michels understanding of ‘democracy’ was strongly
influenced by his syndicalist beliefs at the time rather than liberalism, and his criticism
of the German Social Democratic Party arose from scepticism as to its commitment to a
socialist (and in particular syndicalist) transformation (Hands 1971, 169).  Medding
(1970) criticised his work for ignoring ‘significant and fundamental counter-tendencies’
in organisations which placed limitations on the power of leaders (Medding 1970, 1-2)
which Michels seems not to recognise, something which even his most celebrated
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adherents do not fully concur with.  Robert McKenzie (1955), for example, in his
famous study British Political Parties, argued that although ‘there is ample evidence’ of
the oligarchal tendencies of party organisation, it is ‘certainly not an “iron” law’: parties
may be content to be led, but leaders ‘must carry their followers’ and thus ‘take into
account the clearly defined currents of opinion within their party’ (McKenzie 1955,
587).  Kavanagh (1998) has made a similar argument suggesting that organisation does
not inevitably move in one direction.  In the years following McKenzie’s observations
that both Labour and Conservatives displayed similar oligarchal tendencies, Kavanagh
argued that for Labour in the 1970s and 80s and the Conservatives in the 1990s, the
trend reversed and the parties if anything became less oligarchal in these periods,
although the Labour Party moved back in an elitist direction after 1983 in the search for
votes (Kavanagh 1998, 29-30, 35).
Analysis
Despite the criticisms and caveats, Michels work remains an important one and
therefore it is valuable to consider more directly his underlying understanding of power.
For Michels power is structural: it has its own logic and it is elitist.  He argues that even
when intentions are democratic, the structural logic of organisation drives it towards
oligarchy.  In this respect his ideas clearly share common ground with Max Weber’s.
Indeed, not only does Michels’ theory fit ‘within the framework of Weberian social
science’ (Scaff 1981, 1274), the idea for the study was initially suggested by Weber
(Ibid., 1274).  Weber himself argued that parties are always oriented towards the
acquisition of power (Weber 1948 [CSP], 194-5), and since in modern rational societies
this means control of the bureaucracy, parties seeking to dominate the state, must also
be bureaucratic organisations. Furthermore, parties in mass-franchise democratic
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systems by necessity must organise on a grand scale in the pursuit of electoral victory
(Weber 1948 [PV], 102). The political party is thus a locus of organised domination
which ‘calls for continuous administration [and] requires that human conduct be
conditioned to obedience towards those masters who claim to be the bearers of
legitimate power’ (Ibid., 80). Even in democratic systems, then, parties are often
organised in authoritarian fashion (Weber 1948 [CSP], 194-5). Scaff argues that Weber
saw this as a more positive development than Michels did, since it facilitated the
integration of socialist parties in particular into the established system of government.
But Michels took a more ‘ethical’ approach to Weber’s ‘scientific’ sociology (Scaff
1981, 1270): where Weber was concerned with tracing the conditions of legitimate
domination, Michels was specifically troubled by what he saw as the diminishing
prospects for democracy and socialist transformation.
That aside, there is a common understanding of power between Weber and Michels
which has some relevance for my thesis.  There are assumptions about power in
Michels’ work that clearly resembles Bureaucratic Control in that the substantively
rational goals of parties (e.g. the emancipation of the working class) become
overwhelmed in the very pursuit of them.  Bureaucratic organisation grows in response
to the need to organise campaigns and prepare for government.  As it grows, the logic of
organisation becomes increasingly powerful; constraining and disciplining political
actors, particularly the rank-and-file, whilst by-passing or excluding others from the
political process altogether. But although this is an important part of Michels’ thesis, he
focuses less on the controlling power that bureaucratic logic exerts over individuals,
than on the distance it engenders between technically and socially superior leaders and
bureaucrats on the one hand, and rank-and-file members on the other.  Members are left,
quite simply, with no power at all.  They appear to have been cut adrift.  This poses a
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question: why do they put up with it?   Parties are, after all, voluntary organisations and
no one is compelled to remain a member.  It may be that they want socialism to win and
are prepared to submit to the logic of organisation in order to ensure it.  However, in my
view, this is where Michels’ argument is weakest.  He attributes the willing subjection
of party members to such a regime to a ‘need’ for direction and guidance (Michels 1962
[1915], 88), a ‘gratitude’ for the sacrifice and service of leaders (Ibid., 92), and even a
‘cult of veneration’ for leadership on the part of the masses that borders on worship
(Michels 1962 [1915], 93-6).  Whilst this reflects Michels’ status as an elite theorist
alongside others like Mosca and Pareto, Scaff quite rightly dismisses such assertions as
‘crude psychological reductionism’ (Scaff 1981, 1280), of a kind that Weber would
certainly never endorse.  It is profoundly unsatisfactory and reveals a hole at the centre
of Michels’ assumptions about power.  It shows that although he understands
organisational power, he does not properly address complicity to it. The framework I
have set out addresses and plugs that gap.
Duverger and the ‘Intensification’ of Power
Duverger’s work Political Parties (1959) is another highly influential text in the study
of political parties. This work is another that has been fully absorbed into the
discipline: his characterisation of the mass party is the foundation on which many
schemata of parties (Wolinetz 2002, 139-40), studies of party change (Harmel 2002,
119), and analyses of their rise and decline (Scarrow 2000) have been built.  Indeed,
Scarrow has argued that his work has become such a powerful mythology that it has
obstructed a proper empirical analysis of parties (Ibid., 92-99).
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Of more interest to me, however, is what Duverger has to say about power. Duverger
broadly agrees with Michels’ analysis that the growth of organisational power in parties
is a rational outcome of democratic politics, and that the result is oligarchy.  However,
he produces a more sophisticated response to the question of why members appear to
willingly subject themselves to this power.   There are two main reasons that can be
drawn from his discussion of the growth of power in parties (Duverger 1959 169-177):
the first of these is a cultural explanation; the second is due to what he describes as a
more subtle intensification of power that comes with the growth of the organisation.
1. Cultural Explanations of Power
Duverger argues that the first mass parties were working class and socialist parties and
the working class are ‘by their very nature given to communal institutions and
discipline’ (Ibid., 170).  Indeed, he continues, in working-class culture the distinction
between freedom and discipline has become meaningless because freedom has been a
collective conquest.  As far as Duverger is concerned, ‘no serious social reform took
place until the proletariat discovered the weapon of its liberation: common action’
(Ibid., 170).  Numbers are important because it is numbers that make discipline a
necessary feature of mass political parties but, writes Duverger, ‘the masses have been
liberated not by numbers but by discipline’ (Ibid., 170; emphasis added) which has,
according to Duverger, its origins in a ‘natural tendency’ and ‘mental attitude’ (Ibid.,
171).
This is problematic because it ascribes an essential characteristic to the working classes
which, while not exactly accidental, seems more likely to be an outcome of necessity.
One may choose to accept Duverger’s argument that disciplined behaviour was part of
working class culture, but his implication that it is an innate quality ignores the
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argument that the only power the working class had in early twentieth-century Europe
was numbers and organisation and thus it was a practical and rational response to
inequality in a system which granted them few rights and no voice as a class. Indeed,
he argues that organisation is ‘contagious’ and spreads to the middle class parties too
(Ibid., 25) in response to the superior organisation of the working class parties,
suggesting a certain amount expediency rather than innate class characteristics.
2.  Organisational Growth and the Intensification of Power
A more promising explanation from the point of view of this thesis comes from another
line of Duverger’s argument: that power in political parties intensifies as the
organisation grows and develops.  This argument stresses the mechanical or technical
reasons for power’s growth, which is more closely aligned with Michels.  The creation
of socialist parties saw a strengthening of disciplinary power because there were large
numbers of people to be organised.  Furthermore, the ‘intensity of power is necessarily
proportional to the number of those who are subject to it’ (Ibid., 170). Duverger argues
that the problem of power as such does not arise in small groups, but it becomes vital in
mass parties. Of course, the power of leaders in large organisations is strengthened
through techniques of persuasion (e.g. appeals to unity) or coercion, including the use of
quasi-judicial mechanisms (i.e. disciplinary committees) and coherent systems of
sanctions (Ibid., 173-4). Bureaucratic responses to potential resistance, such as the
establishment of new rules and structures, are also a means by which leaders might
deploy the logic of organisation to obtain obedience.
However, as political parties grow and become mass organisations, Duverger argues
that power intensifies even further than Michels envisaged (Ibid., 169):
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ultimate perfection is achieved and the authority of leaders finds its
most certain foundation when obedience becomes automatic: this
anaesthesia of discipline supposes a very developed technique of
contact with the masses.  By a series of perpetual actions and
reactions, closely intermingled, the centre knows in detail the positions
and influences at the base and at the same time modifies its tactics
accordingly (Ibid., 176).
As a result, it becomes hard to discern any obvious division of command and control.
There is, rather, a dialectic of listening and speaking, one building on and reinforcing
the other.  The party adapts subtly to the people, adapting to their language and modes
of thought.  In the end
[o]ne cannot really say either that the centre follows the base or that
the base follows the centre.  Party leadership listens to the masses and
speaks to them at the same time, its speech being modelled perpetually
on what it hears (Ibid., 176).
According to Duverger, then, while the party is telling its members what they want to
hear, at the same time it is subtly shaping their response.  This is a very effective means
of exercising power because it is barely noticed by those subject to it. Eventually, they
can no longer distinguish between their own thoughts and the party’s voice; the more
this is the case, the less they are likely to resist it:
Thus it proceeds by light touches, by infinitely supple pressure: but the
less its influence gives offence to those who are subjected to it, and the
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better it corresponds to their thought, the more profound and lasting it
is (Ibid., 176).
The masses are thus effectively implicated in their own subjection without really being
aware of it.  Obedience becomes automatic because it is embedded in the desires and
behaviour of the members, where it is fostered by a more subtle, integrated relationship
between them, the organisation and leaders than analyses of structural bureaucratic
logics had recognised:
Without being aware of it the mass is thus slowly orientated, directed,
and transformed.  Its attitude derives less from itself, from its own
spontaneity, but from the initiative of the leaders: it still thinks it has
freedom of choice, whereas it is more and more obedient.  It can no
longer distinguish between what is its own and what is whispered to it.
Progressively there is more and more whispering but the mass is less
and less conscious of it (Ibid., 176-177).
Analysis
In the passage quoted above, Duverger seems to point towards a more subtle form of
power which is directed towards the obedience of party members.  It is more
satisfactory than both Michels’ suggestion that followers follow because they are
‘incompetent’ or ‘weak’, and Duverger’s argument that innate cultural characteristics
make one class more likely to be ‘obedient’ than another.    Firstly, what he describes is
a process: one that moulds and shapes subjectivities. Secondly, it is continuous: it is not
an episodic series of commands by leaders to which members respond, but is more akin
to an ongoing ‘state-of-affairs’.  Thirdly, although it is hierarchical (the mass is being
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directed by leadership initiative), it is not unidirectional: there is an element of
reciprocation, or a back-and-forth between the ‘centre’ and the ‘base’ in which the
former subtly adapts itself to the latter even as it influences and redirects it.  Fourthly, it
is incredibly subtle: the subjects of this power are no longer aware of being so.  Rather
than subject to command or repression, individuals have been moulded and shaped to
the point where their desires and interests correspond with those of party elites.  In such
a way they willingly accept their own subjugation.
In summary, what can be elicited from Duverger’s account is a view of power as akin to
a mode of socialisation working through the organisation.  If power grows in intensity it
is because it has become less discernible and therefore less amenable to resistance. This
introduces a new dimension of power to the analysis.  Duverger’s conceptualisation
shares much common ground with Constitutive Power in that it constitutes subjectivities
through everyday organisational practice.  In this sense, it may even be conceived as
something that empowers members by imbuing them with skills and capacities that the
party needs.  But the continuous action and reaction that Duverger refers to also points
to the anonymous routine functioning characteristic of Bureaucratic Control, albeit with
a more constitutive effect.  It is a first indication of the value of a multi-dimensional
approach to power.  Rather than rejecting one explanation for another, the framework
can be used to account for the different dimensions of power in play at any one time.
Panebianco and ‘Unequal Exchange’
Panebianco draws attention to the conspicuous lack of a ‘serious definition of power’ in
the literature on political parties, specifically organisational power (Panebianco 1988,
21).  The failure adequately to define the concept creates what he sees as unnecessary
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divisions between scholars about the nature of power.  On the one hand, there are those
who regard power as a property, possessed and exerted over followers by manipulative
leaders (e.g. through plebiscites).  These, he says, are supporters of Michels’ ‘iron law’
thesis.  On the other hand, there are those who regard it more as a relation of influence,
characterised by reciprocity and agreement between leaders and followers on political
strategy (Ibid., 21).   The often implicit adoption of one or other of these definitions
means that one of these ‘dimensions of power which coexist in every party’ is
accentuated at the expense of the other (Ibid., 21-22 – my emphasis).  He argues instead
for ‘an alternative definition of organisational power, one which can account for
phenomena which are apparently contradictory’ (Ibid., 22).
Rather than seeing these as two mutually exclusive approaches to power, Panebianco
argues that power needs to be understood as both a property of elites and a relation of
influence between them and the party membership: it is ‘relational, asymmetrical, but
also reciprocal’.  In other words it is an ‘unequal exchange relation’ (Ibid., 22), in
which leaders seek freedom of action and followers or members seek certain
‘organisational incentives’ (which may be collective incentives related to feelings of
solidarity and identification with party goals, or may be selective incentives of status
and material gain).  In this relation, the power of leaders is ‘never absolute’ because it is
limited by the interactions with followers necessary to its exercise, nor is it arbitrary: it
can only be carried through ‘by satisfying … needs and expectations’ of members
thereby paradoxically submitting leaders to the power of followers.  Thus, although ‘the
leader gets more than the followers … [he] must nonetheless give something in return’
(Ibid., 22).  But the actual outcome of these exchanges depends on resources, based on
control over ‘zones of organisational uncertainty’ and it is leaders that tend to control
‘the crucial zones of uncertainty for the organisation, and can capitalise on these
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resources in internal negotiations’ (Ibid., 22).  In sum, everyone controls at least a small
zone of uncertainty, and in this sense a leader’s power is limited.  But it is the leaders
that are invariably at an advantage in terms of the areas they control, and power is
therefore unequal.
But, Panebianco continues, power games are not only played out ‘vertically’, i.e.
between leaders and followers. The main benefit leaders seek in ‘vertical’ power
games with members is freedom of action and movement.  The purpose of this is that it
provides them with advantages in the ‘horizontal’ power games between leaders
themselves.  The greater freedom won in the former, ‘the greater their invulnerability to
attacks made by internal adversaries’ (Ibid., 23), thereby enhancing the security of their
position as leaders.  This underlines the fact that, for Panebianco, elites compete with
each other too and they need the support and co-operation of members in order to
maintain status.  For this reason, oligarchy is tempered and the power of leaders in some
sense is limited.
Analysis
At the heart of Panebianco’s argument is a claim that a political party is a complex
organisation that contains and accounts for different motivations, strategies, tactics,
values and people.  He is critical of Michels, but this criticism is only one of degree,
because Michels does not take into account any limit to the power of leaders: his ‘thesis
on the power relations within the SPD of his epoch is merely exaggerated, not mistaken’
he argues (Ibid., 31).  There is, he says, a continuum between leader domination and
reciprocal influence which means that two modes of power are existent in the party at
one and the same time.  Mapping Panebianco’s understanding of organisational power
onto my theoretical framework highlights two dimensions of power, Strategic and
57
Individualistic, in operation too.  These also act as a brake on a third, Bureaucratic
Control, which is an ever-present threat.
To elaborate, if the unequal exchange relation in ‘vertical’ power relations is regarded
as being the result of a structural inequality, this may have arisen from an underlying
Bureaucratic Control which supports the domination of elites.  However, for Panebianco
Bureaucratic Control is tempered by a direct relation of power between leaders and
followers, in which the latter can extract incentives from the former.  This therefore
suggests a level of Individualistic Power, in which, although leaders control more
powerful resources, members are not at a total disadvantage and do have control over
certain resources (or ‘zones of uncertainty’) of their own which they can deploy to
secure their own interests over those of leaders (thereby providing a check on the latter).
However, this means a way needs to be found to describe the particular kinds of
resources leaders control and the way in which they deploy them to their own
advantage.  The exchange relation between the two is unequal because of the advantage
that leaders have in controlling the most crucial zones of uncertainty.   Another way of
looking at this is by recognising that leaders are more likely to be in a position to shape
the context in which decisions are made and secure control over the agenda.  In other
words they deploy Strategic Power against members.  However, the wise leader will use
such powers carefully.  The leader that provides followers with incentives from which
they can benefit in some way will a) ensure that his or her position is maintained
through support of the membership or a substantial enough proportion of it; and b)
procure support on which he or she can call in horizontal power games with other
leaders.  The horizontal power games between leaders are conducted from a position of
greater equality and may be more reasonably understood as being primarily
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Individualistic Power.  Leaders can, from this point of view, gain advantage over each
other by possessing superior resources in terms of followers.
Panebianco, therefore, starts to point towards a more multi-dimensional view of power,
although this is not fully realised.  To his credit, he does not regard power in parties as a
fixed entity, a frozen set of relations or hierarchy.  He sees it instead as a changing and
evolving resource, where different elements and combinations of the power of leaders
and members may be in play at any particular time.  This is a welcome advance.
Ultimately, however, Panebianco does not take it far enough.  Although his scheme
provides for a dynamic relationship between leaders and members, he does not consider
what other dimensions of power might be in operation.  Power for him is a continuum
between an individualistic dimension and oligarchy, but what of the detailed, shifting
and complex dynamics internal to the organisation?  What about power’s constitutive
side?  These are dimensions of power that he does not consider.
Katz and Mair: Elites and Cartels
Panebianco’s more sophisticated approach to power in parties appears at first glance to
be echoed in Mair (1994) and Katz and Mair’s (1995; 2002) work on the ‘Cartel Party’.
According to this view, as they are able to avail themselves of more state resources to
secure their position (e.g. state subventions and regulation), party elites form ‘cartels’
with those of other dominant parliamentary parties, colluding to maintain their mutual
interests in proximity to power.  Thus they become interpenetrated with the state.  What
Katz and Mair seem to be pointing to, in essence, is the weakening of the party as an
organisation altogether.  Rather than an organised entity separate from the state that
seeks to dominate it, the party becomes absorbed into it.  This might be seen as
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something of a return to the old fashioned cadre parties before universal suffrage which
were simply semi-organised factions of a single ruling elite (Duverger 1959, 21-22).
However, they are not exactly the same since parties need to maintain some form of
organisation on the ground.
As established political parties have got closer to the state itself and even become
absorbed by it, their internal power relations have been altered.  They argue that these
parties undergo an apparently contradictory development of both centralisation and
democratisation. This development represents a kind of trade-off between leaders and
members: in return for ceding power over policy and the direction of leaders, members
are granted greater influence in other areas, like the selection of candidates (Mair 1994,
12-15). This results in what Katz and Mair refer to as a ‘stratarchy’ in which local and
national organisations effectively allow each other a free hand in their respective areas
of responsibility (Mair 1994, 18; Katz and Mair 1995, 21).  Webb (2000) provides some
support for this argument, suggesting that constitutional changes in the British Labour
Party for example
have almost certainly not been designed to enhance the power of
individual members in making policy, though they have clearly
boosted the membership’s role in choosing candidates and leaders
(Webb 2000, 201).
This ‘ostensibly paradoxical’ situation (Mair 1994, 16) in which democratisation ‘on
paper’ is co-existent with powerful elite influence in practice (Ibid., 17) looks quite
similar to the argument advanced by Panebianco that conceding some power to
followers is a condition of maintaining leadership positions.  This argument has, again,
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found some support in the research.  For example, Scarrow, Webb and Farrell (2000)
have argued that
it is reasonable to conclude that there are now many instances in the
democratic world where party leaders operate a coalition of power in
which grass-roots members are significant junior partners (Scarrow,
Webb and Farrell 2000, 149).
However, the process that Katz and Mair describe also seems to mean that the two parts
of the party are becoming increasingly autonomous from one another: the leadership
moves closer to and becomes enmeshed with the power structures of the state itself
whilst the party on the ground becomes increasingly dislocated (Katz and Mair 2002,
133).  This suggests that any influence the party membership may have had over leaders
diminishes as the two parts of the party drift away from each other.  At the same time, it
also suggests a mutual autonomy which allows local parties to pursue their own policies
and programmes at a local level, free from the interference of the national leadership
(Ibid., 129).  However, in other respects, I would argue it looks more like a rehearsal of
the oligarchy that Michels describes: the process of devolving power to members in
certain respects and centralising it in others in fact represents a dual movement of power
away from the organised party towards the leadership on the one hand and the broad
mass of individual members on the other.  Increasing the role of less active members
(who are considered to be more moderate) is a way to ‘dilute the influence of the most
ideologically radical members’ who may be a major irritant or even a threat to leaders
(Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000, 133).  Indeed, as Mair himself argued, this
simultaneous centralisation and devolution suits leaders since the broader, non-active
membership is, they argue, easier to dominate and likely to be
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at once more docile and more likely to endorse the policies (and
candidates) proposed by the party leadership and by the party in
public office (Mair 1994, 16).
Analysis
Katz and Mair’s work has been an interesting and important development in the
classification of party types and their organisational development, but what conclusions
can be drawn from it about power?  Their work has some parallels with Panebianco, in
that they acknowledge a (highly unequal) relationship between elite power and the
power of members.  However, there is an important distinction between the two
approaches which is relevant to my thesis.  For Panebianco, the power relation between
members and leaders is a check on elite domination.  Elites need to some extent to
submit to members in order to achieve and maintain their own position because their
support is an essential component of the ‘horizontal power games’ played out between
the elites themselves.  For Katz and Mair, however, democratisation is a tool elites use
in order to monopolise power for themselves over policy and government itself.  Elites
retain a link with the party on the ground because it provides both democratic
legitimacy (Katz and Mair 2002, 128) and the campaigning resources needed for
elections.   This represents a more firmly elitist view of power in which ordinary
members are relatively helpless to resist: leaders have a firm grip over the organisation
as a whole and are in a position to restructure it in their favour.  It is possible to argue
that there is an element of Strategic Power in play here, in which leaders are able to
exploit their advantageous position and manipulate organisational rules and structures in
their own favour.  However, I would argue that their account of interpenetration of party
and state is closer to Michels’ claim that the party organisation begins to imitate that
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which it seeks to dominate (Michels 1962 [1915], 335). Bureaucratic Control is driven
by the party’s ever closer relationship with the state and supports the strengthening of
power at the elite level of the party.  Members in this account seem to be little more
than tools for legitimisation and resources for campaigning; the apparent
‘democratisation’ of aspects of party life is just the means by which these functions are
managed.
Party Discipline and the Puzzle of Loyalty
So far the party literature I have considered has been strongly influenced by the elite
theory of writers like Pareto and Mosca, focusing mainly on the power of leaders over
members.  But a particular puzzle associated with the exercise of power in political
parties and one that has not been adequately appreciated or addressed by the party
literature I have discussed thus far, is why members remain loyal to them.  The
framework of power I laid out in my introduction suggests some possible answers to
this question.  The important point I want to start with is that each dimension seems
logically to suggest a different reason for complicity or loyalty:
1. Individualistic Power would suggest that the application of incentives or
sanctions by party whips or leaders stimulates self-interested agents to adjust
their behaviour in a loyal direction;
2. Strategic Power highlights circumstances in which potential rebels are denied
opportunities to express disloyalty or a disagreement in the first place;
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3. Bureaucratic Control would emphasise that loyalty comes through automatic
obedience as the behaviour of agents is controlled and structured by the power
of the organisation itself;
4. Constitutive Power proposes that the loyal political subject is constituted by the
daily rituals and activities of party life and its underlying values;
5. Disciplinary Control sheds light on how obedient subjects are produced through
the detailed application of refined disciplinary techniques of organisation.
The debates in the academic literature that deal with questions of loyalty and how
parties maintain discipline and cohesion touch on some, but by no means all, of these
ideas.  In this section, I discuss and assess some of this literature: particularly the work
of von Beyme (1985) and the wider literature on party discipline and cohesion.
Drawing out implications for my framework of power, I will argue that although
plausible accounts are put forward for why party members and representatives remain
loyal, they do not fully take up the challenge posed by a truly multi-dimensional
approach to power, and therefore offer only partial explanations.
In Political Parties in Western Democracies von Beyme supports Michels’ basic
assertion that organisation is ‘always necessary for new political movements’ that wish
to challenge the ‘natural strength of the elite who hold power’ (von Beyme 1985, 159).
But he also argues that the ‘inevitability’ of oligarchy should not be overstated.  He
underlines the fact that that both Michels and Weber were writing at a time when
democratisation had not fully flowered in the west and that their view that undemocratic
party structures were an outcome of democratic development at state level was one
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particular to their time and place (i.e. early twentieth century Germany1). In more
recent times, for example, factionalism and the presence of different internal pressure
groups in parties is
one indication that parties are not monolithic units, tightly disciplined
by their own bureaucracy, with an elite leadership holding aloft the
banner of democracy in the political arena but authoritarian towards its
own rank and file (Ibid, 232).
Indeed, von Beyme (1985) argues that power relations in parties vary according to
which level of the party is being examined.  He suggests that at the party organisational
level (i.e. the party outside of parliament), oligarchy is unlikely and that material
incentives and sanctions are largely ineffective instruments of power.  Instead, he
argues, more ‘subtle’ instruments like ideology can be deployed to inspire the loyalty of
rank-and-file party members.  I will examine this point below.  However, before that I
will turn my attention to the elite, parliamentary level, where von Beyme argues that the
direct application of incentives and sanctions can be more effective.  This argument is
reflected in ongoing debates in the literature on party discipline that are of interest and
relevance to my thesis, and which will form part of my discussion.
Parliamentary Discipline
The level of the ‘political power system’, von Beyme argues, is one at which tight party
discipline operates because representatives in parliament are more likely to respond to
incentives and sanctions designed to procure obedience.  He argues that in the twentieth
century, ‘the parties have increasingly strengthened the mechanisms whereby they can
1 For accounts of German political conditions and the development of the Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschlands (SPD) at the time, see Guttsman 1981 and Roth 1963.
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exercise social control on their members of parliament’ (von Beyme 1985, 313); so
much so, in fact, that party discipline should form ‘an essential part of any consistent
theory of the party state’ (Ibid., 313):
in the modern democracy party discipline in parliament is now such
that only in exceptional cases do members have a free vote … on all
other issues party discipline is so tight that it is … (the) parliamentary
party which should be analysed and not parliament itself (Ibid., 314-
315).
There is today a fairly large body of writers who have taken up von Beyme’s challenge
and focused on the question of party discipline and cohesion. A significant strand of
this literature on party discipline understands loyalty to be a product of the strategic
behaviour of rational actors within party organisations and legislatures.  In these
approaches, the political actor trades some of his or her own immediate personal
interests for longer-term goals and in so doing benefits the whole group.  In return,
longer-term benefits can be expected, including reward through preferment, the ability
to secure policy preferences with the support of colleagues, or increasing the party’s
popularity which helps secure re-election. Thus in the long term, it is in the interests of
the politician to co-operate because of the incentive structures provided by legislative
assemblies and the party itself.
Louise K. Davidson-Schmich (2006) provides an example of this in the context of state
legislatures in eastern Germany.  She argues that the way legislatures are structured
provides a strong incentive for co-operative behaviour amongst legislators even where
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there is a strong tradition of anti-party norms.2 For example, members require state
resources that are provided to Fraktionen (party groups); electoral processes (like the
German list system) tend to favour parties, as does the need to provide predictability for
voters via identifiable party labels; parliamentary committees tend to be allocated on a
party basis; influencing the agenda-setting process is very difficult without some kind of
organised collective action.  Indeed, any kind of patronage or favour in a legislative
arena requires organisation in order to capture such privileges (Davidson-Schmich
2006, 90-1).  This ‘institutional logic’, she argues, therefore overrides norms and
culture, driving members to co-operate ever more closely (Ibid., 100).
Other writers, such as Bowler (2002) and Heidar and Koole (2000), emphasise more
strongly the role of the party itself in shaping the co-operative incentives of political
actors.  Bowler (2002) argues that the institutional drivers for collective action in the
legislature might explain why legislators co-operate with each other but they do not
explain ‘why individual legislators remain members of the same legislative bloc
throughout their careers’ (Bowler 2002, 157; emphasis added)3.  Stability and continuity
in group membership, he argues, can only be explained by the extra-parliamentary
party’s (EPP) powers of nomination4 which is the chief power of ‘parties as
2 Although non-communist parties were officially allowed, neither elections nor political activity could be
described as being in any way ‘free’ and from its declaration in 1949, to its first free elections and
reabsorption into Germany in 1990, the GDR was an effective one party state under the control of the
Socialist Unity Party.  It is not therefore surprising that a strong democratic party culture had not
developed.
3 This classification characterises ‘one arena’ models as those having an almost exclusive focus on
incentives within the legislature, decoupling or weakening electoral and legislative arenas, whilst ‘two
arena’ models consider the importance of both of these.  Cox and McCubbins (1993) is an example of the
former, whereas the most renowned examples of the latter are Anthony Downs (1957) and David
Mayhew (1974).
4 In some case, of course, national party leaders have directly – sometimes notoriously – interfered in
local party selections.  Examples include the imposition by the Labour leadership of Shaun Woodward (a
relatively rare example of an MP ‘crossing the floor’, on this occasion from Conservative to Labour), on
St. Helen’s South in time for the 2001 General Election. The more indirect influence of devices like all-
women shortlists caused notable controversy for the party in Blaenau Gwent in 2005 where the party lost
its seat to protesting former Labour members, despite it being regarded as one of the party’s safest.
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organisations’ outside of parliament.  Heidar and Koole also emphasise the importance
of the EPP, and ‘subordinated staff’ in the rise of a ‘parliamentary-party complex’
(Heidar and Koole 2000, 1-14).  They note that the party’s functions and constitution
help determine the nature of policy-making and candidate selection, and that this means
there is a strong relationship of external pressure between the EPP and legislators.
Without this, they say, ‘a high degree of discipline within the parliamentary party group
is unlikely to exist’ (Ibid., 14).
What follows from this is that leaders, as the senior authority in both the party
organisation and the parliamentary party, have significant resources in their hands that
representatives want.  In particular, this includes significant influence or control over
the agenda-setting process and powers of patronage, including ministries, shadow
ministries and committee memberships.  The prospects of gaining such rewards, or the
fear of losing them, are key drivers of loyalty and discipline.
Cohesion and the Power of Norms and Values
A second strand of the party discipline literature emphasises how individuals sacrifice
self-interest for the party because they share common ideology or values.  Although the
interests and ambitions of legislators make the application of incentives effective, in the
wider party they are likely to be less so.  A very simple reason for this is that parties are
voluntary organisations, and people can always leave or refuse to obey. This affects the
nature of power relationships that are even possible in democratic political parties.  At
least at the grass-roots level, parties have little in the way of recourse to positive and
negative sanctions that might induce people to join or obey (von Beyme 1985, 167).
This has two effects on the conditions under which power can be exercised in the party,
he argues: firstly, parties are much less tightly structured than other organisations like
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unions or bureaucracies and its boundaries are much more fluid and unstable (Ibid.,
168); secondly, it means that patronage cannot explain loyalty to the party on a mass
scale (Ibid., 172). Negative sanctions are minimal and the only positive sanction
available is office in the party itself (Ibid., 172), which may work for some but by no
means all. Scarrow argues that other incentives available for members include things
like socialising opportunities and pathways to office or candidacies (Scarrow 2000, 84),
but if an individual is not interested in the latter, the former is the kind of opportunity
easily available elsewhere.  It suggests that direct force or inducement will rarely if ever
work and thus more subtle modes of power need to come into play. Von Beyme argues
that rather than material incentives like patronage and office allocation, it is ideology
that explains loyalty to parties on the part of members (von Beyme 1985, 173-4).  This
is a point that Pizzorno (1981) picks up on.  Ideology, he says, is a ‘principle of
identification’ in which the party takes a view on ‘a future state of affairs to be achieved
through political action’ (Pizzorno 1981, 250).  He argues that in political parties
‘ideology itself can be seen as a technique for reinforcing organisation’ equivalent to
techniques of participation, training and so on.  It supports organisational power
because it
reinforces the solidarity of those who belong to the organisation by
generating the feeling that all of them share certain goals towards
which durable collective action can be oriented.  Furthermore, it can
coordinate the specific action of various centres of decision, because
from the general principles contained in the ideology it is possible to
deduce rules for action to be applied in particular occasions, thus
avoiding the burden of detailed prescriptions from the centre.  Finally,
ideology offers a criterion by which to check the performance of the
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leaders, even when their action does not produce immediate
satisfaction of interests (Ibid., 253; emphasis in original).
In other words, in a voluntary setting ideology can bring about a disciplined
organisation without the need for the application of sanctions and material incentives.
This is especially important at times when the party is in opposition and material
interests are harder to satisfy (Ibid., 253).  It provides the basic link between the party at
grass-roots level and the party in parliament and, according to a second strand of
approaches to party discipline, provides the necessary foundation for discipline to work.
In this second strand of party discipline literature, a distinction is made between
‘discipline’ per se and ‘cohesion’. Party discipline, i.e. the tools, incentives and
constraints at work in the legislature, ‘begin[s] to function only after the successful
candidates have reached parliament’ (Hazan 2006, 6). Cohesion in contrast refers to a
consensus between those with shared outlooks, values and attitudes that develops out of
a social context (Ibid., 6).  It includes norms of party solidarity, ideology and attitudes
towards teamwork that begin prior to the representative’s arrival in the legislative
chamber. This process was explained in more detail in Kornberg’s (1967) much older
study of MPs in the Canadian parliament which emphasised socialisation and
acculturation rather than the application of incentives.  He argued that expectations of
behaviour on the legislator are assimilated through the internalisation of formal and
informal ‘rules of the game’.  During this process, the political party acts as reference
group, structuring individual values and perspectives (Kornberg 1967, 8-9).  Before
entering parliament, pre-legislative political experience (for example through years of
party membership and activism) is crucial in shaping ‘party-relevant values’ which the
legislator brings to parliament.  It is the means by which
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an individual acquires political values, attitudes, interest in and
knowledge of the political community, the regime and its institutions
and incumbent leaders (Ibid., 49).
In political cultures (such as that in Canada at the time) with a favourable, even proud,
attitude towards party, the majority of MPs acted cohesively because they wanted to,
‘not from fear of sanctions or hope of reward, but from willing acceptance of that
influence’ (Ibid., 134).
More recent studies come to similar conclusions. Owens (2006), for example, argues
that
the reality of legislative decision-making and therefore intra-party
cohesion is much more complex than constitutional and institutional
formalities and appears to depend more on the extent to which values
are shared among co-partisans (Owens 2006, 28).
Shared values (or norms), he says, allows for negotiation and a willingness to
compromise among party group members when specific preferences are not shared.
Discipline therefore needs cohesion which is a product of these values and which is
reinforced through institutional mechanisms. Jensen (2000) (examining Nordic
parliamentary systems) argues that party unity is often voluntary and consensual rather
than forced.  Discipline, he says, should ‘rather be seen as a set of norms that group
members follow’ (Jensen 2000, 213-14) and that formal sanctions and other such
mechanisms are ‘seldom necessary to secure group loyalty’ (Ibid., 215), because norms
of loyalty have largely been internalised through a process of socialisation. This
process, he says, is apparent in the fact that whereby newer MPs act more out of a sense
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of ‘duty’, longer-standing ones5 have more likely fully internalised norms of loyalty,
and so act more out of agreement than anything else. Similarly to Owens, he argues
that although institutional and structural factors are important, it must be underpinned
by a ‘supportive normative system’ among MPs in order to work (Ibid., 233).
Analysis
What I have related in this section is a more complex series of arguments about how
power is exercised at different levels of the party.  In particular, these contributions to
the party literature begin to address an issue I found absent from much of the specific
literature on party organisation: why voluntary members are willing to subordinate
themselves to party discipline and how their loyalty and fidelity to the party comes
about.  I have suggested throughout my analysis that different dimensions of power may
be more appropriate and effective at different levels of the party organisation, and it
now appears that the complicity of the membership may also be explained in a similar
way.
At the elite level, Individualistic Power is an effective means for leaders to control their
parliamentary party.  Amongst elite groups such as the parliamentary party, power can
be understood as a material relation between leaders and rest of the parliamentary party.
The exercise of power is based on the interests of individual political actors. The
obedience of representatives is secured, and the collective action of the group is
maintained, through the direct application of material incentives by leaders, based on
resources secured by the latter as a result of their position.  This has the effect of
securing the interests of leaders by persuading representatives to act in favour of those
interests.
5 Which he designates as having been in parliament for four years or more.
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At the party organisational level, a more subtle form of power provides the glue through
which party cohesion and loyalty is maintained.  Shared values and broad ideological
agreement are cohesive forces that provide the basis for willing submission to power
and, furthermore, the conditions under which agentic dimensions of power can be
effective.  There are, however, two alternative ways of looking at this in terms of the
framework of power: on the one hand, just as Pizzorno argues that ideology is best seen
as one particular technique for reinforcing organisation, it could be understood as a form
of Bureaucratic Control, a means by which ‘automatic’ obedience is secured through
attachment to a series of abstract goals that provide a cognitive framework for action; on
the other hand, these norms and ideologies can be seen as embedded in the day-to-day
rituals of party life (like meetings, campaigning and so on), emerging in the
performance and practice of those rituals and constituting subjects who believe in them.
Whilst they both have some explanatory utility, I would argue that the latter,
Constitutive Power, can provide a more satisfactory explanation of how, especially in
voluntary organisations like parties, loyalty and obedience comes through belief (which
is constituted in participation), rather than by the imposition of rules and the application
of techniques from the ‘outside’.  Many of these arguments are not new, and the
comparative merits of rational, cultural and sociological explanations in explaining
political behaviour have been rehearsed elsewhere, for example over questions why
people bother to vote (see for example Denver 2003). However, drawing out these
kinds of assumptions about power in the literature demonstrates strengths and
weaknesses in the analysis of power in parties that set the scene for my deeper analysis.
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Conclusion
I have by no means covered all the great wealth of literature that is available about
political parties.  Such a task would be impossible in one chapter of a thesis.  I have
sought, instead, to survey some of the most influential texts in the study of political
party organisation: including Michels work on oligarchy; Duverger, Panebianco and
Katz and Mair’s party organisational evolution; and von Beyme’s comprehensive study
of parties at different ‘levels’ of organisation.  My choice has also been guided by which
contributions have decisive or distinctive views on the specific issue of how power
operates within parties.  In conjunction with the last of these, I have also discussed some
of the specific literature on party discipline and cohesion because it is a literature that
specifically addresses some of my concerns about the different means by which power
may be exercised in parties.  In the rest of this concluding section, I present a summary
and overall analysis of what I have discussed in the light of my framework of power.
Summary
Michels’ work quite clearly shows strong parallels with Bureaucratic Control, in which
the logic of organisation exerts a repressive, disciplinary and sometimes exclusionary
power over individuals.  The ultimate logic of this power drives the organisation
towards oligarchy.  Where Michels’ argument is weakest, however, is his account of
obedience.  He puts the fact of people’s submission to such a regime down to ‘need’ and
‘incompetence’ without really explaining or justifying it satisfactorily.6 In democracies,
political parties are voluntary organisations and individuals are not compelled to be
members of them or to submit to them. It follows that if leaders wish to retain power
6 Although acquiescence and deference have been routinely used in the past to explain working-class
Conservative voters in the UK for example.  See Nordlinger (1967).
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and obedience, they must be more subtle about how they do so. Duverger provides a
more plausible explanation.  Whilst he argues that there are cultural reasons why
ordinary working class people were prepared to submit to oligarchal organisation, he
makes a stronger, more compelling argument that I would contend has a greater
contemporary relevance too.  He states that there is an intensification of power in
political organisation which is at once subtle and more effective than an explicit
relationship of command and obedience.  Furthermore, it brings additional dimensions
of power into play by introducing something of a constitutive element to Bureaucratic
Control.
There is a more explicitly materialistic way of explaining loyalty and obedience too:
party leaders, if they wish to retain the support and legitimacy that is provided by
members, must to some degree satisfy their needs and interests. For Panebianco,
Bureaucratic Control is tempered by the Individualistic Power of members who control
some resources that they can use to extract benefits and incentives from leaders.
Leaders comply because satisfied members provide support for them in their own
‘horizontal’ power games (also agentic in nature).  However, the unequal relationship
that exists between leaders and followers, suggest that Strategic Power may also be
present: that is, inequality of power is not just a matter of superior resources held by
leaders, but their specific strategic qualities (e.g. party rules and agenda-setting
processes) which give them the ability to exclude threats and avoid confrontation and
defeat.   Panebianco’s is a dynamic understanding of power.  It is very clearly a
relation, but one which is mediated by hierarchy and bureaucracy.  However, ultimately
power is, for him, more of a continuum running between individualism and oligarchy
than a truly multi-dimensional concept.
75
Katz and Mair provide a neat kind of circularity which goes back to Michels.  For them,
power in parties is elitist, although that elitism has a different source and partly comes
about by granting some powers to the grass roots.  It comes from a mixture of Strategic
Power and Bureaucratic Control, with the emphasis firmly on the latter.  Rather than the
iron control over the whole party organisation that is found in Michels, the power of
elites comes instead from a kind of strategic dislocation between them and the grass-
roots.  Leaders concede a certain amount of ‘democratisation’ at the bottom, but this
belies an iron grip over policy and an interpenetration of the party at elite level and the
state.  This appears to be the product of a bureaucratic logic that disempowers activists
and takes Michels’ idea of the party imitating the state in its organisational structure to
its full conclusion.
Finally, the relationship between members and the party is not purely mechanical, nor is
it purely about command and obedience.  The more subtle ways in which power works
must therefore be identified. Von Beyme points towards how different dimensions of
power might be more effective at different levels of the party.  Thus, although
Individualistic Power works well as an explanation for loyalty at the parliamentary
level because relationships can be more clearly understood as ‘materialistic’ (i.e.
material incentives and sanctions are provided through internal party and parliamentary
patronage), this is not as effective when considering loyalty in the wider party.    Here, a
Constitutive Power that produces party subjects who are voluntarily loyal because they
share the same norms and ideas about the world is more helpful.  This kind of power is
transmitted and produced in the rituals and practices of everyday party life, socialising
activists into its culture.  Moreover, this is also something that representatives at the
elite level are subject to in their own pre-parliamentary life.  The shared values and
76
ideological common-ground between party representatives is an important condition for
their submission to more explicitly ‘agentic’ disciplinary regimes.
Analysis
The main task of this chapter has been to apply my framework of power to the task of
extracting assumptions about power that underlie some of the principal texts on political
parties.  I have shown that there is a wide range of approaches to power in this
literature.  Sometimes power is explicitly discussed, a particularly good example of this
being Panebianco who devotes a whole chapter to setting out his theoretical approach to
the concept (Panebianco 1988, 21-32).  However, references are often oblique and the
explicit conceptual development of power as, say, a force with certain properties, or
attached to certain locations, is distinctly lacking.  This analysis has demonstrated that
in much of the literature there is a continued engagement with the concerns about
elitism and oligarchy that were first raised by Michels.  However, Michels’ account of
oligarchy is subject to an ongoing critique which tempers his ideas with elements of
Individualistic, Strategic and even Constitutive Power.  Nonetheless, authors still feel a
need to engage with Michels’ argument, suggesting that oligarchy and elitist domination
remains a concern.  Thus Bureaucratic Control remains a significant theme, whilst at the
same time the claims of ‘iron laws’ and the like are, at best, treated with scepticism and
usually rejected.  Even the more ‘elitist’ of modern accounts (such as Katz and Mair’s)
do not argue that activists are simply repressed into needy submission, but given some
power of their own.  Indeed, most accounts suggest that, to differing degrees,
Bureaucratic Control is tempered by Individualistic Power.  Drawing on the first strand
of party discipline literature, it is also possible to see how party leaders can use the
institutional resources available to them to support their own Individualistic Power as a
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countervailing force.  To that, I might add, that Strategic Power is a tool by which
leaders can ensure that the Individualistic Power of members is curtailed.  What the
literature is lacking, however, is an explicit and systematic development of these
different ideas about power and of how they work together as different but interactive
dimensions of power in the context of a political party.
The connection is not adequately recognised or explored either between power derived
from potestas, that is in its more negative sense of ‘power over’ and power in its more
positive sense, derived from potentia (from Spinoza’s distinction), that is between
coercion and empowerment.  In the context of this thesis, the latter refers to the
constitution of new capacities that are engendered both by developing party
organisation and by constructing new modes of subjectivity in terms of new political
skills, as well as compliance with a party’s public ideology, message and image (or
‘brand’).  It is important, as my framework of power shows, to recognise how these two
senses of positive and negative, coercive and productive power are interwoven and
inseparable in the building of modern party machines with a loyal members and a
(mainly) complicit, helpful and useful rank-and-file
Furthermore, there are other aspects of power which are not fully recognised as such
and thus not properly exploited as explanations for loyalty to parties.  There are in some
works (such as von Beyme and the second strand of party discipline literature) a
recognition that the loyalty of party members, even (or perhaps especially) in an age of
apparently declining memberships, cannot be explained simply by force, manipulation
or ‘weakness’ but also by the values and common ideas that people share.  Power’s
constitutive side is therefore hinted at but never fully developed.  This is partly because
these ‘cohesive’ elements are not recognised as power in these texts, even though their
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effects are power-like.  At best, they are recognised as conditions for power’s exercise.
I would argue that they need instead to be seen as aspects of a dimension of power in
their own right: that is, Constitutive Power.  The failure to recognise how power works
through such means in modern parties is, I would argue, is a major shortcoming in the
literature.  The modern party, with its far weaker and more pragmatic, electorate-
oriented ideology, brings its members into line in terms of conduct, style and message
(as more or less competent and centrist) by reconstructing them in its image as willing
subjects of, and useful resources for, a party regime.
Finally, there is a dimension of power’s operation that appears to be neglected entirely.
Whilst Bureaucratic Control is a prominent idea in much of the literature I have
discussed it does not fully express a sense of how power works on individuals to
produce such disciplined subjects.  This means having to look elsewhere: to
explanations based on incentives and agents and also, as I have argued, norms and
ideologies.  However, as helpful as these explanations are, they still do not explain how
parties are able to exploit members and activists so as to fashion them into useful,
disciplined resources. Constitutive Power provides some sense of how power produces
subjectivities, but it can be rather abstract in the way that it expresses this.  This is
where my fifth dimension of power’s exercise comes into view.  Disciplinary Control
pays attention to the tactics and strategies of power at the most detailed level.  It
provides detail of how the party is rationalised and bureaucratised and how it operates
as a machine through techniques of control and organisation that function at an
individual level like timetables and training.  Secondly, it shows how surveillance and
normalisation discipline members as subjects aligned with the party’s brand and
political priorities.
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Over recent years, political theorists have developed increasingly rich, complex and
sophisticated analyses of power in terms of power relations.  The literature on political
parties, however, has tended to get stuck with a rather truncated account of power
derived from older theories that were mainly developed in an age when mass parties
were only beginning to modernise.  Behaviouralist accounts of individual conduct (i.e.
who gets what, when and how), elite models that focus on leaders versus led and
Weberian models of bureaucratic rationalisation have remained the dominant
underlying views of power despite being developed initially in the early to mid-
twentieth century. In essence, the challenge is therefore to bring more recent theoretical
developments to bear on questions of loyalty, obedience and cohesion that testify to the
persistence and complexity of power relations in political parties. Furthermore, the
application of these newer approaches to power to a period of significant change in the
organisational structure and practices of the Labour Party underlines their importance in
explaining modern political organisation.
In the following chapters, then, I will examine each one of the dimensions of power in
my framework – Individualistic Power, Strategic Power, Bureaucratic Control,
Constitutive Power and Disciplinary Control – setting out its assumptions in detail and
applying them to aspects, events and stories gathered from my original research on the
British Labour Party in the 1980s and 1990s.  The purpose of this is to demonstrate how
each one of these dimensions operates in the party at grass-roots and elite levels and
how each dimension contributes towards a fully rounded explanation of how power is
exercised in political parties to procure and maintain loyalty, cohesion and discipline.
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Two: Individualistic Power
In the previous two chapters I have set out the framework of power and applied it to
some of the relevant literature on political parties in order to examine the assumptions
about power that are contained within it.  I have argued that power should be
understood as operating in five different dimensions which relate to different modes in
which power operates. It may be understood as a property of individual agents, as
behaviouralists and rational choice theorists suggest, but it may also be strategic,
mediated through manipulated rules and norms.  Its repressive effects are apparent in
the anonymous routines of organisation, but its constitutive and empowering
characteristics are also a feature of day-to-day organisational life.  This is further
demonstrated by its fine-grained disciplinary operation through techniques of
organisation.
This chapter is devoted to fleshing out this first dimension in my framework.  In it, I
will set out the key component characteristics of Individualistic Power that distinguish it
from the other dimensions. As I will show, this dimension of power is derived from a
reading of behaviouralist approaches and uses of rational choice theory.  Power here is
episodic (that is, it is identifiable by presences and absences) and understood as a
dispositional property of agents which is rational in that it is interest driven and
decision-oriented, and behavioural in that it is conflict-centred, interpersonal and causal.
Its exercise is resource-dependent and it is binary in its outcomes.
Once I have fleshed out these chief characteristics and acknowledged where I have
drawn them from, I will point to the kinds of locations and situations in which
Individualistic Power can be identified, the specific means by which it might be
exercised in them and, most importantly, I will set out some basic questions that will
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guide the subsequent analysis.  Following that I will conduct an initial test of the
explanatory efficacy of Individualistic Power using two examples drawn from my own
research amongst Labour Party activists and MPs.
What my analysis will demonstrate is the strengths and utility of this dimension of
power as part of an overall framework.  Power in parties cannot be fully understood
without accounting for the actions of individuals and I will show that this first
dimension of power is a helpful perspective for understanding power relations between
specific actors.  It helps explain the behaviour of agents in situations of direct conflict
with other agents.  For this reason, it occupies a unique and important place in the
framework.  However, it will also become apparent that there is much that
Individualistic Power by itself cannot fully explain.  In other words, it is able to explain
one dimension of power’s exercise.  More theoretical development will be needed in
order to illuminate the full multi-dimensional scope of power in political parties.
What is Individualistic Power?
My understanding of Individualistic Power is drawn from behaviouralist ideas that
originated with Robert Dahl (1957; 1961) and aspects of rational choice theory,
especially as set out by Anthony Downs (1957) and, more recently, Keith Dowding
(1991; 1996).   These approaches, in different ways, originated in an attempt to explain
and examine power empirically, by observing the behaviour of actors and the outcomes
of conflicts.  What can be gathered from these approaches is that the exercise of power
consists of a relation between two actors in which one is able to change the behaviour of
another.  As such, these theories owe much to Max Weber’s elaboration of Macht, a
particular form of power rooted in social action which he defines as
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the chance of a man or a number of men to realise their own will in a
social action even against the resistance of others who are participating
in the action (Weber 1978, 926).
Some years after Weber originally wrote this, Robert Dahl described an ‘intuitive idea
of power’ which can be represented in the statement that
A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that
B would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957, 202-3).
Dahl’s particular purpose in formulating power in this way was to provide a means by
which power could be observed and measured. It was his response to elite theories of
power such as that of Wright Mills (1956) which he felt to be ‘cast in a form that makes
it virtually impossible to disprove’ (Dahl 1958, 463).  They are, he says
a type of quasi-metaphysical theory made up of what might be called an
infinite regress of explanations … if the overt leaders of community do not
appear to constitute a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by arguing
that behind the overt leaders there is a set of covert leaders who do.  If
subsequent evidence shows that this covert group does not make a ruling
elite, then the theory can be saved by arguing that behind the first covert
group there is another, and so on (Dahl 1958, 463).
Dahl’s argument was that, rather than focusing on small groups of (sometimes elusive)
elites, political analysts need to observe actual relations of conflict between actors in the
political system in order to determine in whose hands power lies and on whom it has
been exercised.  These conflicts therefore need to be visible in some way, for example
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as a matter of public record (such as minutes or verbatim reports), by direct observation
on the part of the analyst, or as reported by participants.
However, Dahl’s ‘intuitive’ definition is not complete.  Firstly, behaviouralism is
flawed, argues Keith Dowding (1991), because it lacks a coherent theory of action.
Secondly, and related, the concept of Individualistic Power is intimately associated with
the interests of individual actors.  The relationship between A and B is exercised in such
a way as to secure those interests, otherwise it cannot properly be called power in an
individualistic sense.  Therefore, any fully functioning concept of Individualistic Power
needs to account for the formulation of those interests.  This is where rational choice
theory becomes helpful.
Rational Choice Theory
As another individualistic approach, based on the conflicts between agents and their
preferences, rational choice theory is able to specify the limits of individual action by
modelling the structure of individual decision-making:
studying behaviour requires an explicit theory of action and an
understanding of the structure of the choice situations within which
individuals make their choices.  Rational choice modelling is the best
way of attempting this process (Dowding 1991, 29).
Rational choice theory deals with this by working on the assumption that people are
goal-oriented and choose optimal means to achieve them (Tsebelis 1990, 235).  It
supplements and complements theories of behaviouralism because it provides tools for
deductive reasoning that is more reliable than intuitive reasoning (Ibid., 236):
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both the methodological sophistication of the behaviouralist
programme and the deductive rigour of formal models can help
contemporary researchers reach conclusions that only the most
powerful minds reach without such tools (Ibid., 237).
This was first applied in a party political context by Anthony Downs in 1957.  He
theorised a Homo Politicus (an adaptation of the concept of the utility-maximising
Homo Economicus) who is characterised by a conscious process of calculated, rational
thought and action in which choices or decisions are made according to what would
deliver the most satisfaction in relation to the expenditure required (of money, physical
or mental effort etc.) to get it.  The concept assumes that in any given situation an
individual actor ranks alternative courses of action in a transitive order of preference
(i.e. in any rank of, say, three alternatives, that ranked first is preferable to that ranked
second, second is preferable to third, and so on). This actor can always make a clear
decision when selecting from these alternatives because rational individuals always
choose that which ranks the highest on their list.  Furthermore, such actors will always
make the same decision each time they is confronted with the same alternatives (Downs
1957).   The assumption of ‘selfishness’, that Homo Politicus is primarily concerned
with his (or her) own welfare, satisfaction and pleasure, is absolutely central to this
model.  Rational behaviour is ‘directed primarily towards selfish ends’ (Downs 1957,
27).  Hence, although Homo Politicus does interact with others and participate in groups
or organisations like political parties, it is simply a means of efficiently achieving these
private ends. Any social ‘product’ or function (whether in terms of collective goals or
presumably also social satisfaction) must be regarded as a by-product of this, rather than
an intentional goal (Ibid., 29). Members of political parties in other words ‘act solely in
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order to attain the income, prestige and power which come from being in office’ (Ibid.,
28) rather than for any collective, social, political or even ideological reasons.
Although Downs was the first to apply rational choice theory to political parties, he
sidesteps the question of how it can be applied to parties internally, treating them as ‘a
coalition whose members agree on all their goals instead of just part of them’ (Downs
1957, 25). However, there have been a number of attempts since to apply rational
choice ideas to the internal power relations in parties. Despite its U.S. legislative
context, Cox and McCubbins (1993), for example, make an interesting application of
game-theoretical approaches to argue that parties are ‘invented, structured and
restructured in order to solve a variety of collective dilemmas that legislators face’ (Cox
and McCubbins 1993, 83).  From a rational choice point of view, analysis must begin at
the level of individuals and their diverse preferences, ‘explaining why it is in each one’s
interests to support a particular pattern of organisation and activity for the party’ (Ibid.,
108).  It is, they argue, because parties create a structure of incentives that solve
collective action problems.  For example, the record of a party in government, or as an
effective opposition, affects its (re)election probabilities (Ibid., 121), and sufficient
organisation can help capture potential collective benefits the legislature makes
available to its members.  Thus the rewards the legislator can gain (in terms of
committee memberships for example) are enhanced if his or her party wins a majority at
an election.  These rewards might include, for example, preferment in terms of
committee memberships, some control over the legislative agenda and so forth (Ibid.,
121-135).
Although party formation may be a response to collective action problems, the
relationship between activists and party leaders is an ongoing one.  Thomas Quinn
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(2004) advances arguments about how leaders balance their own interests and those of
activists by applying rational choice theory to exchanges between ‘intra-party actors’ in
the Labour Party between 1983 and the early 2000s.   He argues that the internal
organisation of parties can be usefully comprehended in terms of the ‘political
exchange’ of resources for policy promises.  That is, party members provide resources
to the party ‘in the hope (at minimum) or expectation (at best) that certain benefits will
be delivered in return’ in terms of policy preferences (Quinn 2004, 21-22).  This
relationship, Quinn argues, is mediated by electoral exchange.  In this process, leaders,
understood as vote-seekers, require the autonomy that institutions provide them with to
attract votes.  However activists, understood as policy-seekers, wish to constrain them
(Ibid., 171-177).  There is thus a trade-off between leaders and activists in which the
latter attempt to achieve policy preferences whilst the former seek to appeal to the wider
electorate.
Party reform is purposive and reflects these preferences.  Quinn argues that ‘specific
changes are undertaken for reasons, and the actors who implement them are motivated
by self-interest’ (Ibid., 43): doctrinal purity on the part of activists would be irrational
because policy cannot be implemented whilst in opposition.  Labour Party reform in the
1980s and 1990s, he argues, can therefore be understood as reflecting the dual
necessities of winning votes and maintaining activists.   The particular depth and tenor
of reforms, he says, reflect the party’s continual electoral failure between 1979 and
1997. Successive defeats had the effect of stimulating more organisational change and a
rebalancing of political exchange between members and leaders in favour of the latter
because ‘the longer a party is out of office, more policies must be changed’ and
‘organisational change is often a prerequisite for policy change as the power-bases of
those groups that cling to the old policies are undermined’ (Ibid., 172).
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In what follows, then, I will draw on the insights of behaviouralism and rational choice
theory to detail the key components of Individualistic Power.  Following that, I will
identify the different means by which it may be exercised in parties. Before proceeding,
however, a note of caution should be sounded.  Whilst my concern is to focus on the
ontological character of Individualistic Power, the primary concern of behaviouralists
and rational choice theorists has been methodological: that is, to introduce the methods
of natural science into the social sciences and thereby to develop ways of thinking about
power that are empirically researchable and measurable.  Hence it is argued that A has
power over B because it can clearly be observed that a particular decision has been
made in A’s interests thanks to the latter’s intervention.  Indeed, Dowding points out
that behaviouralism should never be confused with psychological theory of
behaviourism.  Whereas the former is a methodological thesis, he says, the latter is an
ontological doctrine ‘which reduces all mental concepts to publicly observable
behaviour’ (Dowding 1991, 24). Whilst I accept that behaviouralism and rational
choice theory do not necessarily promote such a narrow ontology (although Dowding
continues that the former has often fallen into this because of its lack of a theory of
action), the methodological priorities with which they are concerned nonetheless have
ontological implications from which I initially draw the components of Individualistic
Power.
The Key Components of Individualistic Power
My analysis elicits seven characteristic components of this first dimension of power:
1. It is agentic and rational.  That is, it is the property of an individual actor and is
exercised in pursuit of identifiable coherent interests.  Interests are taken to be
concomitant with preferences, and action ‘is efficiently designed to achieve the
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consciously selected political or economic ends of the actor’ (Downs 1957, 20).
Power can be enhanced through co-operative action (Dowding 1996, 10), but
groups themselves are not conscious actors.  They are simply collections of
individuals, each with their own interests.  This fact gives rise to collective
action problems, which must be solved in order for the group to achieve its
objectives, as Olson (1971) has argued.  It is therefore intimately bound up with
a methodologically individualist understanding of agency, i.e. the (exclusive)
ability of individuals to have interests and to act according to them. It follows,
therefore, that individual actors are and must function as agents in order to
exercise or respond to this type of power.
2. Although power belongs to individuals, it cannot be exercised alone.  To be
manifest, power requires the participation of more than one individual, because
it is a causal relation in which the behaviour of ‘responsive units’ is dependent
on the behaviour of ‘controlling units’ (Dahl 1968, 407), or it is at least closely
related to cause (I will deal with this distinction below).  It is therefore an
interpersonal act. This is a basic premise of Dahl’s formula, referred to above,
in which A gets B to do something B would otherwise not do.
3. The exercise of power comes about in a situation of preference- or interest-
driven conflict between at least two individuals.  For an exercise of power to
occur, the interests of one must prevail over those of the other, or in which one
agent is forced, persuaded or otherwise cajoled into doing something he or she
would not otherwise do.
4. Power is decision-oriented and associated with observable human behaviour.
This is central both to behaviouralist theories of power and to rational choice
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approaches, because power must be measurable.  To be measurable, power must
be visible by the pursuit of conflicting interests over concrete decisions in
publicly visible arenas (Dahl 1958, 464) and apparent in observable human
behaviour. It follows, therefore, that it must also be binary in its outcome.
There must be victory and defeat, in which the interests of one prevail over those
of another for an exercise of power to be attributed.
5. Power is dispositional (Dowding 1996, 4).  Since agents are autonomous
individuals with the ability to make choices, the ability to choose whether to
exercise power or not is essential.  Power therefore does not necessarily need to
be exercised in order to be evident, or for the interests of one to prevail over
another (Dahl 1968, 412-13; Dowding 1996, 4), although it does need to be
evident to be exercised.  Power’s dispositional nature underlines its explicitly
voluntarist character, related closely to autonomy and free-will.  This is why
although it is also closely related to cause it is not the same: the latter does not
require intention, whereas power does.  This in particular underlines the fact that
power is a property of conscious agents, to be exercised at will.
6. Power is based on possession of or access to certain resources which are
unequally distributed between individuals.  These resources may include things
like: specialist knowledge, information and know-how; the legitimacy that
comes from social standing, authority or shared beliefs; incentives like money,
jobs, or access to networks that some actors may be able to offer and so on.  The
use of these ‘resources’ is central to Individualistic Power because they are the
material means by which certain individuals have the ability to get their way
over others.  However, although possession of resources can support the
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exercise of power, it is not the same as the possession of power itself and the
relationship is not automatic.
7. Finally, power is episodic.  In other words, if power is observable, then it
follows that power must be absent and present at different times i.e. it must be
distinguishable from latent or dormant power.  If it is possible to see that power
has been exercised, it must also be possible to see that it has not been.  An object
or a person in an original ‘power-free’ state must be observed to change in
response to certain stimuli.  If this happens in a (pre-determined) direction, it
may then be said that the stimulus has been effective, i.e. power has been
exercised.  If not, then power has not been exercised.
Ontologically, therefore, this dimension of power is committed to individual agents,
freely acting on their preferences in competition with others.  From the point of view of
this dimension of power, it is the only meaningful point of analysis and power is a
redundant term if applied elsewhere (Dowding 1991, 8).  I argue in this thesis that this
rather narrow view puts up unnecessary barriers to a fuller understanding of power,
especially in organisational contexts.  However, for the time being I focus on
Individualistic Power which is built on these ideas.
Identifying Individualistic Power: Conditions and Locations
Now that the key components of Individualistic Power [henceforth IP] have been
ascertained, I will consider how it can be identified in parties: in what kinds of
locations, situations or functions is it likely to be found? What questions should be
asked in order to identify it? In order to access this dimension of power, situations must
be structured in a certain, formal way.  Borrowing Dahl’s ‘A’ and ‘B’ shorthand, the
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identification of IP requires the following four conditions: firstly, that there are (at least)
two individuals (A and B) in a decision-making situation;  secondly, that the decision-
making situation consists of a given issue to be resolved, and an arena in which to
resolve it (such as a conference, meeting or debate);  thirdly, that A and B each has an
interest in a different resolution or outcome;  and fourthly, that victory may be achieved
by A or B using whatever resources available to win, or to cause their rival to change
their mind.  In this formulation, individual A can be said to have exercised power over
individual B to the extent that A’s interests prevail over B’s (or vice versa). The specific
detailed means by which IP is exercised is set out in Table 2.1 and discussed below.
Means / Actions Examples / Resources used
Force: direct hostile intervention, threat or application
of sanctions. A directly threatening B with sanctions
that outstrip any benefit B would receive from getting
his or her own way
Use of conditional incentives: (threat of)
withdrawal of  funding or power and privileges, access
to party leaders etc.
Persuasion: rather than threatening sanctions or offering
particular incentives, A persuades or demonstrates to B
that A’s preference is in B’s best interests.
Use of knowledge: information and know-how,
ability to persuade /argue
Direct Manipulation: A intervenes to offer incentives to
B that outweighs B’s own preference or desire to
exercise it.
Use of conditional incentives: funding,
recommendations for jobs, use of influential networks
Indirect Manipulation: A restructures B’s incentives,
making it in B’s interests to support A over B’s own
original preference.
Use of conditional incentives: altering choice
architecture, making new resources available,
combining measures
Authority: B becomes convinced that A’s preference is
in his or her best interests because A’s opinion is highly
respected.
Use of legitimacy: Expertise, authority, social
standing e.g. of a former cabinet minister
Reputation: B’s fear of potential sanction outweighs B’s
own preference or desire to exercise it. (i.e. there has
been no explicit threat).
Use of reputation: having demonstrated a reputation
for applying sanctions
Table 2.1: The Specific Means by which Individualistic Power is Exercised
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The exercise of power to secure interests may take different forms, including
persuasion, force, or changing the incentive structures of others (Dowding 1996, 5-6).
There are several possible means by which the power of one individual over another can
be successfully exercised.  Power may be exercised simply by force: one individual is
able effectively to threaten another with sanctions if compliance is not forthcoming.   It
may more subtly be carried by persuasion: that is, by convincing another that one’s own
preference is also in their interest.
On the other hand power may be exercised by manipulating someone’s incentive
structure, either by making offers directly or indirectly altering the choice architecture
by introducing new resources.1 Authority that comes from experience and from social
standing, for example a former party leader or cabinet member, can be an effective way
of exercising power over others because it can have a persuasive effect.  Thus, as well
as with what A does to B in order to get his or her own way, the analyst should also pay
attention to who A is.  This also applies to reputation, although it is a more ‘slippery’
concept.  Depending on what kind of reputation an individual has, the actual exercise of
power may become unnecessary.  One whose reputation leads him or her to be feared
may be obeyed in order to stave off even the threat or the possibility of harsh sanctions.
One who has a reputation for wisdom may be followed because it is assumed that
person will most likely be right, and so on.  Therefore a reputation may mean that none
of the other means of exercising IP will need to come into operation in order for an
actor to get his or her own way.2 It is questionable, therefore, whether it would be
1 It is possible that manipulation may also be inadvertent, but this would not be understood as an exercise
of Individualistic Power because it lacks intention.
2 Conversely, I would suppose that a reputation for vacillation or errors of judgement can close off
options, ensuring that threats, offers and persuasion may be ineffective even where they are exercised.
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possible to observe such an exercise of power.  Nonetheless, it is a means by which one
gets one’s way over another, and is a factor that supports the dispositional nature of
power mentioned above.
Guide Questions for Analysis
In summary, then, IP is an individual property that is manifested in episodic social
actions.  It is a mechanism by which an actor in a concrete decision-making situation
may exploit available resources to secure his or her interests over those of another by
means of force, persuasion, manipulation or reputation. Once a decision-situation has
been identified, the salience of IP can be determined by asking four sets of questions,
each relating to a stage of analysis and based on the key components, conditions and
means of exercise that I set out earlier:
Stage One: Visible Conflicts of Interest Between Agents
a) Which individuals were involved (who was A, who was B)?
b) What were their identifiable interests / preferences (in this particular scenario)?
What ends did they want to achieve?
Stage Two: Open Confrontation and Clear Outcomes.
a) How and where was the conflict manifested? How did it play out?
b) Was the conflict direct or indirect?
Stage Three: Analysis of Outcomes
a) Who won?  Who lost?  Was the latter a direct result of the former?
b) Were the outcomes as intended by the winner?  If not, why not?  If so, how?
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c) What were the causal relationships / directions of causation? How did the
actions of a ‘controlling’ A cause those of a ‘dependent’ B?
Stage Four: Deployment of Resources
a) What resources have been used by actors in the pursuit of their interests /
preferences?  How were they used?  What resources did they not use?
Application: Testing Individualistic Power’s Explanatory Scope
The analysis presented above sets out what I take to be the key components and
conditions of IP as identified in my five-dimensional framework of power. Since part
of my argument in this thesis is that all five dimensions are useful for understanding
how power operates within political parties, it is now necessary to apply the IP
paradigm in order to see just how illuminating it is. My own application of this
dimension will test its analytical capacities against actual events within the Labour
Party drawn from interviews I have conducted with party activists and MPs.
Conversely, inasmuch as this dimension withstands the test, it is also part of my thesis
to demonstrate how appreciation of the way power works within political parties is
enhanced by paying attention to each of its dimensions.  From this point of view, it
enriches the understanding of how power works in political parties, with the Labour
Party taken here as an indicative case. This part of the analysis refers to some salient
events in the Party’s history but it mainly draws on my own empirical work among
party members. Because it is equally part of my argument to claim that no dimension of
power is sufficient in isolation, my analysis also explores the limitations of this
approach and of its understanding of power.  Using the questions I set out above, I will
examine the utility of the concept of IP for explaining the exercise of power in real-
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world situations. I will also support the discussion by providing relevant illustrations
and examples from contemporary accounts.
From interviews conducted both with members of the Parliamentary Labour Party and
with local activists in London, I identified two situations that allowed me to test the
efficacy and limits of IP.  The first concerns patronage: an MP, newly elected in 1987
and with a strong interest in miscarriages of justice, wanted to become a member of the
Home Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons that dealt with such issues.
The difficulty he had was that he was dependent on leadership patronage, a key resource
party leaders have in their favour.  Yet this MP’s reputation and background were such
that the party leadership was at best nervous of, and at worst strongly disapproving of
him.  The second situation concerns a struggle between two rivals for the leadership of
the Labour Group on a London Borough Council in 1995: one regarded as moderate and
pro-establishment, the other a left-wing figure at the head of an alliance between left-
wing and Bangladeshi councillors.  The importance of both these cases to the party’s
reform programme was that they had implications for the public perception (and the
reality) of the Labour Party as a ‘mainstream’ and ‘moderate’ party of government.
Example 1: Patronage
Chris Mullin’s prospects for preferment in 1987 were not strong: he had a long
association with the left (he had been a member of Tony Benn’s ‘Sunday Group’)3 ; he
was subject to hostility from moderate MPs for his stance on the mandatory reselection
of MPs4; furthermore, he had upset the legal establishment and the press as a result of
3 See Panitch and Leys 2001, 190; Benn 1994, 24, 35, 38
4 A constitutional amendment passed in 1979 required that Labour MPs subject themselves to a
mandatory competitive reselection process at least once in each Parliament.  This was, for him, a crucial
division within the party, and a prerequisite for renewal (Interview, Chris Mullin); he even published a
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his campaign to free the Birmingham Six amongst other miscarriages of justice.5
Against this background, he became a Labour MP in 1987, which was greeted with
antipathy from the Party Leader, Neil Kinnock and Deputy Leader, Roy Hattersley:
‘they didn’t exactly carry me shoulder-high into the tea room’ he told me.6 His interest
in miscarriages of justice led him to seek a place on the Home Affairs Select
Committee, which was effectively in the gift of the Party Leader.7 However, he was
denied that place despite making representations to the Chief Whip (responsible for
making nominations on the leader’s behalf) and to the Shadow Home Secretary:
Three or four times I tried and failed.  I went to see Derek Foster, the
Chief Whip, and he said ‘Talk to Roy’.  So I went to see Roy
Hattersley, who was then the Shadow Home Secretary.  He stared at
the floor and said ambiguously, “I’ll see what can be done”.  I know
exactly what was done.  Derek received a message from the leader’s
office to say that the leader, Neil Kinnock, had one or two names in
mind for the latest vacancy on the Home Affairs Committee and would
Derek kindly call on him to discuss the matter.  When Derek got there
guide to support local parties wanting to make use of their new powers.  See Chris Mullin, How to Select
or Reselect Your MP (CLPD, 1981).  Also see Kogan and Kogan (1983) for an account of its rather
bumpy journey into the Labour Party constitution.
5 A group of six men who were, it turned out, wrongly convicted for a 1974 terrorist attack on two city
centre pubs in Birmingham.  For a full account see Chris Mullin, Error of Judgement: The Truth About
the Birmingham Bombings, Revised Edition (Poolbeg Press, 1990)
6 Interview, Chris Mullin
7 Membership of a Select Committee was at the time effectively in the gift of thee party leader.  Names of
prospective select committee members were ‘brought up in the Committee of Selection by the individual
party whips to fill the party “quota” on committees.  … It is up to each party how it decides who is to be
put forward by its whips in the Committee of Selection and the process is not transparent.’ (House of
Commons 2009, 18-19).
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he found that the leader had no names in mind for who might fill the
vacancy, but one name in mind for who might not.8
In short, Mullin failed to get on to the Committee because Neil Kinnock made use of the
resources of patronage available to the Party Leader to deny him a place.  Certainly that
is the most straightforward conclusion that can be drawn from Mullin’s account and it
fits well with a simple individualistic approach in which A has power over B.  However,
this story needs to be used to approach the question of power’s exercise more
analytically, using the conditions I have set out above.
Strengths of Individualistic Power as an Explanation
There are undoubtedly some aspects of this situation that exhibit, and are illuminated by
the application of IP. I begin by using the questions set out in the stages of analysis
above to examine these aspects before moving on to highlight the way in which IP falls
short as an explanation.
Stage One: Visible Conflicts of Interest Between Agents
a) Which individuals were involved (who was A, who was B)?
b) What were their identifiable interests / preferences (in this particular scenario)?
What ends did they want to achieve?
On one level, there is a simple, identifiable conflict of interest between two parties:
Chris Mullin (CM) and the Party Leader Neil Kinnock (NK). CM sought membership
of the Committee and the leader opposed him (i.e. NK’s preference was that CM should
8 Interview, Chris Mullin
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not be appointed to the Committee). However, this is not the only way of looking at
this situation, as I will discuss further later.
Stage Two: Open Confrontation and Clear Outcomes.
a) How and where was the conflict manifested? How did it play out?
b) Was the conflict direct or indirect?
There was a clear identifiable point at which a confrontation occurred and an observable
result.  The confrontation occurred in a series of requests CM put to NK (via Roy
Hattersley and the Chief Whip).  Although it may be argued that this process is slightly
less open than a truly ‘public’ decision would be, it could still be seen as a direct
confrontation with a clear outcome, which was that CM was not considered for
membership of the Committee.
Stage Three: Analysis of Outcomes
a) Who won?  Who lost?  Was the latter a direct result of the former?
b) Were the outcomes as intended by the winner?  If not, why not?  If so, how?
c) What were the causal relationships / directions of causation? How did the
actions of a ‘controlling’ A cause those of a ‘dependent’ B?
The answers to the first two questions at this stage of analysis are clear.  Firstly, it can
be said that NK ‘won’, in that he achieved his goal and CM did not achieve his.
Furthermore, the latter was a result of the former (indeed, it would have been
impossible for both actors to achieve their goal in this situation).  Secondly, on the basis
that NK’s intention was simply to thwart CM, it can be assumed that the outcome was
as intended by him.  The answer to the third question, however, is less clear-cut: IP
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seems to require a more active response on the part of the ‘responsive unit’ to the
actions of the ‘controlling unit’.  Does NK thwarting the ambitions of CM count?  I
would argue yes: it does not fundamentally challenge the notion of IP to say that just as
one may be forced to do something against one’s will, one may also be prevented from
doing something one desires.  Thus if CM could do so, he would become a member of
the Committee, but NK’s ability to prevent him from doing so constitutes an exercise of
power by NK over CM.  The key point is that NK gets what he wants and CM is
prevented from getting what he wants, or fails to prevent NK from getting what he
wants (which in this case is the same thing).  Thus it can be said can say that NK
demonstrated power over CM by denying him his desire.
Stage Four: Deployment of Resources
a) What resources have been used by actors in the pursuit of their interests /
preferences?  How were they used?  What resources did they not use?
The preferences of NK prevailed over those of CM because his wishes were backed up
by superior resources, namely the powers of patronage available to him.  CM, in these
terms, was relatively weak.  He had no power to decide or persuade.  He was more or
less entirely at the mercy of the leader.  All he could do was ask.  Indeed, it could be
argued that Mullin’s central problem was that such resources as he did have were
negative ones: his radical associations would have immediately made the leadership
leery of him; his support for mandatory selection is unlikely to have found him much
support in the mainstream of the Parliamentary Party; and most of all, his public profile
was controversial in respect of some of the very issues for which the Home Affairs
Select Committee was responsible.  However, perhaps the most powerful resource he
could have had was the support of Roy Hattersley, which he evidently did not.
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Hattersley was Deputy Leader, a senior member of the Shadow Cabinet and responsible
in particular for Home Affairs.  He was thus in a strong position to wield influence over
appointments to the Home Affairs Select Committee, which is precisely why CM was
directed by CW to speak to him.  Had CM had his support, there was a much stronger
likelihood of appointment.  Since he clearly did not, he failed to achieve his goal.
Kinnock, on the other hand, had the strongest trump card that any leader has to play:
solid conditional incentives in the form of power of patronage, which he used to
exercise power over Mullin.
To summarise, the analysis of this situation suggests some important strengths of IP as a
dimension of power.  Firstly, by focusing on particular decisions in which conflicts of
interest between actors can be identified, it is possible to pinpoint where confrontations
over preferences may arise.  Secondly, by analysing these conflicts and struggles and
interrogating their outcomes it can be categorically stated whether or not there has been
an exercise of power, by whom and in what direction.  Because the analyst is aware of
each actor’s preferences, and therefore their intentions, it can be determined whether the
‘controlling unit’ altered the choices of the ‘responsive unit’ in the direction intended.
Thirdly, examining the resources that were used reveals how that exercise of power was
carried out.  Fourthly, the model is parsimonious and has great clarity: it allows the
observer to pare down the situation and reduce its complexity by translating interactions
into formal positions and roles between individuals.  This is one of the specific benefits
of rational choice based approaches like game theory.  Despite these strengths, however,
each stage of the analysis throws up some particular problems which I will discuss
below.
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Weaknesses of Individualistic Power as an Explanation
Stage One: When applied to a clear conflict between two actors, the analysis of a
situation from the point of view of IP is relatively straightforward, as demonstrated
above.  Indeed, the situation in question was selected because it is one that is
particularly amenable to such an analysis.  However, one of the difficulties with this
approach is that party conflicts are rarely just between two actors: other players are
usually involved and their role may muddy the situation in which power is exercised.
For example, there are two additional players in this situation: Roy Hattersley who was
the Shadow Home Secretary, and also Deputy Leader of the party (RH) and the Chief
Whip, Derek Foster (CW).
To deal with the latter first, there are two functions that the Chief Whip will play in a
situation like this.  Firstly, whips play a vital role as an important channel of
communication between the leadership and the rank-and-file (Crowe 1983, 912;
Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999, 16): CW was such a conduit in this situation.  He was
the means by which the preferences and will – in the form of a request and a response –
of NK and CM were conveyed. Secondly, although ultimately he would seek to carry
out the leader’s wishes, CW, as the Chief Whip, would also have had a role in advising
the leader on who might be suitable and in ensuring that spaces on Committees were
allocated in the best interests of the party more widely.  An unknown here is what
advice he (and indeed others) may have given to NK in respect of CM.  This is an
important issue because it introduces an unobserved element into the situation, which
raises problems for this model and what it reveals about the exercise of power. What
were CW’s motivations and preferences?  Did he try to influence the situation in favour
of either actor or to serve his own interests?
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RH, or his support, is treated in the initial analysis as a potential resource to be used for
or against CM. However, just as CW may be understood as more than merely a channel
of communication but as an agent in his own right, so RH may be regarded as more than
just a ‘resource’. What the simple A-B (or NK-CM) model does not easily account for
is the extent to which RH’s own preferences and motivations may have been in play in
this situation.  What were they?  Did he exert influence over NK by persuading him that
CM should not be appointed because of the likely embarrassment it would cause him as
Shadow Home Secretary?  Assuming there was such an intervention (and Mullin
certainly implies that there was), did this have the effect of changing NK’s mind or was
the Leader already in agreement with RH anyway?
Stage Two: Whether this truly qualifies as an open confrontation is a further question
that needs to be addressed.  If not, can its status as an exercise of power be clarified?
The fact that this has not taken place in ‘public’ as an on-the-record process means there
is a behind-the-scenes element to it. Furthermore, the roles of both RH and CW
indicate a more indirect confrontation between NK and CM. Does this challenge its
status as a clear exercise of power by NK on CM?  In my initial analysis, I assumed that
CW is neutral and has merely acted to convey information between CM and NK and
that RH’s support is a potential resource that CM is denied.  Given Kinnock’s antipathy
towards Mullin it might be reasonable for me to assume that RH’s representations made
little difference to NK’s view and that CW would not have had much scope for
changing NK’s mind either.  But what if he tried?  What if NK had to persuade CW that
this was the correct course of action?  Alternatively, what if both RH and CW acted to
strengthen NK’s resolve that it was correct?  In all these kinds of confrontations there is
the possibility of an ‘unknown’ element, which might affect decisions about where
analytically to locate the conflict: is it really between CM and NK and not CM and RH
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for example?  Or perhaps it is between NK and RH, or NK and CW; or even between
NK and other advisors?  This particular problem may be resolved by a little further
research, but would even that be enough?  Is more information needed on the
background to the conflict in question?  What are the underlying causes?  What other
players are involved in it?  These are the kinds of contextual questions which pose
serious problems for the condition of direct and open confrontation and expose
shortcomings in IP’s ability to illuminate power’s exercise in parties.
Stage Three: As I have argued, one of the benefits of these accounts is a parsimonious
neatness and clarity: the exercise of power is conceived as an isolated conflict between
two individuals, which aids the clear identification of those with power and those
without it in a given situation (subject to some of the caveats I have mentioned above).
But how helpful is individualisation of conflicts really?  The answer to the question of
where power lies can depend on where one chooses to locate the conflict.  The focus at
present is very narrow.  If it is widened a little, new questions and possibilities open up.
What does it say for party democracy if leadership possesses such a powerful resource
in the form of patronage, for example?  What, alternatively, does it say about party
power that the Leader of the Opposition could not allow an individual with such
expertise in justice issues to join a body designed to scrutinise the Government on such
matters?  To what extent does it in fact display a weakness in the leadership itself? Did
it reflect the balance of power between RH, NK and other elements in the party? Is it
possible that NK felt unable to make an appointment like this because of the anticipated
reaction of Conservatives and the sections of the press that supported them?  Should the
analysis extend beyond this isolated conflict to identify from where else pressure, real
or imagined, explicit or implicit, might have been exerted on NK?  A slightly different
answer is also forthcoming if the focus is shifted from the direct conflict over
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membership of the committee to more strategic concerns.  Looked at in this way, NK
exerts a more strategic kind of power in blocking CM’s membership: by denying CM
the opportunity to raise inconvenient issues in such an arena.  In other words, the
parsimony that modelling conflicts along these lines can bring becomes detrimental to
providing an adequate explanation of power.
Stage Four: The way in which IP needs to be modelled means that participants are
either understood as agents, acting independently on their own preferences, or as
resources to be used by other agents.  However, this closes off other explanatory
possibilities. For example, since the Chief Whip plays the formal role in putting forward
members for selection, it could be argued that in order to get what he wants NK would
also need to exercise power over CW whether by means of manipulation, persuasion, or
force.  However, this assumes that CW has a choice (i.e. makes a rational decision, even
if it is a result of manipulation).  But does he?  The role of Chief Whip, and its
relationship to the role of Party Leader is a feature of organisation and hierarchy rather
than necessarily personal loyalty or an individual exercise of power.9 One might say
that CW makes the ‘choice’ to obey NK’s commands.  However, this does not account
for the extent to which ‘obedience’ is a matter of fulfilling tasks and following rules and
formal practice.  In the present dimension of analysis the only alternative is to treat CW
as a resource: a channel by which the leader’s wishes are communicated to the
Committee of Selection.  But given CW’s role in the party machine, organisation and
rules may have an important role in shaping and stimulating responses too.  To be
effective, any understanding of power in parties needs to account for these kinds of
formal roles and functions that shape individual behaviour.
9 Labour Chief Whips were elected by the Parliamentary Party.  However, it would be a difficult job to do
without the leader’s confidence and later preferment for other jobs that are in the gift of the leader need to
be taken into account.
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To summarise, when it comes to illuminating the exercise of power, the weaknesses of
IP are fourfold: firstly, it does not and cannot account for additional, unobserved
elements, whether that means individuals who are unaccounted for, or agents failing to
act to resist or defend their interests; secondly, it isolates conflicts and treats them as
unique, ignoring possible underlying causes in other conflicts, in hidden tensions, in
differing social and cultural attributes; thirdly, its parsimony, though a helpful tool, also
makes it too simplistic by ignoring the nuances and multi-faceted nature of conflict;
fourthly, it cannot always distinguish easily between a resource and what actually might
be another potential source of power, e.g. another actor or the organisational context in
which the confrontation takes place.
Example 1 Conclusion
Analysis of the struggle between CM and NK highlights how IP can illuminate some
particular aspects of power’s exercise, whilst falling short in others.   It provides insight
into the power relationship between the leader and a backbencher in a very direct sense,
including the resources they each have access to and how they use them, but it fails to
illuminate the more contextual dimensions of power: for instance, what was the role of
outside forces like the press, the legal establishment and the government in forcing
NK’s hand?  What role did organisational rules or conventions regarding the leader’s
role in these kinds of appointments play?  A shortcoming of IP as a dimension of power
is that it is unable to accommodate these factors in its explanation.  They may at times
appear as resources used by actors in power games, but they are not themselves
regarded as sources of power.  The picture presented of power so far is therefore only
partial: one-dimensional, in fact.
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Example 2: A Coup in Tower Hamlets
My second test situation concerns a major split within the Labour Group on Tower
Hamlets Council that began just five months after the Labour Party re-took control in
1994 after eight years in opposition to the Liberals / Liberal Democrats.10 The conflict
apparently arose because of a profound disagreement over reversing the controversial
decentralisation programme of the previous administration.11,12 John Biggs, the new
council leader, wanted to include guarantees that existing senior officers would be
automatically considered for new posts in the restructured council, but Bangladeshi and
left-wing members of the Group, including Dennis Twomey, combined forces to argue
that they should only be guaranteed an interview, thus facilitating opportunities for
ethnic minority candidates who, it was felt, were under-represented at this level.13 This
was a sensitive issue given the Borough’s recent political history.14 The rebel
amendment was passed by 20 votes to 16, to the fury of Biggs and the executive and the
concern of local trade union representatives, not to mention the party regionally and
nationally.  Moreover, it sharpened the divisions in the Labour Group and precipitated a
tussle over the leadership of the council between Biggs (backed broadly by the right and
centre of the party) and Twomey (backed by the left-faction and Bangladeshi
10 The Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party had merged in 1988 to form the Liberal Democrats,
thus the administration began in 1986 as a Liberal one and ended in 1994 as Liberal Democrat one.
11 Interview, Dennis Twomey
12 The previous administration had reorganised the borough into smaller ‘neighbourhoods’, devolving
much of the administration and management of council services.  The new council saw as one of its
primary tasks to reverse decentralisation and restore Tower Hamlets council as a single bureaucracy.
13 Edward Pilkington, ‘Jobs Row Splits Labour Council.’ The Guardian October 7, 1994.
14 Tower Hamlets had come to national prominence in 1993 when a far-right British National Party
candidate was elected at council by-election on the Isle of Dogs (he was defeated in the 1994 borough-
wide elections).  Controversy also surrounded allegedly racist literature being distributed by the Liberal
Democrats during the 1994 elections, in which the party’s national leader, Paddy Ashdown, had seen fit
to intervene to the chagrin of some local activists (‘BNP “Racists of Millwall” Are Routed’ Evening
Standard, May 6 1994).
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members).15 The party’s annual general meeting that followed was a difficult, fractious
affair that ‘went on for three weeks, which must be something like the longest on record
between the beginning and the end, with the Greater London Labour Party being very
active in-between.’16 At this meeting, Twomey had directly challenged Biggs for the
leadership, but the result was a dead-heat.  Since neither candidate was prepared to back
down, the Greater London Labour Party (GLLP) was forced to intervene.   The initial
nature of the intervention was to mediate between Twomey and Biggs in an attempt to
resolve the matter peacefully. However, this changed when
having recognised that this wasn’t going to happen, they were fairly
brutal about removing him as the favoured candidate. I went along to
this meeting … expecting to be put under pressure to stand down in
John’s favour and there was some pressure towards that, but they had
obviously decided that John couldn’t win and they effectively told him
he would have to stand down.  Pretty bluntly.  Which he did.17
As a result, Biggs was forced to relinquish his post after only a year and Twomey
became leader of the Labour Group (and thus the Council) in May 1995.18 The
immediate interpretation of this situation in terms of IP is that it was a successful
exercise of power by Twomey (DT) over Biggs (JB), which is demonstrated by the fact
that the former achieved the goal of taking over the leadership of the Group from the
latter against his will and therefore was in a position to advance his policy on
15 Interview, Dennis Twomey
16 Interview, Dennis Twomey
17 Interview, Dennis Twomey
18 See Will Bennet, ‘Whiff of Scandal Haunts Troubled Council Victors Rulers.’ The Independent May
27, 1995.
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recruitment to the restructured administration.  I will test the strength of this assertion
by analysing the situation more closely using the guide questions.
Strengths of Individualistic Power as an Explanation
Stage One: Visible Conflicts of Interest Between Agents
a) Which individuals were involved (who was A, who was B)?
b) What were their identifiable interests / preferences (in this particular scenario)?
What ends did they want to achieve?
A visible conflict can clearly be identified in this situation between two individuals, JB
and DT, for the leadership in the Labour Group.  There were two parts to this conflict:
the first one was based on a particular policy towards the recruitment of senior staff;
however this precipitated a more significant conflict from the point of view of the party
between JB and DT for the leadership of the Group itself.  The preferences of each actor
are therefore straightforward in the light of IP: DT wished to become leader of the
Group in place of JB, whilst JB’s preference was to remain in position.
Stage Two: Open Confrontation and Clear Outcomes.
a) How and where was the conflict manifested? How did it play out?
b) Was the conflict direct or indirect?
There was an open and direct confrontation which took place initially at the Labour
Group’s annual general meeting. The conflict came out into the open in the form of a
challenge by DT to JB’s leadership.  However, there was not a clear outcome initially
since the result of the vote was a dead heat.  Thus the intervention of a third party, the
GLLP, was needed to break the impasse.  Does this mean that the confrontation could
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still be regarded as ‘open’?  It had, after all, moved out of the local party’s formal
decision-making structures, into negotiations led by the GLLP.  I would argue yes it
was still open, especially since regional parties like the GLLP have an important formal
role in the resolution of conflicts in the Labour Party.  Because the confrontation could
not be resolved at local level, the next, natural step was for it to be dealt with at regional
level.  In other words, this should not necessarily be regarded as an attempt to exercise
power in a clandestine way.  The involvement of a third party, however, opens a
question as to whether the conflict could still be seen as a direct conflict between two
actors.  I will deal with this question in more detail when I discuss some of the
shortcomings IP displays in explaining this situation below.
Stage Three: Analysis of Outcomes
a) Who won?  Who lost?  Was the latter a direct result of the former?
b) Were the outcomes as intended by the winner?  If not, why not?  If so, how?
c) What were the causal relationships / directions of causation? How did the
actions of a ‘controlling’ A cause those of a ‘dependent’ B?
Whatever the setting, viewed as a direct conflict between DT and JB, the eventual
outcome is clear: DT won because he became Leader of the Labour Group, and JB lost
because he was forced to step down from that position.  Thus the latter was a direct
result of the former.  Given that DT openly challenged JB in a contest, it is clear that
this outcome was the intended one.  However, whether it was DT’s original intention to
challenge for the leadership (the initial conflict was over a matter of policy), and
whether the means by which the eventual outcome came about (i.e. with the
intervention of the GLLP) was as intended is a different question.  In the first case, it is
possible to see how a dispute about one issue (over council restructuring in this case)
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might trigger a clash over another (the leadership itself), and lead to an adjustment in
the preferences or interests driving the conflict between two agents.  In the second, DT
may have hoped to achieve a decisive victory in the initial vote, which may have
provided DT’s leadership with stronger legitimacy.  As it was, it may appear to his
opponents that he got his way at least partly by surreptitious back-room methods and
this puts a question mark over whether it could really be called a clear outcome, except
in a formal sense.  Again, I will tackle this problem among others below.
Stage Four: Deployment of Resources
a) What resources have been used by actors in the pursuit of their interests /
preferences?  How were they used?  What resources did they not use?
DT’s resources were: firstly, an issue which provided a motivation for organised
opposition to the existing leadership (the appointment of ethnic minorities to senior
posts); secondly, as a result he had enough numbers to damage JB irrevocably, even
though he did not have enough votes to win outright; thirdly, as a result of this, I would
suggest he had ‘momentum’, that is, in inflicting such a wound he was able to
undermine the legitimacy of the existing leadership even if he was not necessarily able
to provide decisively for his own.  JB’s story, as with so many in his situation, is one of
lost or diminished resources. He was the incumbent and current leader and as such had
legitimacy and authority.  However, as I have suggested, this was fatally damaged by
the vote.  Consequently, he lost a further asset that may have been in his favour initially:
the support of the GLLP.  DT subsequently gained their endorsement in his place.
To summarise, then, a clear conflict between two actors over the leadership of the
Labour Group is identified, which is the key strength of IP as a dimension of power.
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This was directly manifested in a challenge at the Group’s Annual General Meeting.
There was a clear result eventually, but some potential difficulties for IP are posed by
the protracted nature of the conflict, its progression from a specific issue to the broader
question of leadership, its transition into less public arenas and the involvement of a
third party in the form of the GLLP. Moreover, there are some particular problems with
the last point that I deal with in more detail below.  An interesting point about resources
in this case is that, for DT, they seemed to be relatively small to begin with but grew in
value as the confrontation went on.  Momentum seems to be particularly important in
strengthening an actor’s position and opportunities for victory.  Overall, IP once again
shows its value in pinpointing conflicts in preferences and therefore where power
relations between individuals come into play, but there are ambiguities in its ability to
explain some of the complexities of power’s exercise in parties, as I will discuss next.
Weaknesses of Individualistic Power as an Explanation
Stage One: The first question that can be asked about the above analysis is: can this
conflict really be characterised as one between two individuals?  There are two reasons
why this is may be in doubt.  Firstly, the conflict between DT and JB in fact has its roots
in the ideological and political preferences of two groups: the left faction and the
Bengali contingent (both backing DT) shared the aim of changing the representative
make-up of the council administration so that it a) better reflected the local population,
which was around 30 per cent Bangladeshi in origin (thus benefitting the latter’s
community), and b) was more likely to be in tune with the council’s political priorities
(i.e. more left-leaning) particularly if it was run predominantly by members of the left-
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wing faction.19 JB’s support, on the other hand, came from the pragmatic centre and
right of the party.20 In some ways the parsimonious quality of IP, in which a conflict
which may be quite complex can be boiled down to ‘A’ versus ‘B’ for analytical
convenience, can be seen as a strength.  It can illuminate very effectively one dimension
of power’s exercise (that is between agents).  But it falls short in other ways.  It would
be oversimplifying this situation, for example, to present it as simply a stand-off
between two demagogues and their acolytes.  Beneath the surface is a complex series of
battles and struggles and sometimes complex alliances between groups and factions.
Secondly, there was a third player: this time in the form of the Greater London Labour
Party (GLLP), with a key mediating role to play. The GLLP was not just a resource to
be deployed as the initial analysis suggests but had a clear set of interests and
preferences of its own and a status and legitimacy that gave it the potential to intervene
decisively in the dispute to secure those interests. The GLLP was effectively an agent
of the national party organisation.  As such, it had an interest in the good image of the
party locally and nationally, and in maintaining stability and order.  Officers had the
power and responsibility to intervene in such disputes and would have had an interest in
making sure that the party did not split or collapse into chaos.  Furthermore, party
leaders were on constant vigilance for anything that might feed the seemingly endless
appetite of the press for stories about ‘loony left’ Labour councils in London and
elsewhere.21 Although adding a third player complicates the analysis somewhat as I
have argued, it satisfies some of the prerequisites of IP as a dimension of power, in that
it treats the GLLP as an agent, an actor with a set of desires that it seeks to satisfy in
19 Concerns had been expressed in some Labour quarters  (whether justified or not) that the Liberal /
Liberal Democrat administrations had conducted a politically motivated recruitment strategy (Interview,
Mike Tyrrell).
20 Interview, Mark Taylor
21 Interview, Mark Taylor; Interview, Frank Dobson.
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competitive situations with other actors. However, this highlights further weaknesses in
the approach which I will discuss further under ‘Stage Four’ below.
Stage Two: There were in fact (at least) two stages to this conflict, which is significant
to the efficacy of IP.  The initial conflict and the rebels’ victory over the leadership
precipitated a further struggle over the control of the Labour Group. In other words,
DT’s victory in the first conflict generated resources (authority, organisation,
momentum, confidence) that made a further, more fundamental, challenge viable.  At
the same time, JB’s apparent opposition to the amendment and reluctance to concede
damaged his legitimacy and failed to close down the confrontation that had begun.  A
wider rift opened up, leading to a leadership challenge.  Therefore, one conflict can act
as a trigger for others.  What is observed is part of a chain of events rather than the
simple, one-off conflict that this dimension of power will tend to prefer.  Examining just
the initial conflict, DT got what he wanted by decisively winning the vote on the policy
matter in dispute.  However, the events that followed suggest that this may have been
either a) part of an intended strategy, or b) an unintended outcome of the initial conflict.
Either way it highlights the problems in treating conflicts as isolated incidents in a
closed system.  It means the full extent of power’s exercise cannot be properly
understood.  One conflict can change the landscape or widen the scope of existing
conflicts.  These were not, then, two separate incidents and two separate ‘victories’ but
part of the same struggle, whether intended or otherwise.
Stage Three: As I have already argued, one of the main problems that the formulation of
IP has is that it does not easily accommodate third parties with independent interests or
preferences.  This creates problems for understanding the outcomes of more complex
conflict situations because the result is not necessarily binary.  Causal relations are more
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difficult to establish.  A potential way of using the formulations of IP to understand this
three-way conflict might be to conceptualise it as two separate conflicts: one between
JB and the GLLP and one between DT and the GLLP. The GLLP’s primary interest
was in stability, ideally by maintaining the status quo.  However, DT’s successful
resistance to the GLLP in one conflict forced the latter down its hierarchy of preferences
in the other.  Thus, a weakened JB was effectively forced to stand down by the GLLP
and the latter’s interests prevailed (although not necessarily first choice).  In this case,
then, it might be more accurate to argue that it was not DT, but the GLLP that
successfully exercised power over JB by persuading or forcing him to stand down.
However, although this meant that the GLLP’s interests were met to some extent (by
maintaining peace and stability), it was on DT’s terms, because he was able successfully
to resist being asked to stand down himself and this outcome was undoubtedly not the
GLLP’s first preference given DT’s association with the left and the party’s concern
with maintaining a moderate image.  As Dowding argues ‘changing the choice situation
of people is … an important way of altering their individual and collective power’
(Dowding 1996, 24).  This is arguably precisely what DT (with the backing of an
alliance of factions) did to regional party officials, effectively leaving the latter little
choice but to act in his favour. Quite apart from the fact that this once again treats the
GLLP as an agent (which I will discuss further below), breaking multiple conflicts into
a series of analytically separate incidents is problematic.  Whilst it may be a convenient
way of simplifying investigation, does it really enrich the understanding of power?
How far should it be taken?  Should the relationships each actor has with each of his or
her supporters be included, for example?
George Tsebelis (1990) has attempted to deal with this problem of complexity by
arguing that context matters and can be accounted for in a rational choice context.  He
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proposes the idea of ‘nested games’ as ‘a way of transplanting context into game theory’
(Tsebelis 1990, 245).  He argues that accounting for the various other conflicts at
different levels of the party is important because crucial to the strategies that actors
choose is the pay-offs they receive as a result.  The other conflicts in which those under
analysis may be nested influence the payoffs of different actors in nested games, ‘and
the payoffs influence the choice of strategies’ (Ibid., 246).  Thus, he would argue,
isolating the conflict between DT and JB without understanding how pay-offs are
affected by other ongoing conflicts in which it is ‘nested’ (e.g. between rival leadership
groups or factions, or the electoral competition between Labour and the Liberal
Democrats in Tower Hamlets), means the picture of power’s exercise is incomplete.
The danger is that the attempt to include every actor that might appear to be influential
in some way on a situation may result in an unmanageable series of intricate
relationships and incidents that have no clearly theorised connection with one another.
In other words, it treats the party as no more than an aggregate collection of individual
actors, each with their own interests or preferences, rather than as a party, that is, as a
collectivity with a shared interest in exercising power within a wider political system.
Therefore, Tsebelis does not fully address the problem of context, but simply extends
the number of conflicts to be included or acknowledged in the analysis.
Stage Four: The problems raised by treating the GLLP as a third actor could arguably
be simply dealt with within the framework of IP by treating the GLLP instead as a
resource deployed by DT against JB as the initial analysis suggests.  In that case, it
could be argued that there was a form of indirect manipulation in which DT made use of
available resources (including the GLLP) to restructure JB’s incentives, thus making it
in JB’s interest to back down in favour of DT.  However, this does not ring true because
the GLLP was not simply a resource that DT was free to use or not to use, but an entity
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with apparent interests of its own and a crucially important influence on the outcome.
The GLLP was arguably able to ‘persuade’ JB to step down, because of the authority
regional party officers held in the party hierarchy.  Given the GLLP’s interests and role,
it might be better to argue that DT’s ‘victory’ was in part a by-product of the pursuit of
the party’s wider interests, i.e. it was an indirect result of the GLLP’s ‘desire’ for
stability. The GLLP is therefore conceived as an agent (rather than an aggregate of
individuals who may themselves have conflicts to resolve). But this is also problematic:
it demonstrates neither an adequate understanding of the GLLP’s role nor its
relationship to power.  Regional party organisations like the GLLP have an
organisational status and function, in other words a bureaucratic role.  The ‘preference’
it appears to have for settlement is better understood as an imperative towards order that
is inherent in its functioning.  That is, the GLLP has a bureaucratic ‘self-interest’ in
upholding its own position and reputation and its role within the broader party,
indicating a more bureaucratic dimension of organisational power that needs to be
accounted for. IP has no means of explaining this and so has to conceptualise it either
as a resource or as an ‘agent’. Neither of these is satisfactory in my opinion and I would
argue that the result was in fact partly an outcome of the GLLP’s function. From this
point of view, it can be argued that both DT and JB were subject to an organisational
discipline that was more routine and anonymous than it was an expression of agentically
centred desire.  In other words, there was an entirely different dimension of power at
work here.
In summary, the discussion above demonstrates that focusing the analysis of power
around individual actors (agents), their preferences and the conflicts they give rise to
can be a helpful simplification tool in the study of power’s exercise.  It allows the
analyst to cut through complexities and get to the ‘essence’: a struggle between agents,
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resulting in the victory of one set of interests or preferences over another.  However, the
first danger of this is that by ‘cutting through’ the complexity of a given situation, one
may actually be ignoring important aspects of power’s operation in parties.  In this case,
the intervention of a third party indicates difficulties, not just for the simplicity of the
two-way conflict as a point of analysis, but for the very conceptualisation of ‘actors’ or
‘agents’ as the only meaningful vehicle for power’s exercise.  Second, by focusing on
agents, IP can oversimplify things by ignoring the complexity of the relationships
between individuals, the groups to which they belong and the alliances they form with
others.  These kinds of problems suggest that explanatory power of IP is limited and
should be complemented with theoretical perspectives that can account for these
complexities.  The agency that is accorded ontologically to individual actors endows
them with foresight, intent and interests which in practice are often more ambiguous,
complex or obscure. They may in any case be relatively impotent in relation to more
anonymous, impersonal forces associated with collective action and bureaucratic
imperatives.
Example 2 Conclusion
Overall, the discussion above illustrates the shortcomings of a one-dimensional
approach to the analysis of power in parties.  There is a twofold problem: on the one
hand, there is likely to be more than one relationship behind any conflict, which IP finds
it hard to account for; on the other hand, there are structures that IP ignores completely.
A purely individualised understanding of power cannot really account for the
complexities of how – or even, where – power really works.  In this situation, for
example, as well as differing balances of power and resources between JB and DT, there
is also that between JB and the GLLP, and between the GLLP and DT to consider, at a
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minimum.  There is also a problem with conceptualising power solely as property of
agents.  Although it is possible to acknowledge the power of organisational units or
collectives by treating them as agents for analytical purposes, it means that powerful
parts of the organisation become anthropomorphised which, to my mind, means that the
nature of their power is misunderstood.  The GLLP is not an agent with a desire for
order and unity but a part of the party with an organisational imperative towards order.
Furthermore, in any scenario, there is context, background and preceding exercises of
power that changes the landscape.  For example, further research reveals that the most
likely alternative leader to Biggs was not in fact Twomey, but Rajan Jalal Uddin.
However, he had been suspended (for allegedly sending forged, racist faxes to other
councillors) and the intervention of the party nationally in the person of Frank Dobson
ensured that the suspension was extended to cover the period of the leadership
election.22 Moreover, all of this has to be understood in the context of the ongoing
process of party reform.  Tony Blair had become leader of the Party the year before and
‘New Labour’ with its image of moderation and discipline as a responsible, moderate,
united, governing party, was becoming well established in the public mind.  Surely this
had some bearing on the GLLP’s eventual support for Twomey, thus preventing further
potentially high profile political bloodshed (although ideologically JB may have been
preferred).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have focused on Individualistic Power, the first dimension of power in
my framework.  I began by laying out its principal methodological and ontological
claims and identified a series of questions to operationalise the analysis of its strengths
22 ‘Tower Hamlets Leadership Contender Ruled Out’, Local Government Chronicle 3 April 1995.
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and weaknesses as a means of understanding how power operates within political
parties.  Following that, I then examined two situations from the Labour Party’s recent
history, both of which drew on the accounts of participants whom I interviewed.
Looking at these events through the lens of Individualistic Power is helpful, I
concluded, inasmuch as it can draw attention to conflicts between individuals and
explicate them in clear, parsimonious terms as a struggle whose ingredients and
outcomes are clearly observable. But Individualistic Power is a relational concept. It is
a property of individuals and is exercised by altering the behaviour or choices or other
individuals.  In order to uncover this dimension of power’s exercise, an analysis of
particular situations of confrontation between individual actors needs to take place.  It
requires that the analyst accounts for the intentions and preferences with which
individuals enter a conflict. This is why they are agents and not merely individuals.  As
a result, it can be calculated on the basis of the outcomes of that conflict who has
exercised power over whom.
This approach, then, can highlight certain kinds of power relationship in a political
party. My examples show that it does have utility in helping the analyst identify when a
certain kind of power is being exercised and it therefore contributes to an appreciation
of where and how power operates within political parties. However, because
Individualistic Power focuses directly on individual actors and their preferences or
interests, it is not particularly effective at addressing the wider causes of that conflict.
My analysis suggested that in order to apply this model, complex situations between a
number of actors had to be considerably simplified. This was not very satisfactory:
applying the analysis to actual cases seemed to leave a lot of relationships and power
relations invisible or ambiguous. Although Tsebelis’ ‘nested games’ approach offers
some response to this because it means that contexts and other involved parties are not
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as easily ignored as they might be in Individualistic Power situations, it does not deal
with the central problem in my view.  Conducting numerous bilateral exchanges in
order to build up a fuller picture does not amount to a proper understanding of
contextual, structural and narrative dimensions of power that the actual history,
especially as it is recounted by my interviewees, suggests. The strength of the approach
in terms of analytical clarity was also therefore its weakness in failing to identify or
locate these dimensions of power.   In short, to gain a fuller sense of how power
operates in political parties, it is necessary to include additional dimensions of analysis.
To summarise the discussion so far, then, if the purpose of an analysis is simply to
explain an isolated, unique situation and compare the relative power of two individuals,
then Individualistic Power can be highly informative.  However, if the purpose is to
uncover the operation and exercise of power in an organisational context, such as in a
democratic political party, then it cannot provide enough explanatory power.  My
conclusion is therefore that although it illuminates very effectively one dimension of
power’s exercise, Individualistic Power is seriously lacking on its own and requires
supplementary analysis if the kind of power operating in political parties is to be
identified, located and assessed.
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Three: Strategic Power
The previous chapter set out the first dimension of power in my framework,
Individualistic Power.  It conceptualised power as an agentic capacity exercised in the
confrontations that arise when the interests or preferences of two (or more) actors
conflict.  To say someone has ‘exercised power’ is to say that they have been able to
secure their interests or preferences over and above those of others.  The parsimony of
this approach means it is possible to elicit who powerful party actors are by observing
the frequency with which they are able to secure their preferences over others.  That it
facilitates this kind of straightforward analysis makes it a very attractive approach,
particularly effective at illuminating the power relations between agents in specific
situations.  However, I concluded that it is a rather narrow definition of power that
requires a level of simplification that may sometimes conceal more than it reveals.  In
short, it is literally one-dimensional. In this and the following chapters I will introduce
additional dimensions of analysis that will provide a fuller picture of power’s exercise
in parties.  This chapter will concentrate on Strategic Power, the second dimension in
my framework.
What is Strategic Power?
Max Weber argues that when it comes to competitive struggles those who have more of
the personal qualities required to succeed will typically do so (give or take accident and
luck).  However, he qualifies this by adding that ‘what qualities are important depends
on the conditions in which the conflict or competition takes place’, including ‘the
systems of order to which the behaviour of the parties is oriented’ (Weber 1978, 38-9;
emphasis added).  In other words, individuals or groups may gain ascendancy not only
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because they are personally superior, but because ‘social relationships may be
influenced by the creation of differential advantages which favour one type over
another’ (Ibid., 40).  In other words, the actions of individuals and the resources they
have are not the only indicators of power.  The conditions under which they pursue
those interests; the rules that govern social and political relationships; who designs,
controls, directs and arbitrates them, are all crucial advantages that underpin the
condition of the powerful. These are the kind of concerns underlying Strategic Power.
To explain further, it is helpful to turn to E.E. Schattschneider.
Schattschneider argues that a purely individualistic understanding of politics (and thus
power) is naïve.  He is explicit about the limits of rational choice and similar models
based on economic assumptions like Downs’ Homo Politicus, arguing that
the economic interpretation of politics has always appealed to those
political philosophers who have sought a single prime mover … The
logic of economic determinism is to identify the origins of conflict and
to assume the conclusion.  This kind of thought has some of the
earmarks of an illusion (Schattschneider 1960, 36).
Power, Schattschneider argues, can also be regarded as a more ‘strategic’ phenomenon
that is found in procedure, and which is concerned with means rather than ends
(Schattschneider 1960, 70).  According to his analysis, there is a limit to how often an
individual can continuously take on opponent after opponent in gladiatorial
confrontations.  If there were not, it would demonstrate a kind of power, but the grip on
it would be tenuous and continually under threat.  Much more effective would be to
conserve energy and resources by controlling the likelihood of conflict arising in the
first place.  This view is illustrated by Neil Kinnock’s reflection on his time as leader of
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the Labour Party.  He recognised that ‘leadership will-power is not an adequate engine
of reform’ (Kinnock 1994, 536).  In other words, to exercise power successfully in
political contexts, will, intention and action are helpful but by no means enough.
Individualistic Power might demonstrate who is more ‘powerful’ in one or a series of
isolated incidents, but it does not reveal much about how power is secured by dominant
actors.  In other words, how does A not only secure victory over B, but maintain
ongoing supremacy?  The answer to this question lies in the ability to influence, define
and shape the conditions under which power is exercised and control the means by
which it is exercised; to exercise power of a more strategic kind in other words.  In sum,
the analysis requires the addition of a second dimension of power that accounts for this.
The Key Components of Strategic Power
My understanding of Strategic Power is drawn chiefly from two sources.  The first of
these is  Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) argument (in response to Dahl) that power has a
second face in which what they call ‘nondecisions’ are as important as observable
decisions.  This is where I share some common ground with Lukes, who recognises this
‘second face’ as representing a ‘two-dimensional’ approach to power which he seeks to
build on (see Lukes 1974, 16-20). Bachrach and Baratz’s concept of nondecision is in
part an operationalisation of Schattschneider’s concept of the ‘mobilisation of bias’, my
second source. It is because of my emphasis on this latter work, which is more
specifically centred on how the scope of conflict is controlled in political organisations,
that my approach differs from that of Lukes.
Schattschneider draws attention to ‘the ancient observation that the battle is not
necessarily won by the strong nor the race by the swift’ (Schattschneider 1960, 5-6):
controlling the scope of conflict is far more effective than wasting precious resources in
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open conflict.  The effects of the political process need to be understood because
‘everything changes once a conflict gets into the political arena’ (Ibid., 36).  The most
decisive way of preventing conflict, he says, is ‘simply to provide no arena for it or to
create no public agency with power to do anything about it’ (Ibid., 69).  Political
organisation, he argues, is always biased in some form or another, exploiting certain
kinds of conflict and suppressing others, because ‘organisation is the mobilisation of
bias’. Therefore ‘some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out’
(Ibid, 69).  These are themes built on by Bachrach and Baratz who argue that the
underlying biases built into the system of decision-making means that power is not
exercised only when A gets B to do something that B would otherwise not do, but
when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and
political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the
political process to public consideration of only those issues which are
comparatively innocuous to A.  To the extent that A succeeds in doing
this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore
any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s
set of preferences (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, 7)
In other words, procedures, institutions and rules can govern what questions are
considered in the first place and leaders might seek to use these to their advantage in a
number of ways: by seeking to reorder decision-making norms so as to exclude certain
issues and voices; by manipulating existing rules and procedures in order to block
challenges and engineer victories; by exercising control over access to decision-making
processes in the first place, ensuring that certain voices are excluded more or less
permanently.
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It is possible to identify five characteristic components of this dimension of power:
1. Conflict and power are intimately related.  As with Individualistic Power it
requires a conflict of interest, or a grievance for an exercise of Strategic Power
to be possible.
2. Strategic Power focuses on the process and scope decision-making, rather than
decisions per se.  Thus, although power and conflict are closely related and
power is exercised in a situation of interest driven conflict, it is mediated by
organisational rules and norms.  Thus, conflicts may not become visible
because they are ruled out, excluded or go unrecognised as genuinely admissible
grievances.
3. Power is strategic in that it is focused on the means by which conflicts are
managed.  The ability of an actor to secure his or her interests is dependent not
just on prevailing in confrontation, but on an ability to prevent others from being
able to secure their interests over him or her.  One actor can therefore exercise
power over another by manipulation of rules or norms to avoid or short-circuit
confrontation.
4. Inequalities in power are amplified by organisation.  Strategic Power is
dependent on the ability of certain actors to control aspects of the decision-
making process.  In other words, there is an inequality embedded in the
organisational norms and rules of the political party that means some voices are
more likely to be heard than others.
5. This exercise of power is therefore obscured behind legitimate rules, procedures
and norms.  Identifying an exercise of power centres on how particular
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individuals or groups predominate and control the agenda whilst others go
unheard.  The objects of analysis are formal and informal rules and norms, in
whose favour they operate and what people, in what roles and positions, are
disfavoured by them.
I will now turn to the question of how to identify this dimension of power.  Its
identification is less straightforward than IP since surface appearances cannot be taken
for granted.  Where there appears to be peace there may be conflict beneath the surface,
and where there is conflict its full extent may be obscured.
Identifying Strategic Power
My analysis suggests that there are three stages to the analysis of Strategic Power
[henceforth SP]. The first stage is to a) examine the prevailing norms of decision-
making and participation and the kinds of voices and issues that are and are not heard;
b) determine which individuals or groups are seeking to reorganise and alter those
norms in their favour; and c) which individuals or groups are seeking to defend the
prevailing system. The second stage of analysis looks to establish the existence of
grievances that have somehow not been addressed, or potential confrontations that have
been by-passed or short-circuited in some way by a) identifying what opportunities exist
to express preferences; and b) at what point and how they have been thwarted. The
third stage of analysis will identify how the scope of decision-making may have been
affected by the exploitation or reordering of norms, or the reform of procedures and
rules.  How are certain voices and issues excluded from the decision-making process,
and how does this secure the power of certain individuals or groups?
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Guide Questions for Analysis
In summary, SP is deployed by agents in pursuit of their interests, but it is mediated and
can be amplified by organisation.  This dimension of power widens the scope of
analysis, focusing on how power is exercised by using organisation strategically to
circumvent confrontation.  Powerful actors can maintain dominance by engineering the
exclusion or dilution of threats by using the bureaucratic resources of organisation as
instruments of power.  The three stages of analysis set out above gives rise to a series of
questions which are used to guide the analysis:
Stage One: Prevailing Norms
a) What are the prevailing decision-making norms of the organisation and what is
their effect on the access of certain voices to decision-making arenas and the
airing of certain issues?
b) What people or groups are there seeking to reorganise these prevailing norms?
c) What people or groups are committed to defending prevailing norms?
Stage Two: Blocking Preferences and Demands
a) What opportunities do members have to express grievances or preferences or
make demands?
b) How and when are they thwarted?
Stage Three: The Scope of Decision-Making
a) How do actors use organisational rules and procedures to silence certain voices,
and preclude certain issues from getting a hearing?
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b) How does their exploitation secure the dominant positions of particular
individuals or groups?
Application: Testing Strategic Power’s Explanatory Scope
So far in this chapter, I have set out what I understand to be the main components and
conditions of SP.  It now remains for me to apply it and to test its effectiveness as a
dimension of power in the context of the research I have undertaken amongst Labour
Party activists and elites.  There are some challenges to be cognisant of here.  An
exercise of SP may be hard to identify since it is unlikely to be recorded in minutes, say,
or accounted for in official records.  Also, those who have lost out may not understand
clearly how they were actually excluded.  After all, those who benefit may want to
conceal their intentions, if indeed they are aware of the full implications of their actions
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, 47).  Whilst acknowledging these potential difficulties,
then, the rest of this chapter focuses on three examples which illuminate different
aspects of SP.  Using the questions as a guide, I will determine what this dimension
adds to the understanding of power in parties and assess what limitations need to be
addressed.
Firstly, I examine changes to the Labour Party’s policy-making structures that were
consolidated under the banner of Partnership in Power in 1997 and ask how they have
affected the kinds of issues and voices that get a hearing. Secondly, I look at a specific
example of reform: the introduction of One Member One Vote in 1993.  Of particular
interest here is how the rule changes themselves were secured by exploiting decision-
making rules and norms. Thirdly, I will look at the different ways in which local parties
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have been able to put up barriers against people, excluding voices from important
centres of local influence putting up barriers to membership or office.
Example 1: The ‘Partnership in Power’ Reforms
The Labour Party Conference was for many years the key ‘public forum within the
Party in which all sections and elements could contribute’ and ‘an arena in which the
contending forces identified themselves and their opponents and obtained the ‘feel’ of
strengths and weaknesses’ (Minkin 1978, 241).  The culture of resolutions, composites
and debates all centred on conference was, for many activists, the highlight of the year:
I used to enjoy it.  It was really full on. A massive fringe, there was
always a dozen meetings to choose from.  And you’d do loads of
networking; meet people from up and down the country.  On the
conference floor there was always a bit of an edge, a little bit of
unpredictability.1
By 1997, despite many piecemeal reforms, the National Executive Committee (NEC)
and Annual Conference were still the party’s key policy-making bodies.  Traditionally,
resolutions came from all sectors of the organisation to the Conference, where they were
composited (see below) and then discussed on the Conference floor.  Those adopted
became party policy. The process of policy-making was long and convoluted, but it
allowed the smallest of local branches a small chance of influencing policy.  They could
debate and submit motions to the General Management Committee (GC) for
consideration as a potential constituency party (CLP) submission to Party Conference.
It was also a means by which local activists could, in some small way, challenge
1 Interview, Mike Davis
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leaders, perhaps even defeat them.  Indeed, this seemed to be the primary purpose for
some, since the preliminary agenda of the conference was ‘dominated by the resolutions
and amendments of the affiliated organisations’ which were characterised by ‘criticism
of the Party’s official policy or by proposals for its change’ (Minkin 1978, 64).   For
many activists, these powers were greatly valued: ‘you did feel in control’, said one,
‘and rightly or wrongly, we thought we could influence the government through the
conference.  Getting resolutions to conference seemed incredibly important at the
time’.2
But for leaders, the existing arrangements were embarrassing and damaging to the
party’s image and therefore its electoral prospects:
The party conference was bloody useless.  It was bad presentationally
– we must have been the only party in the Western world who got all
that exposure on television, for a week of conference and actually went
down in the polls as a result – and it was bad for policy formation.3
There were concerns that the policy-making process as it stood was too confrontational
for the TV age.  The adversarial nature of the process characterised by set-piece battles
between ‘left’ and ‘right’ or activists and leaders was regarded as damaging.  Yet there
were tools available for ensuring unwanted proposals were defeated, especially the
process of compositing.4 One former Cabinet minister told me that this was a process
leaders in fact relied on to some extent:
2 Interview, Jan Burnell
3 Interview, Frank Dobson
4 Compositing was designed to reduce the huge number of resolutions by amalgamating duplicates and
those with overlapping wording and themes.  On the surface ‘it was a purely technical process’ but it was
also highly political, with  ‘a subterranean pattern of politics with its own tactics and skills’ (Minkin
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the machine would always sort things out in the compositing process.
If there was a proposal that we didn’t want then it would machinate
one loony proposal into the composite and it wouldn’t go through.5
However, these processes were not one hundred per cent reliable and ‘it had got the
point where the proposals we didn’t want did go through!’6 Even where they did not,
the Conference had become a means by which internal tensions were unnecessarily
publicly exposed and often dominated by
a great divide between the Parliamentary Labour Party [PLP] and the
rest of the Party, where the Party saw what the PLP were saying as a
betrayal of the true cause of socialism and the PLP saw the NEC and
the Conference as the albatross around our necks.7
The Partnership in Power reforms changed all that. Blair ‘launched a remarkable
overhaul of Labour’s constitution’ (Reid and Pelling 2005, 185) in which a new
National Policy Forum became ‘the summit body of an ongoing series of policy
commissions’ and open regional and local discussions, but ‘in practice the process was
largely controlled from above’ (Ibid., 185-6). 8 Although Conference would remain
sovereign, from now on it would only consider policy after a two year gestation period
during which it would be shaped in four internal forums: Joint Policy Committees
(JPCs), the National Policy Forum (NPF), Policy Commissions and a reformed NEC.
1978, 137).  Much of it was conducted through timetabled meetings where two or more sets of delegates
(party National Executive members could not formally participate) sought to draw up a streamlined series
of motions called ‘composites’.
5 Interview, Frank Dobson
6 Interview, Frank Dobson
7 Interview, David Blunkett
8 The NPF had existed informally since 1993, but the Partnership in Power proposals formalised its status.
See Russell (2005), 141
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Although the NEC had once (with its labyrinthine network of subcommittees) been the
most significant policy-making body in the party, it now became an adjunct to a process
rendering it, ‘a largely administrative forum’ (Wring 2005, 155).
Subsequently, the NPF became the main arena of policy debate, but it was the JPCs that
became the really significant policy-making body.  JPCs set the agenda, deciding which
policies should be discussed, and were placed firmly under the control of the leadership
team: they were chaired by the Party Leader, and populated by members of the NEC
and Shadow Cabinet, along with representation from the European Parliamentary Party
and local government.  JPCs set the parameters for six Policy Commissions, with
memberships drawn from the front-bench, the NEC and the NPF.  Reports were then
submitted for consideration by the NPF, which was the first stage of consultation after
the Policy Commissions had done their work, and the last point of ratification before
submission to Conference.  Here, representatives of ordinary members did become more
significant.  The NPF’s membership included representatives from constituencies,
regions and affiliated bodies.  However, it also counted MPs, MEPs, councillors and
NEC members among its number.  In fact, only 54 out of 175 NPF delegates were
representatives of ordinary members, and all were appointed by Conference rather than
membership ballot (Fielding 2003, 135).  The NPF was not given the power to originate
policy but it could amend it or propose alternatives to be put to Conference.  Only once
this cycle was complete was policy discussed by the NEC (with a membership
expanded to include more elite representation) and finally submitted to Annual
Conference for endorsement as official policy (Seyd 1998, 67; Fielding 2003, 131-2).
The Partnership in Power reforms in one sense provided for a wider and more balanced
input from the different sections of the party in the policy process. There were a
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number of ways in which the ordinary activist was disadvantaged by the old system.
For example, at the Conference, even if a grass-roots activist proposal made it through
the preliminary stages unscathed, trade union delegations dominated the vote:
the way the party was structured, ordinary members had no say at all
and the trade unions ruled the roost. It was the union delegations
where the decisions were really made, once an issue was up for vote,
the deal was already done.9
At the same time, however, the new procedure was much more controlled and restricted
in terms of what could be discussed.  Because of the extended gestation period of
policy, debate at Conference would be more predictable and open to direction than
before (Taylor 1999, 17-19).  On the other hand, policy proposals would be more fully
considered and worked out in advance.  From the point of view of party leaders, the
system as a whole was more planned, reflective and methodical and, crucially,
controllable. But for many activists, the inability to submit resolutions to Annual
Conference as before closed off an important route to democratic participation. Some
blame the emasculation of the policy-making powers of Annual Conference for
declining membership and diminished local activism:
The rooms emptied around the time the party conference became less
important and there was more central control.  The various reforms to
the party structures that meant you couldn’t really do anything
locally.10
9 Interview, Hilary Armstrong
10 Interview, John Burnell
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Even those not so nostalgic recognise a problem for participation.  As a former party
official and Labour Party historian told me,
a lot of people look back with rose-tinted spectacles at these things, the
kind of participation where parties would send resolutions through to
conference and of course they would get voted down by the trade
unions anyway!  But at the centre, I think we underestimated how
important these things were to people.11
Whatever the truth of it, reform certainly diminished the opportunities for members or
groups within the party to express preferences through the policy process by closing off
the ‘traditional’ avenues of participation.  As one activist in Nottinghamshire succinctly
put it: ‘there’s no point in making a resolution if there’s nowhere to send it!’12
In short, the new institutions were – and were intended to be – a more effective tool for
‘blocking’ unsafe issues.  As one former Cabinet Minister told me,
I would say that provided the NPF process is carried out in good faith
and capable of modification at conference then it’s a good thing.  The
trouble is that it hasn’t been carried out in good faith and the
leadership uses it to push through what it wants. It’s not that they
ignore it. They actually manipulate it.13
Another former minister agreed that the problem was not the principle of the reform so
much as the way it was practised:
11 Interview, Dianne Hayter
12 Interview, Marjorie Paling
13 Interview, Frank Dobson
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The NPF was inserted into the process so that there was an
opportunity for the detail to be discussed, but at the end if it came out
with a view that was contrary to the party leadership then it was
referred back, incorporating ‘conference views’ … So, the NPF is
what I call a ‘paper aeroplane’ device.  It just goes around and
around.  It talks about things but can’t do anything.14
However, it is also worth noting the positive effects that reform had, particularly on
disagreements within the party.  David Blunkett, whilst acknowledging that the new
policy-making process ‘has not worked as well as I would have hoped’ in terms of
participation, argues that it did succeed in other ways because ‘it did stop the major,
public, internal conflict over policy that had been a feature of the 1980s.’15
Strengths of Strategic Power as an Explanation
This looks like a major exercise of SP: leaders have brought about major reforms in the
decision-making process which has had the effect of shoring up their own positions of
authority.  I will now examine this claim more closely by conducting a brief analysis
guided by the questions set out in the previous section
Stage One: Prevailing Norms
a) What are the prevailing decision-making norms of the organisation and what is
their effect on the access of voices and issues to decision-making arenas?
b) What people or groups are there seeking to reorganise these norms?
c) What people or groups are committed to defending prevailing norms?
14 Interview, Michael Meacher
15 Interview, David Blunkett
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In the period before reform, the party’s prevailing organisational norms of
representation and decision-making could be summarised as a regime of rule-based,
publicly visible policy-making supported by a system of delegatory and representative
democracy (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 23). Annual Conference could be described as an
expression of these norms and a point at which they were manifested.  The conference
and the debates held there expressed publicly the relationship between the different
parts of the party from the branch to the constituency party; from the trade unions and
socialist societies to the Parliamentary Labour Party and the leadership.
Through the Partnership in Power reforms, these prevailing organisational norms were
challenged by leaders seeking both to enhance their own authority within the party and
to manage the way in which the party was perceived in public.  The reforms that
followed would make the policy process more predictable and easier to control and
therefore less of an encumbrance on the party leadership.  It would also (in the view of
leaders) make the process less divisive, providing more ‘credible’, carefully considered
policy that was properly discussed rather than aggressively competed over.  However,
for party activists, Conference was an exciting and valuable aspect of party life and an
opportunity to voice views not usually expressed by the Parliamentary Labour Party or
the leadership.
Stage Two: Blocking Preferences and Demands
a) What opportunities do members have to express grievances or preferences, or
make demands?
b) How and when are they thwarted?
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Both under the old system and under the new, means were available to block
unwelcome policy proposals and debates.  What did change was, first, the availability of
opportunities for activists to submit policy ideas and motions, second, the point in the
process at which demands were thwarted, and third, the effectiveness with which this
could be done under new rules.
As I have mentioned, there had been in the past some opportunity at least for all parts of
the party to participate in the policy-making process, however indirectly.  However, the
likelihood of a particular branch’s policy proposal making it all the way unscathed to
the Conference agenda was tiny and the truth of the matter is that many proposals from
CLPs were thwarted at compositing stage.  Compositing was a useful tool for
organising issues off the conference agenda or making their defeat inevitable.  Indeed, it
was relatively simple.  Great care and precision in wording composites was important
because the success or failure of a particular policy was dependent largely on this
process.  A huge union block vote could swing on the basis of a sentence: ‘in the
compositing meeting one phrase could appear interchangeable with another.  When it
came to the union delegation meeting it could make all the difference to a million votes’
(Minkin 1978, 139).   Therefore, knowing how to swing those votes was a key strategic
weapon in determining what decisions fell and which were carried.
The effect of the new rules, then, was not so much to provide tools for obstructing
unwanted proposals, since they already existed.  Rather it was both to bury those tools
deeper, away from the view of activists and the public, and to render them more
effective.  By devising a system in which Joint Policy Committees set the agenda and
determined what could actually be debated in the first place, a framework was created in
which certain issues could not even be considered in the earliest stages of the policy-
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making process because the opportunities to get them included in the process were
foreclosed.  Where it was once relatively easy for small groups of activists to promote
their policy agendas and build up a head of steam by careful co-ordination and
organisation (such as the distribution of ‘model motions’ to constituency parties and
union branches), the fact that the gates to that process were now guarded by the JPCs
meant that any issue would now effectively need the leader’s approval before it had any
chance of crossing the threshold.  Furthermore, the two year gestation period in four
different internal forums, ensured that difficult proposals could be sanitised away from
public (and more specifically, media) view.  By the time it was debated at Conference,
the outcome was effectively pre-determined: directed not by the concerns or whims of
local constituency parties, but by the pre-existing policy process.
Previously (for example, at the compositing stage), proposals could be buried or
subverted by manipulating the process itself in order to engineer their defeat (see my
second example below), but there was some point in participating.  Indeed, proposals
acceptable to the leadership got through too, and many members valued the process in
itself.    Although the new process had the effect of making the decision-making process
‘safer’ and more controlled for leaders, it might also have been a reason behind
declining membership participation.  Furthermore, this decline may well have tended
disproportionately to exclude activists with non-mainstream views.  Previously,
unorthodox voices had some opportunity to be heard, even if they were not always
taken seriously; henceforth such voices were silenced.
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Stage Three: The Scope of Decision-Making
a) How do norms, rules and procedures exclude certain voices, issues and
challenges?
b) How does their exploitation secure the dominant positions of particular
individuals or groups?
I have established that the prevailing organisational norms of the party were challenged
by Partnership in Power, which embodied new ones: more deliberative and consensual
norms, perhaps with a greater strategic outlook (i.e. with an eye to winning elections).
Furthermore, the NPF was lauded by some as a way of creating opportunities for greater
participation amongst the grass-roots members who did not get to participate in
conferences (which were in any case dominated by trade union votes).  However, as one
former minister said, ‘there is a lot of cynicism about that’16, which is not surprising
given that MPs, MEPs, councillors and NEC members count for a more significant
proportion of the membership than those from constituencies, regions and affiliated
bodies.  Furthermore, the powers of the NPF were carefully circumscribed.  Thus,
although there was arguably some wider input it became more controlled and restricted.
This leads me to the most significant outcome of these manoeuvres in terms of power:
because certain voices were excluded from the policy process by altering the process
itself, leaders secured more control and more capacity to get their own way in matters of
policy.
To summarise, analysing the Partnership in Power reforms through the lens of SP has a
number of strengths.  The analysis shows how leaders sought a restructuring of policy-
making norms in order to curtail damaging or embarrassing conflict. Altering rules
16 Interview, Gavin Strang
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meant that voices and issues unfavourable to elites could be thwarted at a much earlier
stage of the process, even before it began.  The risk of unwanted issues becoming
‘visible’ conflicts was therefore much reduced.  This, I would argue, is a prime example
of a mobilisation of bias in which practices are altered and new organisational norms
established that act as an ongoing barrier against challenges and threats to leadership
hegemony.  The point here is that methodologically, this mode of power lies hidden
within procedural reforms, but the reforms themselves are introduced in order to
foreclose potential opposition and ensure that conflict remains out of public view, even
though dissenting opinions and grievances may still exist.
Limits of Strategic Power as an Explanation
I have argued here that SP explains how power was intentionally exercised by and in
favour of leaders, via reform of the party’s procedures. SP supplements IP by
illuminating how leaders secure power by manipulating rules and preventing the kind of
conflict likely to threaten their position.  This therefore militates against some voices or
issues from getting an airing.  However, this additional dimension of power is not
adequate on its own because it cannot explain how the Labour Party came to embrace a
new political culture.  Additional accounts of power would need to be identified to do
this.  In particular this opens up questions about the relationship between power and
intention, and therefore the role of agents in its operation and exercise.
Example 1 Conclusion
Analysis of the effects of the Partnership in Power reforms highlights in particular how
SP can be used to entrench the position of certain powerful groups by excluding certain
voices and closing off the possibility of challenge.  Rule changes may act as an
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insurance against future threats.  On the other hand, they may simply displace those
threats to other arenas such as the NPF itself.  Either way, what I have demonstrated
here is how the structure of the policy process affects the ability of activists to
contribute to policy, the likelihood of conflicts over policy being exposed to public view
and the ability of leaders to predict and control the outcomes.  It is strategic because it is
a power which is centred on the means by which decisions are made, conflicts are
managed, and voices are included or excluded from decision-making.  In this case, the
exercise of SP has shored up the position of party leaders by marginalising and
silencing voices and issues undesirable to them.  There are, arguably, some resonances
here with Robert Michels’ theory of party elites.  However, Robert Michels (1962
[1915]) brings to light a more structural organisational logic which is missing from SP.
This dimension of power should be understood as more ontologically agentic,
supplementing and building on IP by explaining how some groups or individuals are
able actively to maintain dominant positions over others.
Example 2: Getting ‘One Member One Vote’ Through the 1993 Conference
A crucial aspect of the Labour Party’s ‘modernisation’ process was realised when ‘One
Member One Vote’ (OMOV) finally became the basis of the selection of parliamentary
candidates and election of leaders in 1993. The moment appeared ripe.  The year
before, a poll of members found that 81% supported changing the leadership electoral
system to OMOV (Russell 2005, 49). It did not happen suddenly but had been a matter
of debate ever since the introduction of the electoral college in 1981.17 Nonetheless, it
was a momentous change:
17 The electoral college for the election of leader was made up of three sections: forty per cent of the
college was given over to trade unions (who were under no obligation to ballot their members), thirty per
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in a short period of seven years the party had abandoned the principle
of delegatory democracy enshrined in its constitution for over sixty
years and had begun the process which leads to individual member
democracy (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 23).
What I am particularly interested in here is how the rules were changed rather than the
changes themselves; that is, what sort of power was needed to bring this change about?
What does the reform reveal about how power works in political parties and does it
demonstrate the value of SP as a lens of analysis? How, in the face of much resistance,
which persisted right up to the last moments, did the leadership get its way on this
particular issue?
It seems that sheer persistence may have been as important as anything else: the issue
just kept on coming back. The process of change took seven years from its first
appearance on the conference agenda in 1983 (when it was remitted to the NEC) up to
its use in NEC elections in 1990, and another three before it was applied more widely to
candidate selection and (in modified form) to leadership elections. In the interim,
another proposal was once again remitted to the NEC (in 1985). This time, a working
party was set up, reporting back to Conference in 1987, but consultation only served to
demonstrate how polarised views really were.18 Conference reflected this division by
voting down both OMOV and the status quo. Hence an electoral college system for
candidate selection was chosen ‘by default’.19 Nonetheless the case for further reform
cent to Constituency Labour Parties (in practice, their General Management Committees), and thirty per
cent to individual MPs.
18 107 favoured mandatory OMOV, 100 preferred the status quo, 23 supported a local electoral college,
18 preferred other options (see Russell 2005, 44).
19 When it was adopted in 1988, this did have the result of extending participation, since selecting
candidates was no longer the preserve of activists on the GC but was extended to all party members, but
unions still retained a role and ballots were not compulsory.
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was getting stronger. The leadership contest of 1988 underlined the gap between
activists and ordinary members: amongst the 350 constituencies that balloted their
members, support for the incumbent Kinnock / Hattersley ticket was far stronger in
comparison with those that did not.20 Finally, in 1993 OMOV was formally adopted.
Or it was almost OMOV: what the Conference in fact voted in favour of was a version
of OMOV that was, firstly, a candidate selection process that would be conducted by
means of a ballot of all CLP members, with individual trade unionists being required to
pay a nominal sum to join in order participate; secondly, reforms to elections for Leader
and Deputy Leader retained elements of the old electoral college, whilst
‘individualising’ them.  The electoral college itself was reformed to one third each for
MPs and MEPs, CLPs and trade unions (as opposed to 30-30-40 as it had been), and
henceforth TUs and CLPs would be required to ballot their members individually and
allocate the votes proportionally. However, the reasons for reform and its consequences
have been extensively documented elsewhere.21 It is the how of this reform which is of
greater interest to this thesis.
The leadership’s victory in getting OMOV through in 1993 is conventionally
understood as the party leader, John Smith, asserting his will over the Labour Party by
winning a straightforward vote at the party conference in 1993.  At the Conference
itself, Smith proclaimed it as ‘the chance for more trade unionists than ever before to
take part in all the decisions and the campaigns of the Labour Party’ and that reforms
20 In 1988 Benn challenged Kinnock for the leadership and was crushed (Kinnock got 88.6% of the vote).
John Prescott and Eric Heffer are both overwhelmingly defeated after challenging Roy Hattersley for the
Deputy Leadership. Many of Benn’s Campaign Group colleagues advised him against running, and a
group of women members resigned from the group in protest at his candidacy.
21 See, for example, Lovenduski and Norris (1994); Russell (2005, Chapter 3); Shaw (1994, 117-121).
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were ‘vital’ and ‘central’ to winning power.22 He even made threats to resign over the
issue if he did not get his way, but even then, the vote was on a knife-edge. The
Independent reported that
the leader's number crunchers were panicking.  The momentum
towards reform had stopped, and the anti-OMOV traditionalists, they
reckoned, had a seven percentage-point lead among the delegates. The
situation could only be transformed by ‘theatre, a politician with
background.’23
Smith’s masterstroke, it appeared, was to recruit John Prescott, a tub-thumping
working-class union man, to the cause. Larry Whitty (the party’s General Secretary)
had been due to wind up the debate, but this plan was promptly dropped and a rousing
speech by Prescott, insisting that this was a not a step towards divorce with the unions,
has largely been credited with turning the conference around (Russell 2005, 55) and
ensuring that the reform got through by the closest of margins.24 It was a highly
acclaimed, if unconventional performance:
in the bar even his union critics were saying it was ‘the best piece of
joined-up shouting’ they had ever heard.25
22 Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1993.
23 Stephen Castle and Paul Routledge, ‘Is Labour Electable?’ The Independent, 3 October 1993.
24 Patrick Wintour and Keith Harper, ‘Smith Pulls Off High-Risk Gamble.’ The Guardian 30 September
1993; ‘Hero Prescott Stakes Claim to the No 2 Job; Smith Calls in the Cavalry.’ The Daily Mail 30
September 1993;Matthew Parris, ‘Verbal Bulldozer Clears the Path for Smith Reforms. ‘The Times, 30
September 1993.
25 The Independent, 3 October 1993; op. cit.
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In fact, the decisive actions that ensured the policy squeaked through happened away
from the conference floor.  Absolutely crucial to the rule-change being passed was the
votes of trade unions which at the time still controlled 70 per cent of the votes at Annual
Conference between them.  In a confidential memo to the party leader before the
conference, Larry Whitty noted that the 70 per cent was likely to be split 22.4 per cent
in favour of reform and 47.4 per cent against.  The situation seemed grim for the
leadership:
On this basis it would take only one in ten CLPs to vote against to
defeat the proposal.  The CLP opposition is bound to be at least that.  It
would be unwise to assume anything more than 60/40 amongst CLPs
for the proposition.  This would mean 57.3% against, 34.4% for.
Abstention by MSF and USDAW would reduce against votes to
36.1%, although … on a 60/40 split the proposal would still go down.
There could be more work done on MSF and USDAW … but … one
of the big unions has to shift to at least abstention.  Only if the GMB
(or TGWU) shift will others start to shift except on a clear confidence
vote for and against the leader.26
The National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) had shifted into the ‘for’ camp
already, but the big unions continued to oppose change.  MSF and USDAW were the
only hope left.27 In the end the USDAW delegation went against its mandate and voted
in favour of the reform and the MSF abstained, which was just enough to carry the day.
26 Larry Whitty Memo to John Smith, 4 August 1993
27 MSF: Manufacturing, Science, Finance union; USDAW: Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied
Workers.
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The key to resolving the problem was the way in which the motion was drafted.  It
linked together two questions: as well as implementing one member one vote, the policy
also would bring all women shortlists for parliamentary selections into being.  This, for
Hilary Armstrong, who was John Smith’s Parliamentary Private Secretary at the time,
was a clever move:
Larry Whitty had somehow got the question of OMOV linked to that of
all-women shortlists (AWS).  I don’t quite remember how on earth he
did it.  There were probably political reasons, but he also had
constitutional reasons for lumping a whole series of reforms
together.28
He certainly did have political reasons: such a move would support the General
Secretary’s key aim to ‘minimise the number of defeats, and not to compound them’.29
This action ‘consciously exploited the dilemmas that would be faced by unions that had
policy supporting one and opposing the other’ (Russell 2005, 56), thus opening up the
possibility of some unions changing position.  This is precisely what happened, as an
inside account MSF’s shift of position demonstrates.  A Guardian columnist wrote at
the time:
The leader's real hero was some unknown party official who earlier
this summer rolled the proposed one-member-one-vote reform and a
quite separate plan for women-only shortlists into one compendious
rule change to be put to conference. It was done quite deliberately, I
28 Interview, Hilary Armstrong
29 Whitty op. cit.
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was later told by someone who certainly should know, in order to force
Labour's feminists to vote for OMOV.30
Recounting this story also brings to light a second important factor.  Hilary Armstrong,
at the same time as being a close aide to the leader, was officially part of the MSF
conference delegation.  As such she could speak at its meetings and participate in
decision-making.  The MSF’s position on both issues was clear cut: there was ‘strong
policy support in the union for AWS, but also against OMOV’. 31 Voting against the
motion would therefore break their mandate on the former, and voting for it would
break their mandate on the latter.  The delegation was divided on what to do.  However,
Armstrong knew that an abstention was likely to be enough and she and a close
colleague in the delegation were able to decisively influence its response to the dilemma
at a crucial last-minute meeting:
We ended up putting off the delegation meeting to make a decision
until Tuesday lunchtime, so it was just before the vote. It was that
meeting that was a key to getting it through. Me and Anne, the
women’s officer went up and down in the lift three times before the
meeting trying to decide how we could get the vote.  In the end we
decided that the delegation should abstain, because if we voted against
the motion, we would be voting against our AWS policy and if we
voted for it, we would be voting against our policy on OMOV. And
that’s what got it through! 32
30 Martin Kettle, ‘Why Prescott’s Peroration was Just the Gloss.’ The Guardian, 2 October 1993.
31 Interview, Hilary Armstrong
32 Interview, Hilary Armstrong
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The delegation decided by 19 votes to 17 to follow their advice, thus allowing the rule
change to be passed by 45.7 to 44.4 per cent.  Delegates from Constituency Parties
voted 60:40 in favour, as the most optimistic forecasts predicted.  For Armstrong, it was
a relief:
I remember I went to see John who was on the platform and whispered
in his ear, I told him not to show anything on his face (there were
cameras all around and he was on the platform), but I told him not to
worry and that we’d won the vote.  Then of course John Prescott did
his speech, and everyone thought it was him, which is great!33
In the end though it was ‘the single anonymous member’ of the MSF delegation who
voted to abstain on the proposals that won it and ‘Prescott was simply the big finish’.34
Strengths of Strategic Power as an Explanation
Stage One: Prevailing Norms
a) What are the prevailing decision-making norms of the organisation and what is
their effect on the access of voices and issues to decision-making arenas?
b) What people or groups are there seeking to reorganise these norms?
c) What people or groups are committed to defending prevailing norms?
The existing means of selecting leaders and candidates was based on the principles of
representative or delegatory democracy that I highlighted as part of the previous
33 Interview, Hilary Armstrong
34 Martin Kettle, The Guardian, op. cit.
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example.35 As I have argued, these were traditionally important parts of the party’s
prevailing organisational norms.  However, the leadership sought to modify these norms
by introducing the principle of One Member One Vote which would a) provide more
opportunity for the mass of ordinary members to participate in these activities; b)
further circumvent the influence of trade union leaders who wielded large ‘block votes’
on behalf of their memberships without directly consulting them and c) as a result,
moderate the potential for challenges to the leadership.  Since it was thought that
ordinary party and trade union members were likely to be more moderate, the kinds of
results that would come from member ballots were thought likely to be more acceptable
to the party elite.  Indeed this had been demonstrated by previous informal uses of
ballots, including in the 1988 leadership contest, as I have shown above.  The biggest
barriers to change were the trade union leaderships who had an interest in maintaining
the power they currently held in the form of the huge block votes they controlled.
Stage Two: Blocking Preferences and Demands
a) What opportunities do members have to express grievances or preferences, or
make demands?
b) How and when are they thwarted?
The opportunity for trade unionists to express their preferences was presented in the
form of reform proposals which they could vote against if they wished.  However, those
preferences became ‘thwarted’ in the case of the MSF by the use of procedural
mechanisms: combining two policies on which the union delegation had differing
instructions.  The existing rules therefore were used to create dilemmas for potential
35 It should be noted that up to 1981, party leaders were elected by the Parliamentary Labour Party alone,
thus the precise form that these prevailing norms took in the context of leadership elections was relatively
new.
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opponents of change and thus potentially block resistance.  This is a primary example of
how confrontation is mediated by manipulating procedure and changing the scope of
decision-making.  The MSF’s situation was manipulated with the aim of producing just
this result.
Stage Three: The Scope of Decision-Making
a) How do norms, rules and procedures exclude certain voices, issues and
challenges?
b) How does their exploitation secure the dominant positions of particular
individuals or groups?
The leadership and their supporters in the party conference administration were able to
exploit and manipulate rules and procedures so that, in mobilising the support of trade
union delegations like the MSF behind All Women Shortlists (AWS), they were able to
silence the opposition to One Member One Vote (OMOV).  Combining the two policies
into a single proposal made it impossible for the MSF delegation to both challenge
OMOV and support AWS.  The norms of delegatory democracy required delegations to
stick to their mandates (in this case to oppose OMOV and support AWS) but they could
not do both and dominant interests in the party exploited this by intentionally creating
the dilemma.  There is another layer to this.  Whilst party leaders were able to secure the
change they desired through the manoeuvring of anonymous officials and aides behind
the scenes, the trappings of confrontation, including a big set piece speech and threats to
resign made the result look like a victorious head-to-head confrontation with reactionary
trade unionists. Indeed, Lovenduski and Norris argue that the vote was more  ‘a
symbolic assertion of the will of the party modernisers, directed at the electorate’,
designed to maximise ‘the appearance of independence of the party from the unions’
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(Lovenduski and Norris 1994, 216), than it was about the detail of parliamentary
selections ‘which were little understood and largely hidden from public view’ (Russell
2005, 55). However, the introduction of OMOV was not just ephemeral or symbolic:
by widening the involvement of the regular, less active membership, it was a means by
which the leadership sought to moderate the likely outcome of selection processes and
leadership ballots, thus securing their own position in the longer-term.
On the other hand, it was arguably a risky tactic for the leadership: since the delegation
would have to go against its mandate either way, then it would have nothing to lose by
voting against the proposal.  However, the gamble was that they would not be prepared
to sacrifice women’s representation. This is where the importance became apparent of:
a) the nineteen members of the delegation for whom the case for AWS was stronger
than that against OMOV; and b) the influence of leadership allies like Hilary
Armstrong.
Limits of Strategic Power as an Explanation
There are two points I wish to highlight here.  My analysis of SP in this context has
focused on the strategies and tactics employed to win the necessary number of votes to
get a policy proposal through the 1993 Conference.  However, it should be noted that
the reforms themselves were part of a more gradual change, not just the outcome of
certain tactics used on the day.  It was trialled and tested on a voluntary basis,
established as a means of electing representatives to the NEC constituency section and
therefore had become a part of party culture, even if just in a small way. Only then was
the leadership prepared to risk attaching itself to the proposal so decisively.  The
gradual acceptance of OMOV, one might argue, comes about because of a series of
smaller,  less ‘visible’ decisions around the edges of the party (i.e. in places deemed less
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important to trade union interests in the party).  One way of looking at this as the
outcome of persistence, in which the policy came back and back again; another is to
understand it as part of an organisational logic in which the wider political context
inevitably propels the organisation towards measures which strengthen elites and
diminish the influence of activists.  Thus whilst SP provides a necessary supplement to
IP by bringing context in as an important mediator of intentional power, it fails to
account for the extent to which a more anonymous organisational logic might itself be a
source of power that shapes decision-making possibilities. Secondly, as I have argued
earlier, new organisational norms are developed out of pragmatic reforms designed to
support political effectiveness and professionalism.  This also has the effect of
strengthening elite power and muffling or silencing alternative voices, such as organised
trade unionism. SP can be very effective at explaining these processes, but it can go no
further.  Whilst SP focuses on norms it does not explain how they become sedimented
through practice as part of the party’s ‘culture’, pointing to the need for additional
dimensions of analysis.
Example 2 Conclusion
This example of SP arises from a struggle for power and influence between party
leaders and union leaders.  For the latter, OMOV would weaken their influence over the
selection of party leader in particular (because they would be obliged to ballot their
members).  They had only had that power since 1981 and were not going to give it up
easily. It would also diminish the power of union representatives over candidate
selection in local constituencies, which is a key influencing tool over the party as a
whole (Schattschneider 1942, 64; Lovenduski and Norris 1995, 3). For leaders, on the
other hand, victory was by no means guaranteed, even with the help of the strategic
155
manoeuvres that took place.  Clearly, the General Secretary, the party leader and
sympathetic others felt the danger of losing OMOV was a real one. Seen from the point
of view  of IP, the degree of careful calculation and the exploitation of the NEC’s right
to combine the two proposals in a single proposal, arguably demonstrated a level of
weakness on the part of the leadership over this issue, because it recognised that they
were unlikely to win in a direct confrontation.  But IP sees power in only one dimension
and fails to understand how power can be exercised more strategically.  This example
shows how SP was operationalised within the decision-making process in the way the
motion was drafted and in the covert bargaining that took place within delegations. SP
explains the leadership’s victory in terms of the exploitation of both the norms and rules
of decision-making thus securing its preferences with the threat of preventing another
party (MSF) from securing an important part of theirs (AWS).  Thus power is exercised
by manipulating the ability of some actors to respond to issues, thereby suppressing
their voices.  However, SP is agentically focused and thus unable to account for the role
of organisational logic and inadequate for grasping the processes by which the interests
and subjectivities of participants were constituted before the crucial vote.
Example 3: Recruitment and Selection
My third example is concerned with the ability to exercise influence over who can join
and represent the party. One sure way of heading-off a challenge to one’s authority is to
ensure that those likely to make one do not join the party in the first place. Thus, control
of recruitment is a significant form of SP because it prevents certain people from getting
into a position to express their views.
Until 1988, because control of recruitment was in local hands, local parties were able to
have a significant say in who could or could not join the party.  In a place like Tower
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Hamlets, where the Labour Party was until 1986 in perpetual control of the council, this
meant that local elites could prevent challenges to their own positions on the local
council.  However, this state of affairs was eventually threatened by two different
developments: firstly, the entry of a new tranche of radical activists from the early
1980s onwards; secondly, the centralisation of the party’s recruitment system and
membership list in 1988, making it easier for people to join (via the national
organisation) and harder for local elites to exercise the power of exclusion.
Subsequently, however, new strategies became available for controlling candidate
selection in the form of approved ‘panels’ of candidates, which arguably revived the
possibility of control and shifted the location at which that control was exercised from
further inside of the party.
This relocation and reorientation of SP in the party is well illustrated by the experience
of Stephen Beckett, a trade union activist who first joined the party in the 1980s,
motivated by the brand of left-wing politics espoused by Tony Benn and Ken Coates
(See Coates 1979).  Later in his party career, after years as an activist and still very
much of the left, he became a councillor.  He held that position at the time of the left-
wing coup in the Labour Group which led to Dennis Twomey’s capture of the
leadership (see previous chapter).  At these two key points in his party career, Beckett
found himself subject to attempts to exclude him from the political process.
Beckett and other members I spoke to recount how the old small ‘c’ conservative party
elites ran the local Labour Party in paternalistic fashion: members were relatively
deferent and leaders acted as gatekeepers of party membership.36 The kinds of barriers
that existed were neither transparent nor formal and often varied.  Sometimes, simply
36 Interviews, Mike Davis; Stephen Beckett; John Burnell
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not being part of a dominant group could be a barrier. In some parts of London, for
instance, local Labour Parties had traditionally been dominated by the Irish community:
There were some parties in London particularly that would very much
stop you coming in.  The old Islington North Party – a guy called
Michael O’Halloran was the MP, in the 60s or early 70s – If you tried
to join, they actually wrote back and said ‘sorry, no vacancies’!37
Other local parties (e.g. Hackney) would exclude non-union members from membership
and keep the membership regulated that way.38 Others, however, were difficult to join
simply because of disorganisation or incompetence.39 At other times it appeared to be
more political in nature.  Stephen Beckett’s story is an excellent example of this.
Trying to join the Labour Party was fun, in a way.  Having decided I
was going to do it, I thought, how do you join the bloody Labour
Party?   I knew various councillors, well I say knew them, I knew who
they were, and could identify some of them on the street. And I pulled
up one of the councillors once and asked him about joining the Labour
Party, and he looked at me very peculiarly and said ‘No, no.  You
can’t’ and so I said ‘What do you mean?’ and he went ‘it’s full up’!40
As a result, many members had to work surprisingly hard to join, or had to be
‘sponsored’ by people already on the inside. Persistence was required to get past the
barriers that had been erected, as Beckett found out:
37 Interview, John Burnell
38 Interview, Jan Burnell
39 Interview, Marjorie Paling
40 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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It took me the best part of a year to get a card and find out where the
branch was!  I knew somebody who was a party member in Hackney
and they sorted out a form and said send the money to Walworth
Road41, it will take its time, because they didn’t have a local contact or
one they could recommend locally to do it.  It weren’t like open party
recruiting! 42
These kinds of practices were, it seems, a way of maintaining a kind of political and
cultural homogeneity, and therefore power, by excluding those deemed undesirable by
local elites.  Those like Stephen who managed to get around the barriers recount the
tension that was caused:
It was really difficult.  Very old councillors, very traditional right
wing, rather than particularly vicious: slightly incompetent, bumbling
along types.  And there was a hostility between new people coming
into the party and I must say pretty much most, if not all, of the Labour
group.  You wouldn’t have been able to call them Bennites! So there
was a sort of clash immediately in that sense.43
As a result of this, local elites were able to control who was nominated as a candidate
for local elections.  In Hackney, for example,
several of the wards, particularly in the Hoxton area, the councillors…
they had never had any proper selection procedures where anybody
could be nominated and be selected.  There were such low
41 The party’s national headquarters at the time
42 Interview, Stephen Beckett
43 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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memberships and they used to keep them quite low deliberately, a lot
of us felt. So they were there, and they were the candidates.44
Dennis Twomey reports that in the heyday of the ‘old guard’ the selection process for
council candidates was informal, and highly localised
the selection was done entirely by the ward.45 I don’t think there was
anyone actually present from the party at all, just the ward members.
It was by today’s standards, sufficiently informal as to be almost non-
existent.  There were no panels or formal selection meetings, nothing
like that.46
But in Tower Hamlets, the grip of the old elites began to slip as more members broke
through the barriers they had erected.  Indeed, the elite losing control of recruitment
seems to be a factor in the growing prominence of the left in the higher echelons of the
Tower Hamlets Labour Party in the 1980s.  Beckett played a role in that:
that’s what pushed me and a few others to see we could recruit openly
and that … and soon the party was starting to fill up with activists.
Branch meetings soon became thirty, forty people … the whole party
seemed to re-energise.  There were lots of internal battles, though,
between the camps.47
44 Interview, Mike Davis
45 The ‘ward’ is an electoral sub-unit which elects councillors. In the context of Labour Party
organisation, the term is synonymous with ‘branch’, referring to the most localised unit of the party
organisation.
46 Interview Dennis Twomey
47 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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However, by 1988 the Labour Party had begun to centralise its recruitment process and
membership system.  Individuals could now more easily apply directly to the national
office and local parties had much less power to prevent anyone from joining and
perhaps eventually becoming candidates and councillors.  So whilst the benefit for the
party was (potentially) more members, the problem was less ability to control who
joined in the first place.  However, because of the left’s growing local prominence by
this time, this was becoming more of a problem for them than the old right, since they
had in a different way, been just as selective about who joined:
one of the lines we took in terms of trying to recruit is we would be
involved in our tenants associations and things like that.  And then
amongst the tenants activists, initially you’d sort of think: ‘so-and-so’s
really good’ and you’d recruit them in.  So they’d bring the issues of
the tenants association into the Labour Party … and that made them
feel that the Labour Party was the vehicle that would help achieve
those aims.  And so that’s why it became a bigger thing.48
Although there was no longer direct control over who joined, a reform introduced in the
1990s made available a new tool that could help prevent ‘inappropriate’ candidates from
being selected for office. Henceforth, prior to being selected as a candidate in any ward,
an individual would have to be approved by the Local Government Committee (LGC)
of the Constituency Party following admission to a ‘panel’ of approved candidates
vetted by interview. It was a way in which local parties could keep a ready list of
approved and acceptable candidates who were then permitted to go forward into the
selection process in local wards.  Thus it was also a potential tool for determining who
48 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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could or could not become a candidate. Furthermore it meant that control of the Local
Government Committee played a decisive role in the approval of candidates.
This is demonstrated by what happened following the 1995 coup in the Tower Hamlets
Labour Group (see previous chapter).  The defeated faction, despite losing control had
meanwhile taken control of the LGC, which gave them control of an important strategic
tool in the right’s fight-back.  In the following years, a number of left-wing councillors
who had been elected in the Labour victory in 1994, were deselected and replaced.
One former councillor recalls that ‘a lot of my colleagues, who I had worked very
closely with, were never reselected.’49 Stephen Beckett was among them and recounts
his experience:
I was a councillor until 1998.  The LGC at the time decided not to put
me and a few other left councillors on the panel, so we couldn’t re-run,
unless we stood independently or whatever, which we weren’t going to
do.  Although some people thought about it.  There was no real reason.
We were all totally competent as councillors.  We hadn’t broken the
whip.  We all had a number of very insulting reasons for our dismissal.
I think mine was that I didn’t show the commitment to be a Labour
councillor.  I appealed.  And I won my appeal, as most of us did.   Very
disappointing, but politically motivated.50
Thus by capturing control of the process of candidate approval, the right of the party
were able to block their political opponents from even being considered as candidates,
49 Interview, Phil Maxwell
50 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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thereby excluding voices of the left not just from the council chamber, but from the
selection process itself.51
Strengths of Strategic Power as an Explanation
In this particular case, SP has provided an important explanatory dimension which has
two aspects to it.  Firstly, it draws attention to how positions of authority can be used to
mobilise bias: in this case, by putting up barriers against threats to the status quo and
that exclude certain voices from membership altogether.  Secondly, it highlights how
changes in rules, procedures and norms can affect access to arenas that others may wish
to protect and how this silences certain views.  I will now discuss these points using the
guide questions I have set out.
Stage One: Prevailing Norms
a) What are the prevailing decision-making norms of the organisation and what is
their effect on the access of voices and issues to decision-making arenas?
b) What people or groups are there seeking to reorganise these norms?
c) What people or groups are committed to defending prevailing norms?
Using SP as the means of analysis, this example sees prevailing organisational norms
coming under threat from two sources.  Traditionally, local parties controlled the
recruitment of members:  they were the point at which people generally needed to apply
to join the Labour Party, they collected subscriptions and were the key point of contact
with individual members.  Local elites were the gatekeepers to the organisation and
clearly interested in defending their own powers in this regard.  However, a challenge to
these powers came from two directions: firstly, from a new breed of activist wanting to
51 Interview, Stephen Beckett, Phil Maxwell
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access the party and open it up to more activists like them; and secondly, from the party
nationally who wished to bring the membership under their control by means of a
national membership scheme.  This would, it was hoped, open up membership to the
public much more widely, supporting the development of a mass, mainstream
membership.
Stage Two: Blocking Preferences and Demands
a) What opportunities do members have to express grievances or preferences, or
make demands?
b) How and when are they thwarted?
SP also reveals how changing the norms of (in this case) recruitment can bring about a
re-location of powers of exclusion.  Under the old rules, barriers could be put in the way
of some people joining.  Used judiciously, this would ensure that there was no
opportunity at all for the voices of certain groups to be heard in the party’s decision-
making arenas.  But these powers were relatively informal and, although often effective,
were surmountable with a little effort.  Furthermore, once an individual joined, there
was little restriction on who could participate in selection processes. Thus once local
elites lost control of recruitment they began to lose their grip on the local party
altogether, including candidatures. The opening up of membership later on made it
easier for anyone to participate if they chose to.  However, new selection rules made it
much harder for anyone to get through the process, since ‘unacceptable’ candidates
could be thwarted more efficiently by a formal, rule-based system than by the arbitrary
methods of the past.
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Stage Three: The Scope of Decision-Making
a) How do norms, rules and procedures exclude certain voices, issues and
challenges?
b) How does their exploitation secure the dominant positions of particular
individuals or groups?
These examples clearly demonstrate how SP can be used to prevent certain voices, often
from particular ideological perspectives, from being heard in the party’s decision-
making arenas and consequently in the council chamber itself.  Whereas in the past,
informal power was used to prevent those politically or culturally ‘undesirable’ to local
elites from entering the party, the centralisation of recruitment made this impossible.
Indeed, in the 1990s under Tony Blair’s leadership there was a series of press
advertisements in which a tear off membership card was glued to the page, including a
Freephone number to call in order to make a credit card or direct debit payment, thereby
becoming an ‘instant’ member of the Labour Party with no questions asked.
Accordingly, membership became open to all.  This had a double effect: it prevented
local elites from restricting recruitment, but it also served to overwhelm and
delegitimise small groups of activists who were both a source of local vibrancy and an
of irritation to the party leaders.  At the same time, however, it left no screening
mechanism, no way of filtering out candidates until new rules around selection allowed
the possibility of blocking ‘unsuitable’ people from public positions.  This, first of all,
points towards greater central control of the selection process, or at least makes it
possible for providing a consistent, rule-based, observable process.  Strategically, the
new selection processes could be captured by organised groups and used for political
purposes to exclude rivals, as appeared to be the case in Tower Hamlets in 1998.  In this
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way, there was a ‘gatekeeping’ function that shifted location from the outside of the
organisation – where elites could put up barriers to entry – to inside, where procedures
could be used or captured in order to restrict access to influential positions.
Limits of Strategic Power as an Explanation
A strength of SP over IP is that it illuminates how organisational procedures can be
used to consolidate power and prevent conflicts arising, whether by preventing conflict
as such or by excluding certain voices.  What it does not explain, however, is the more
anonymous, structural way in which organisation might itself function as a form of
power rather than being an instrument of particular actors.  In always looking for
intentional action, SP does not look beyond agents to find explanations of exclusion and
discipline: towards the power that is also inherent in the routine functioning of
procedures like selection or membership, or in disciplinary procedures, for example.
The important question here is: once these processes are set in train, to what extent do
they take on a ‘life of their own’ not as directly controlled on a day to day basis by any
agent, but as organisational powers that set contexts and shape the action possibilities of
all who are subject to them?  In other words, SP notices organisational procedures as
vehicles that give agents more subtle modes of power than IP, but it still broadly
adheres to the same agentic ontology.  Its virtue is that it identifies additional resources
and sources of power, but it is still insufficient in itself to explain how power operates
within political parties qua bureaucratic structures.
Example 3 Conclusion
SP can be said to have particular benefits for explaining situations like the one I have
discussed here.  It adds much to the Individualistic approach set out in the last chapter,
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because it looks behind the confrontations (or lack of them) between agents in parties
and looks to how rules are used to block them.  However, although it enriches my
framework in this way, its maintenance of the focus on agents means that it does not ask
a) how the agendas and preferences of individuals are constituted; and b) what role
organisation plays as an independent, autonomous and perhaps anonymous means by
which power is exercised on all party subjects, whatever their status in the party
hierarchy.
Conclusion
In the last two chapters, sufficient material has been produced and analysed to show
how power in its first and second dimensions is exercised.  Whilst the previous chapter
demonstrated that individuals do use power to pursue their interests or preferences, this
current one shows how power is used strategically by manipulating procedures in order
to exclude certain voices, perspectives and issues from the decision-making process.
This dimension of Strategic Power adds significantly to the overall framework by
explaining how power can be wielded in a political party like the Labour Party by
occlusion rather than direct confrontation.  It also indicates the extent to which the fields
on which Individualistic Power might be played out are not level, but often shaped and
manipulated in such a way as to favour of one group over another. Together, these
approaches provide a much more expansive picture of how power in parties really
works.  Yet, although these two dimensions combined provide a much richer
understanding of power than either one of them can alone, they are still inadequate for
grasping how bureaucracy itself operates as a form of power.  To this end, it is
necessary to turn to a third dimension of power which considers this very question. This
will be the subject of the next chapter.
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Four: Bureaucratic Control
In the previous two chapters, I have analysed two dimensions of party power in which
the individual agent plays a crucial role.  In the first chapter, an individual’s success in a
conflict of interest constitutes an exercise of power.  In the second chapter, the power of
agents is mediated by organisation.  It is concerned with how rules and norms of
decision-making can be used to secure power.  However, whilst this second dimension
adds much to the understanding of how power is exercised, decision-making practices
are still regarded only as a means of enhancing individual power.  It cannot explain how
organisations function independently of agents and might actually shape human
behaviour and courses of action. This will be the subject of the third dimension of
power in my framework, Bureaucratic Control. As I argued in Chapter One,
Bureaucratic Control is a recurring theme in the literature on party organisation and in
this chapter I develop a consistent understanding of what this kind of power is so that I
can investigate the role mechanisms and processes of the party organisation play in
constraining, disciplining and excluding certain voices, while at the same time offering
possibilities for action.  This addition to my framework will support a richer
understanding of the role of power in party political life more generally.  I will therefore
depart from individualist notions of interests and conflict, pointing instead towards
organisation itself and the more structural role it plays in shaping and directing political
actors.
I begin this chapter by setting out the overall theoretical framework which draws mainly
on the work of Max Weber as well as some more recent analyses of bureaucracy.  This
is discussed explicitly in the opening section of the chapter.  Following that, I set out the
key characteristics of Bureaucratic Control and the ‘guide questions’ on which my
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analysis is based.  As with the previous two dimensions, I will then draw on examples
from my research among party activists and MPs to test the theory.
What is Bureaucratic Control?
Weber is a particularly interesting and valuable theorist of power, but his work is most
often considered from the perspective of individuals and only more rarely is it used as a
source for developing more impersonal ways of looking at the concept.  Indeed,
consulting Weber in order to develop a conceptualisation of ‘structural’ power may
initially seem somewhat counter-intuitive, since he is a methodological individualist
who believes that power can only be exercised by an individual (or a group of them1).
Weber’s concept of Macht, for example, underpins the Individualistic and Strategic
dimensions power that I set out earlier.2 A second form of power, ‘domination’
(Herrschaft), is, for Weber, concerned with legitimate forms of rule and obedience to
them: this has been extremely influential on the analysis of state power.3 Nevertheless,
organisations and structures cannot, in his view, be seen as independent entities with
agentic capacities (Weber 1978, 14); only individuals have such agency.  Organisations
like a political party are, for Weber, simply ‘a certain kind of development of actual or
possible social actions of individual persons’ (Ibid., 14), a view that chimes with
individualistic approaches to power.  Yet Weber also recognises a third kind of power,
‘discipline’ (Weber 1948, 253-264), which is a routinised kind of organisational power
more structural and impersonal in its operations and possessed of a logic that restricts
agency.  It is exemplified by bureaucracy (Weber 1948 [MD], 253-4) and, as such, it
1 This is not the same thing as power being the property of a collective.
2 See Chapter Two.
3 Weber’s own definitions and explanations of the different kinds of legitimate domination can be found
in Weber (1978), 212-245.
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can significantly add to the analysis of power in political parties, and so, of Weber’s
approaches to power, it is this one that I accordingly develop here.
In order to understand Weber’s concept of discipline it is important to be mindful of a
theme he consistently returns to: the phenomenon of societal ‘rationalisation’.
Rationalisation refers to how, as part of the process and even the character of
modernisation, rational calculation overtakes all aspects of life, from music and art to
politics and economics (Weber 1992 [1904], introduction).  It is therefore an integral
feature of modern Western societies, characterised by rule-based conduct. It makes
human activity consistent and predictable, bringing calculability to, and a
‘technicalisation’ of, the way in which business is conducted, scientific discovery is
made, buildings are built, harmonies are written and so on.  The effect historically of
this process was, according to Weber, to free action from superstition and ‘magical’
thought, and reorientate it towards the achievement of specified, rational ends (i.e. those
most practically beneficial to the actor/s concerned) by the most efficient means
available (Weber 1978, 24).  In other words it signified the ‘disenchantment of the
world’ (Weber 1948 [SV], 155).  Thus:
one of the most important aspects of the process of “rationalisation” of
action is the substitution for the unthinking acceptance of ancient
custom, of deliberate adaptation to situations in terms of self-interest
(Weber 1978, 30).
Rationalisation provides the equipment for the accumulation and storage of a technical
and specialised knowledge which is logically structured and reproducible;  it involves a
process of documentation whereby calculations are made, tests are conducted, results
are analysed, learning documented and abstracted as general rules of conduct which can
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be taught, learned, practised and improved by others.  This kind of development has had
a particular impact on the way that human beings organise themselves and is
exemplified in modern societies by the triumph of bureaucracy as the primary legitimate
and most effective form of organisation.  It is within bureaucracy that ‘discipline’
functions.  This is of course relevant to political parties since, like other forms of
modern organisation, they have become increasingly bureaucratic, in their structures
and modus operandi. This chapter therefore is concerned with a more complex
understanding of power than those described earlier inasmuch as social action and
individual actors become routinised and subsumed into rational, bureaucratic
organisation.
Bureaucracy and the Concept of Discipline
Weber defines ‘discipline’, then, as
the probability that by virtue of habituation a command will receive
prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms on the part of a
given group of persons (Weber 1978, 53).
This is to say, that inasmuch as there is intentionality it is carefully circumscribed and
formulaic: a kind of ‘tick-box’ reasoning reserved for limited calculation of means
rather than critical reasoning about ends.  Weber differentiates discipline from Macht
and Herrschaft because it is unquestioning, uncritical, unresisting and habitual (Ibid.,
53).  For Weber, the content of discipline
is nothing but the consistently rationalised, methodically trained and
exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is
unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and
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exclusively set for carrying out the command (Weber 1948 [MD],
253).
This still concerns the individual in some sense, although one exercising a rather weak
agentic capacity and appearing more as a kind of automaton than a free actor.  This is
because discipline also brings to light a certain kind of power inherent in organisation
itself: an immanent structural logic of its internal rules and mechanisms which directs,
suppresses and reorients individual agency and undermines its autonomy.  Since much
of human interaction takes place in or is mediated through organisation in contemporary
western societies, this is a very important aspect of power’s operation to be accounted
for, especially in the context of political parties.
For Weber, discipline is a totalising force, which demonstrates its rationality not just in
how commands are communicated and carried out, but also in the use of calculation to
extract optimum ‘physical and psychic power’ from individuals.  Weber’s concept
shares some common ground with Foucault’s elaboration of discipline (Foucault 1977)
in this concern.  However, the latter belongs analytically to a later dimension of power,
in which agency is itself an effect of discipline rather than simply a victim of it.4
To illustrate discipline’s scope, Weber uses the analogy of a large scale factory in which
the conjunction of the person, a machine, the available time and the space in which the
enterprise is carried out is organised for optimum efficiency. As a mere resource, the
human being is adjusted to the machine and thereby effectively mechanised (Ibid., 261).
The factory becomes a place in which
4 Disciplinary Control in Chapter Six, where I focus on a) the everyday details and minutiae of discipline
and how it works at an individual level and b) the more constructive, empowering side of discipline.
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the psycho-physical apparatus of man is completely adjusted to the
demands of the outer world, the tools, the machines – in short, to an
individual ‘function’.  The individual is shorn of his natural rhythm as
determined by the structure of his organism; his psycho-physical
apparatus is attuned to a new rhythm through a methodical
specialisation of separately functioning muscles, and an optimal
economy of forces is established corresponding to the conditions of
work (Ibid., 261-262).
However, the sine qua non of discipline is not the factory; discipline’s ‘most rational
offspring’ is bureaucracy (Ibid., 254), and as my review of the party literature in
Chapter One showed, its relevance for modern political parties has not escaped the
notice of commentators.
Bureaucracy and Modern Society
Weber’s account of bureaucracy has become central to understanding power in modern
society, and especially in organisations like political parties.  Kallinikos (2004) argues
that ‘bureaucracy and modernity are … inextricably bound up with one another.
Bureaucracy is the organisation form of modernity’ (Kallinikos 2004, 22).  The study of
bureaucracy is most often associated with the study of the state itself and public
administration (Dunleavy 1991; Pierre 1995; Peters 2001), but its effects are spread
much more widely.  It is recognised as forming the organisational principle of
businesses, corporations, voluntary organisations, unions and political parties amongst
others.  In fact, it ‘describes the entire organisational landscape of modernity’
(Kallinikos 2004, 17).  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a large organisation like a
political party functioning effectively without a bureaucracy.  Formal, bureaucratic
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associations like these are crucial forms for a democratic polity (Savage 2005, 309) and
a ‘key part of a pluralist, democratic culture with an active civil society’ (Ibid., 329).
They therefore deserve close attention in terms of power.
Bureaucracy is indispensable for any sizeable association with specific goals and is
without doubt technically superior to any other form of organisation.  It is of great
benefit in measuring levels of efficiency; in providing organisational learning and
consistency (Weber 1948 [B], 214); in matching means to ends.  Its detachment and
objectivity support the functioning of organisations based on rules, which require ‘the
abstract regularity of the execution of authority’ (Ibid., 224) and demand formal,
rational and objective administration.  As a way of performing complicated tasks,
distributing roles and ensuring the continuous functioning of processes, it is highly
effective.  The principle of meritocratic  recruitment, another important feature of
bureaucratic regimes (Weber 1978, 225), looks not only fair and legitimate, but is also a
means of organisational renewal: in theory, at least, it ensures that power is circulated
among the most able rather than locking it up in old elites.  In short, what bureaucracy
means for parties is the ability to operate continuously at the optimum level.
Despite its indispensability, however, there is an inherent tendency in bureaucracy for
substantively rational goals to be overcome by structural ones that are responsible for
reproducing the system itself.  In other words, the primary purpose of bureaucracy may
become its own perpetuation.  In this case, the means by which organisations are
managed, their efficiency measured, their functioning assessed, become more important
than the ends it is supposed to seek (Albrow 1970, 65) and they become self-enclosed.
This is a potential problem for all organisations and therefore has consequences for how
power in political parties is to be understood, too.  The logic of organisation is that its
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positives – rationality, calculability and efficiency – become ends in themselves and the
party’s broader purpose is sidelined. A machine-like rationality shapes and directs
political action in a way which routinises it so that political actors become cogs in ‘a
ceaselessly moving mechanism which prescribes … an essentially fixed route of march’
(Weber 1978, 988).  They are subject to instrumental values that undermine their
freedom at all levels of the party, even elites (Beetham 1996, 51).  Indeed, this
understanding of power seems to question the possibility of being an independent actor
within organised politics at all.
One possible solution might be to escape and set up another organisation (like a party or
a union), but this in turn would be subject to the same processes (Ibid., 54).  Another
more feasible solution, which Weber himself advocates, is to provide the maximum
possible freedom for ‘leaders who have political expertise and initiative’ (Giddens
1972, 19).  This is ‘a kind of individualism writ large’ (Beetham 1996, 62) and the only
means by which ‘the wholesale domination of bureaucratic initiative can be avoided’
according to Weber (Giddens 1972, 19). To Weber’s mind this ‘leadership democracy’5
was the one hope for some freedom of human action. However, this freedom belongs to
the leader alone and entails a parliamentary party that contains ‘nothing better than
well-disciplined ‘yes’ men’ at the beck and call of the whip’ (Weber 1948 [PV], 106)
and ‘the “soullessness” of the following’ in the wider party (Ibid., 113).  Ordinary
members, therefore, remain subjected.  Yet, at the same time, bureaucracy is ‘the means
of transforming social action into rationally organised action’ (Weber 1978, 987),
giving power to individuals that they might otherwise not have.  Organised action
empowers them to achieve ends individuals could not bring about alone.  The paradox is
5 This was very influential on Schumpeter’s elitist theory of democracy.  See Joseph A. Schumpeter
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin. 1976), Chapter 22.
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that whilst this provides them with ‘purpose’ or ‘direction’ (for example, a job or a
series of tasks to complete), it substitutes independent political action with an
imperative to serve organisational needs, indirectly undermining the political or moral
purpose of the party.  This was precisely what Weber feared: to achieve substantive
political ends, the individual must participate in formally organised politics which leads
inexorably to the triumph of Bureaucratic Control.
Key Components of Bureaucratic Control
Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy has clear relevance to any understanding of how power
works in political parties.  Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter One, the application of a
Weberian framework has been a prominent approach in the political party literature.
My own argument, however, is that it is best understood as a particular dimension of
party power: one that operates in addition to and in conjunction with – although
sometimes in conflict with – more individually oriented dimensions.  In some instances,
Bureaucratic Control may operate in its own right to constrain the action of party
members and foreclose or even constitute their ideas. In others, the party bureaucracy
may preclude certain perspectives, actions or voices, or determine their action
possibilities.
Drawing on the discussion above, then, I propose five components or characteristics of
Bureaucratic Control that will guide the rest of my analysis:
1. This kind of power is not a matter of conflict, but of process.  It is exercised
smoothly and anonymously in the functions and routines of organisation (e.g.
through disciplinary procedures, decision-making processes).  In this sense it is
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structural logic and imperatives, more than elite will, that disciplines party
actors.
2. Power is unequal.  Although all individuals are constrained by the logic of the
bureaucratic form, it disadvantages some more than others and perpetuates
existing inequalities of power. In other words, bureaucracy is inherently and
necessarily hierarchical.
3. Power is therefore conservative because it gives considerable and unequal power
to those at the top of the hierarchy whilst making it difficult to advance radical
or novel positions at odds with the inertia and routines built into bureaucratic
structures.  Thus although reorganisation of decision-making structures can be a
means of imposing elite control, it can also deaden and choke-off the
independent initiative and creativity the party needs (and this tends especially to
affect radical, non-mainstream or new voices).
4. It is also therefore exclusionary in that it rules out certain voices, ideas and
interventions but more often as a by-product or logic of its procedures and
routines than deliberate action or decision.
5. Power subdues agency. It is a form of control that, through routinisation,
constrains action and disciplines individuals into its functioning. Organisational
imperatives, once set in train, take precedence over and overwhelm individual
intent and action and individuals are ‘carried along’ in its operation.
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Identifying Bureaucratic Control
Bureaucratic Control [henceforth, BC] differs from Individualistic and Strategic Power
in two in key ways.  Firstly, power is not the property of agents who use it strategically
to advance their individual powers but is ‘exercised’, or operates, through the
anonymous functioning of organisation in ways that may nonetheless benefit elites
despite not being wielded by them.  Secondly, rather than being action-oriented, BC
frames, restricts and even constitutes action.  Therefore, I approach analysis here
differently from the last two chapters.  In order to illuminate this dimension of power, I
draw on examples from my interviews which look more specifically at people’s
experience of particular party functions, especially those that illustrate the consequences
of centralisation and the experience of organisational routines.  This includes experience
of office-holding and activism at different levels of the party, and what happens when
individuals attempt to challenge orthodoxy. These examples will illustrate Bureaucratic
Power whilst giving empirical and experiential support to my argument that it is an
important aspect of power in the modern party.
Following my identification of its characteristics above, there will be three parts to the
analysis of BC:  the first part considers how bureaucratic organisation disciplines
members by constraining action, choking off independent initiative and thwarting
challenges to orthodoxies;  the second considers how bureaucracy empowers elites by
ruling out or suppressing certain voices, ideas and interventions whilst effectively
supporting others (but not by being intentionally wielded as a resource); the third part
looks at how organisational imperative grips the party, rendering people ‘cogs’ in an
instrumentally rational machine and inhibiting freedom of political action, which
(indirectly) has wider political effects.
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Guide Questions for Analysis
In summary, then, BC describes a dimension of power which is immanent in the logic of
organisation, its internal rules and mechanisms.  It is a rational, impersonal, and
routinised power, intimately associated with control and obedience of an automated,
mechanised kind. At various points it constrains and disciplines, excludes and punishes
and accentuates and perpetuates existing inequalities of power.  Although the design of
specific organisations and parts of it may have substantive intent behind them at the
outset, the power immanent in it is driven by organisational imperatives rather than the
will or intention of any specific actor or group of actors, although it may benefit elites
by suppressing change. The operation of BC will be uncovered by following the three-
part analysis set out above, each of which gives rise to a series of questions which are
used to guide the analysis:
Part One: The Discipline of Party Members
a) What happens when members break the rules or behave or act in ways contrary
to ‘orthodoxy’?
b) What mechanisms are available to discipline individuals and constrain that
behaviour?
Part Two: The Empowerment of Elites
a) How are leaders empowered whilst others are disadvantaged?
b) How are certain voices ruled out or excluded?
c) How does the way organisation functions entrench existing inequalities?
179
Part Three: Organisational Imperatives
a) How do the activities members participate in as part of party life discipline them
and govern their conduct as political actors?
b) How do the positions people hold in the party or the jobs they do restrict their
capacity for free and independent political action?
Application: Testing Bureaucratic Control’s Explanatory Scope
Thus far, I have outlined the key components and conditions of BC.  In what follows, I
will apply and test its effectiveness using material gathered from interviews, archives
and contemporary sources.  I do not examine a single situation but instead, using the
questions to guide my analysis, I draw on a range of experience that illuminates what I
regard to be the two overarching features of BC: the tendency towards centralisation
and its effect on the relationship between leaders and led and how individuals are
disciplined by and into the routine functioning of organisation.
In the first of these, I use the guide questions under parts one and two above to examine
three key aspects of the Labour Party’s processes of centralisation that took place
roughly between 1987 and 1992 (Kelly 2003, 110): the party leadership’s increasing
power and willingness to intervene in local party affairs, the National Executive
Committee’s growing authority over candidate selection, and the establishment of the
National Constitutional Committee as a disciplinary tool.  Using the guide questions
under part three, my second set of examples examine more closely the paradox inherent
in this dimension of power: at the same time bureaucratic organisation empowers
individuals by providing opportunities and capacities for political activity, it also shapes
and directs their involvement, stifling free political action in favour of organisational
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imperatives.  Thus empowered actors are also disempowered regarding their own values
or preferences.
It is worth noting that some of the ways BC disciplines and excludes may not be
immediately obvious to the observer or to those who experience it or, if they are, they
might be experienced as a sort of ‘Kafka-esque’ frustration rather than being recognised
as forms of power.  Whilst it may be perfectly possible to observe and assess a process
of centralisation in an organisation and how it changes the scope of action or decision-
making, it is less straightforward to make arguments about how individuals become
‘caught up’ in organisation, such that they are disciplined, directed and shaped by it.
Therefore, although the analysis that follows draws on individual accounts of
encounters with the party machine, these require interpretation and reconstruction in
order to draw out the operations of BC.
Example 1: Centralisation and Bureaucratic Control
Greater control over the Labour Party’s organisation was ‘the indispensable condition
for the leadership’s drive … to transform the party’(Shaw 2000, 133) and therefore its
electability.  Members had arguably gained significant ground in organisational terms in
the 1970s (Kelly 2003), and Taylor (1999) argues that the activities of party
modernisers in the 1980s and 1990s confirms Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy because
it shows that elite control is reasserted after a period of membership influence (Taylor
1999, 22).   Shaw (1994) agrees, suggesting that voluntary organisations, including (or
perhaps especially) political parties, have ‘endemic oligarchal tendencies’ and the
party’s transition from traditional representative democracy to more ‘direct’ forms (see
Chapter Three) facilitated more ‘vertical’ relationships between members and the
centre, diminishing the role of local parties, and channels for independent discussion
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like Labour Weekly (Shaw 1994, 120).   As a former Cabinet minister and ‘moderniser’
argued, it was felt that to have a chance of winning again: ‘we had to show that not just
policy was changing, but that the party itself was’6 and asked what it was that drove the
process of centralisation and professionalisation, one senior party worker and trade
unionist said, ‘I think the demonstration that the opposite had been disastrous’.7
Certainly the direction of travel was clear, as one activist and left-wing campaigner for
party reform reflected:
there were big issues that we fought and lost over around party
democracy… and it was quite clear, even under John Smith, there was
going to be a tightening up of central control … [compared to] the
eighties where there had been a lot of autonomy for local parties, and
conference had been a powerful force.8
In what follows, I outline three examples of how the party’s relatively liberal regime
became more controlled and even authoritarian: firstly, in the willingness to intervene in
local party affairs; secondly, the NEC’s expanded role in candidate selection; thirdly,
the establishment of the National Constitutional Committee as a disciplinary tool.
Example 1.1: Intervention in Local Party Affairs
When, between 1982 and 1986 there was a troublesome ‘open split’ in the Tower
Hamlets Labour Group, the attention paid to it by higher party authorities was minimal:
6 Interview, Hilary Armstrong
7 Interview, Joe Irvin
8 Interview, Mike Davis
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anywhere between 8 and 11[of us] … voted against the whip quite
often. [But] the Greater London Labour Party seemed to spend most
of its time not doing anything, I mean quite deliberately not doing
anything… I would have thought that these would have been the
people who were supposed to be saying, you know ‘you ought to
suspend these people from the party, you should be taking disciplinary
action’  but actually it was always putting it off. 9
This relatively hands-off approach did not last since it was now recognised by leaders
that swift and decisive action was required to safeguard the party’s electoral goals.
Thus local parties became increasingly subject to intervention from the centre, and
although sometimes this may have been used strategically to enhance elite positions,
from the perspective of BC, a more invidious, subterranean process was at work.
Most of the time, regional parties were empowered to play the interventionist role (see
Chapter Two) which often took the form of gentle ‘advice’ or warnings to take care:
I mean, we got read the riot act a few times and we had people like
Frank Dobson and Nick Raynsford come over, you know, and say the
Daily Mail were always looking for one story rubbishing the Labour
councils and please don’t give them ammunition.10
However at other times it was more direct and intrusive. In Hackney, for example, Left-
wing activists had gained control of the Local Government Committee (LGC) in an
9 Interview, Dennis Twomey
10 Interview Mark Taylor; Frank Dobson is MP for Holborn and St. Pancras (since 1979), Nick Raynsford
was MP for Fulham between 1986 and 1987 and for Greenwich and Woolwich since 1992.
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attempt to exercise control over councillors, who they felt were unaccountable to local
members, and this became subject to intervention. The LGC, after all, ‘was quite a key
vehicle for expression of the Labour Party’s will’ in Hackney and controlling it meant
‘we more or less determined what the council’s policy would be … I think there were
some people in the council who weren’t happy.’11 Others in the party hierarchy were
clearly unhappy too, and the Greater London Labour Party intervened to obstruct, and
eventually suspend the LGC, accusing it of acting unconstitutionally.12 In another
example, Mildred Gordon, candidate for Bow and Poplar in the 1992 General Election,
discovered what happened when campaigns deviate from national strategy:
I wrote my own leaflets and Jenny Fisher, who was brilliant on the
computer, drew them up.  But … they [the Greater London Labour
Party] sent bloody Jim Fitzpatrick13 down who took over, ignored
Dennis Twomey [Gordon’s Election Agent]… and cancelled all my
leaflets.  They put in their standard leaflets and tried to take over the
campaign.  They didn’t like what I was saying.14
Just how decisive and ruthless the party machine had become by the 1990s, though, is
illustrated best by the suspension of Walsall District Labour Party in 1995.  The left-
wing Labour administration there had run into controversy locally for its policy to
radically decentralise local services, which the Conservative government seemed intent
on exploiting. The Conservative Party chairman, Brian Mawhinney, was due to visit
the area, and seemed bound to attempt to embarrass the Labour leadership over the
11 Interview, Mike Davis
12 Interview, Mike Davis
13 Fitzpatrick was a Greater London Labour Party official, later to beat Gordon to the nomination of the
newly created seat of Poplar and Canning Town (in 1997).
14 Interview, Mildred Gordon
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affair.15 On the very day he was due to go, the local Labour Party was suspended.
Responsible for the decision was Frank Dobson, the party’s Environment spokesperson
at the time.  For him it was ‘a very easy decision’ because, in his view, ‘they were
completely crackers!’16 Only two NEC members voted against a proposal to suspend
the leader and deputy leader of the council,17 which was itself a strong indicator of how
the balance of power there had changed in favour of the leadership, but also the attitude
towards disciplinary measures of this kind.
Example 1.2: The NEC and the Selection Process
Two episodes were crucial in leading the NEC to tighten its grip over candidate
selection, especially for high profile by-elections.  Firstly, in 1983, Peter Tatchell’s
selection as the candidate for Bermondsey and Southwark, and the inept attempts by the
leadership to block his candidature had been a highly public, drawn-out process which
was embarrassing to the party leadership and ultimately unsuccessful.  It resulted in a
massive defeat in the ensuing by-election (See Tatchell 1983; Golding 2003, 273-283),
not surprising given that ‘many people, even in the highest reaches of the Labour Party
… did not want me to win’ (Tatchell 1983, 119).  Secondly, and a turning point in
Labour’s drive towards centralisation, was the 1987 Greenwich by-election. Deirdre
Wood had been selected by the local party and immediately cast as ‘a hard left
candidate’ (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 210), although ‘somewhat unfairly’.18 The press
relentlessly attacked her throughout the campaign as an extremist, with which she
15 John McKie ‘Walsall “in Shock” Over Suspension Move.’ The Independent, 10 August 1995.
16 Interview, Frank Dobson
17 John Rentoul ‘Labour Removes “Extremist” Council Chief.’ The Independent, 30 November 1995
18 Interview, Frank Dobson; there is some doubt as to whether she was seriously regarded as hard left
amongst the Party leadership (See McSmith 1996, 124-127).
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seemed ill-equipped to cope,19 and was duly defeated by Rosie Barnes of the SDP on a
10% swing.  These two catastrophic results in Labour heartlands led directly to a
strengthening of the NEC’s role by creating a by-election panel to directly oversee the
process of selection.  As Frank Dobson, Campaigns Co-ordinator for the Party between
1987 and 1989, confirms:
The lesson after Greenwich was that we couldn’t leave the selection of
by-election candidates to local party choice … a by-election is a
national event with a national impact and therefore we need a national
approach.  So the rule became that local parties could appoint from
shortlists that were drawn up by the national party, and if the local
party did not play ball then we could impose one.  And that’s still the
rule now.  Is that undemocratic?  Maybe.  But it is fully tied up with
the general prosperity of the national party.  What’s more it’s about
the candidate themselves.  Whoever it is must be able to stand up to the
attention that they will get from the national press and media.  I’ve
had many candidates crying on my shoulder in these situations,
literally.  And when people complained, I’d say: I’ve seen this and you
haven’t.  It’s horrendous.20
In 1989, these new rules came into practice when the NEC panel interviewed and short-
listed candidates for the Vauxhall by-election and drew up an almost all-white shortlist
including Kate Hoey and Nick Raynsford, and excluding locally favoured black, left-
19 Interview, Frank Dobson; See Richard Evans, ‘Mudslinging Marks By-election Launch’ The Times,
February 5 1987
20 Interview, Frank Dobson
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wing candidates, like Martha Osamor despite attempts to reinstate her.21 Local activists
refused to participate in the election as a result (although Labour won anyway).  In
December of the same year, the NEC ordered a further selection process to be
conducted when Frank Field was denied reselection in Birkenhead by the result of a
TGWU block vote.22 Other cases include the exclusion of Ken Capstick as a candidate
for the Hemsworth by-election and the imposition of Derek Enright after the CLP
rejected the NEC’s approved shortlist.23
Example 1.3: Party discipline and the National Constitutional Committee
Until 1986, the NEC was largely responsible for disciplinary issues relating to
individuals. However, serious problems over the expulsion of members of the
Trotskyite entryist group, the Militant Tendency, and the conflict between Labour Party
rules and the Courts which arose from them,24 exposed the inefficiency of the system
and persuaded the NEC that changes were needed (Shaw 1988, 279). High profile
Militant members had been expelled only following exhaustive and exhausting
meetings characterised by ‘endless hours of procedural wrangling’, and the efforts of
many constituency parties to expel others had collapsed (Ibid., 278).
In response to these problems, the General Secretary put before the 1986 Party
Conference proposals for a National Constitutional Committee (NCC) which would be
21 NEC Minutes, 17 May 1989
22 This problem was in part a product of the fudge on selection processes in 1987 which introduced the
short-lived local electoral college.  All this achieved was to highlight the conflicts between TUs and local
members (Russell 2005, 46), as this case (and the case of George Galloway in Hillhead: see Ken Smith,
‘Hillhead 13 Quit in Anger at Galloway’ The Herald 29 August 1989) amply demonstrates.  On the other
hand there were some doubts over the veracity or validity of Field’s complaints via a 150 page dossier, as
suggested by Hattersley and Peter Kilfoyle (who oversaw the process).
23 Colin Brown, ‘By-election Candidate Imposed by Labour.’ The Independent, 18 October 1991.
24 Courts were becoming increasingly interested in the affairs of voluntary organisations (see Shaw 1988,
238, 280).
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elected by Conference and independent of the NEC.  This committee would have a
specific remit to handle disciplinary issues against individuals referred by the NEC or
constituency parties.25 This new committee, bound by clear rules and procedures
represented a legally less ambiguous way of handling discipline.  Whitty told the
Conference that
an organisation is lost if it cannot enforce its own rules and it is lost if
it relies on the judges to enforce them for it.  Our present rules,
unfortunately, and our long-standing procedures at national level and
at constituency level, neither protect the party nor do they protect
individuals from vindictive action … The best way of keeping the
judges out of our business is to make sure that our rules are
unambiguous and unchallengeable.  These proposals are just that.26
Richard Heffernan and Mike Marqusee (1992) were highly critical of these reforms,
arguing that the NCC was politically driven, treating party left harshly whilst letting the
right off lightly (Heffernan and Marqusee 1992, 263-5).  There is no question that
reform was critical to the ability to seek out and expel members of Militant and other
entryist groups but this was because the meaning of ‘bringing the party into disrepute’
specifically included membership of organisations deemed ‘incompatible’.  Whitty,
clarifying the charge described it as follows:
We are not talking about individual actions; nor are we talking about
the expression or publication of ideas.  People will not be pursued for
their ideas, they will not be pursued for individual actions.  We are
25 Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1986
26 Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1986
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talking about a sustained period of conduct … where somebody stands
against an official candidate of the Party, and the provision whereby
they have been involved in an organisation which has been deemed
incompatible with Party membership.  These are the two main areas
where this new provision would apply.27
In other words, the process was successful because it was effectively depoliticised (and
therefore depersonalised), by removing these responsibilities from the party
organisation’s key political body (the NEC) to a more bureaucratic, rule-based one.
This had an additional benefit for the leadership of actually achieving the political
objectives in which they had hitherto failed, since members of Militant could now be
explicitly and clearly pursued for breaking party rules rather than for their political
beliefs.
But the NCC dealt with more than simply Militant, as an extract from the report to the
NEC of 27 April 1988 reproduced below shows.  It summarises forty-four cases that
had gone before the Committee since its first meeting in February 1987:
Of the 44 cases, 6 were appeals against the withdrawal of the Whip, 3
were upheld and 3 were rejected but had the period of time of the
withdrawal of the whip reduced; 16 were charged with membership of
the Militant Tendency, 14 were found to be proved and expelled from
membership of the Labour Party; 16 were charged with sustained
course of conduct prejudicial to the Party and 6 with breach of other
Party rules and Constitution.  Of these 22 cases, 8 were expelled from
27 Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1986
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membership of the Party (2 for standing against official Labour
candidates in last year’s local elections), 5 were found not proved or
rejected, and the other 9 had various penalties imposed on them, from
severe reprimand to suspension of Party membership for a period or
suspended from being a delegate or holding office.28
Altogether, the NCC dealt with 251 disciplinary cases between 1986 and 1990.  Charges
included ‘bringing the party in disrepute’ and ‘sustained course of conduct prejudicial to
the Party’, 150 of which ended in expulsion. Of the 119 members charged with Militant
membership, 112 were expelled (Heffernan and Marqusee 1992, 264-5). Key to its
success in doing this was its legalistic, rule-based approach because it made Militant
expulsions more acceptable to those on the emerging ‘soft-left’ who had previously
harboured doubts about so-called ‘witch-hunts’ of left-wingers.  Said a member of the
Committee,
It was a very important process, partly because it brought the soft left
over.  When we expelled Dave Nellist [MP for Coventry South East],
Clare Short fronted the case and only a few years before she had been
defending Militant.29
Furthermore, it meant that now there was a permanent process in which cases such as
these could be heard and resolved relatively quickly and efficiently.
28 NCC report to NEC, 27 April 1988
29 Interview, Dianne Hayter
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Strengths of Bureaucratic Control as an Explanation
The examples and stories used in this section have a common theme running through
them: they all demonstrate the kinds of interventions that local organisations, members
and activists are subject to in order to prevent or punish deviation from organisational
rules and orthodoxies.  In contrast with SP, BC is concerned with the mechanisms that
operate in organisations and discipline members rather than how confrontations are won
or lost.  It recognises the extent to which organisation itself is imbued with power.  This
enables the analyst to identify how organisation militates against freedom of political
agents to act because the exclusion or punishment of certain voices, behaviours, views
or approaches to politics are ‘built into’ it.  The examples I have used should be
understood in that light.  The Weberian thesis that organisations in the end tend towards
centralisation and domination by an elite clearly have some salience here.  However,
what is specifically interesting to me is the extent to which BC, as a particular
dimension of power derived from Weberian theory, is at work through these processes.
I will now analyse this question by conducting an analysis of the cases I have outlined,
using the guide questions I set out above.
First Part: The Discipline of Party Members
a) What happens when members break the rules or behave or act in ways contrary
to ‘orthodoxy’?
b) What mechanisms are available to discipline individuals and constrain that
behaviour?
What these examples demonstrate is that as the party organisation becomes more
sharply directed towards rational goals, i.e. electoral victory, there is increasing
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intolerance of anything that is likely to detract from them and greater likelihood
therefore of interference in local affairs and activities.  The investigation and
punishment of those who break rules is made simpler by a) the establishment and
enforcement of new and existing rules and b) the establishment of clear procedures for
investigation and the application of sanctions.   Mechanisms might include suspension
of individuals or whole local parties, overruling selection processes, taking over election
campaigns and even expulsion.  In order to shed further light on this, I will look at each
of these mechanisms more closely.
Firstly, local members, local committees and even entire local parties may be suspended
for unorthodox practices.  In each of the cases presented in Example 1.1, members were
participating in organised, official party activity, pursuing their own local objectives: in
Hackney, members attempted to use party mechanisms in order to tackle the problem of
(what they felt to be) insufficiently accountable representatives; the general election
campaign team in Bow and Poplar developed their own localised election publicity
materials;  the party in Walsall had its own specific policies on the structure of local
administration.  However, although these locally organised initiatives may not
necessarily have been directly designed to challenge or confront the leadership, they
were blocked or obstructed as incompatible with the party’s immediate electoral goals
(e.g. by generating negative press coverage).  Members, activists, or candidates in
Walsall developed a policy which may have been appropriate to specific local
circumstances, but it was specifically their own and not the Party’s policy.  That is, their
policy was dissenting, unconventional and attracting attention, something the more
effective, centralised, election-oriented party machine could not tolerate.
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Secondly, the rights of members can be overridden by the centre as is demonstrated by
Example 2.2.  Selecting candidates was a traditional privilege of local parties but,
following a rule change in 1988 (after the Greenwich by-election), the NEC was granted
power to take over a constituency party’s selection process for by-elections.  There were
very practical reasons for this, not least the high profile of such contests.  But it was also
linked to the leadership’s fear of local parties failing to select the ‘right kind’ of
candidate, damaging not just local re-election prospects, but national ones too:
Bermondsey had selected an openly gay left-winger; Vauxhall favoured a radical black
activist from Tottenham; Hemsworth wanted a left-wing former Vice Chairman of the
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).  In each case, the leadership was vehemently
opposed to their candidacies and intervened to try to stop them.  Despite their failure to
stop Tatchell’s selection, they got their way in the latter two cases because by the time
they arose, there were rules and a system by which the NEC could, indeed was required
to, intervene without the same level of legal and constitutional wrangling.  In other
words, an administrative process had become established, providing the conditions for
BC to become active.
Thirdly, at the extreme end, members may be expelled.  The case of the Militant
expulsions is an interesting one.  The new NCC was successful at excluding so many of
those associated with the entryist group not because individual members were deemed
to hold views incompatible with the mainstream or the leadership (although that was
certainly the case), but for being part of organisations that were regarded as such.
Greater clarity of organisational (as opposed to ideological) rules and the establishment
of clear procedure enabled the party to purge itself of organised groups hostile to the
leadership (including the Militant Tendency) much more efficiently.
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What these examples illustrate is how, in the process of centralisation, BC gradually
takes hold.  Individuals and groups within the party are brought into line, punished or
excluded not by individuals seeking personal ends but for deviating from party
orthodoxy.  Discipline is depersonalised, procedural and concerns the efficacy of the
party as an electoral machine rather than specific political or ideological goals.  Thus
suspensions are carried out for unorthodox activities rather than ideas; intervention in
selections has generally been approached as a procedural rather than political matter,
and exclusions are carried out for violation of organisational rules rather than
ideological ones.
Second Part: The Empowerment of Elites
a) How are leaders empowered whilst others are disadvantaged?
b) How are certain voices ruled out or excluded?
c) How does the way organisation functions entrench existing inequalities?
The three examples above also demonstrate how elites indirectly benefit from new
procedures which are designed to make the party a more effective organisation.  The
establishment of these measures removes the autonomy of rank-and-file members and
local party organisations to make policy, run campaigns select candidates, and set
membership rules.  As new rules become established, a different kind of power emerges
that acquires a sort of extra-agentic capacity to discipline and control, the effects of
which are not always neutral.  Leaders are empowered partly because more of the
party’s functions are under their direct control, which allows them to respond swiftly
and quickly to issues that concern them (such as the embarrassment that may have been
caused by Walsall District Labour Party).  But also, as part of the logic of organisation,
local parties become more like a small part of the national machine than an independent
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organisation, and grassroots members more like a cog in that machine.   Unorthodox
and noncompliant voices are thereby suppressed, silenced or ruled out as incompatible
with the party’s functional logic.
In the case of Walsall, there is clearly an element of tactical manoeuvre designed to
deflect negative publicity, which suggests not BC so much as an exercise of SP by party
leaders.  However, such an exercise of power would not even be possible without the
structural advantages with which BC empowers leaders and disadvantages others.
Indeed, the disadvantage to which some groups like local activists are put is perhaps
even better illustrated by the case of the Hackney LGC.   Activists there were
attempting to ensure that existing organisational rules and mechanisms (i.e. the Local
Government Committee) were used to hold local representatives to account.  However,
their attempts were overridden by higher authorities, and they themselves became
subject to a procedural discipline more concerned with party unity than democracy.
Similar things can be said about the NEC’s control over selection processes.  It has been
a key mechanism for excluding ‘undesirable’ candidates, and this appears to have been
the initial reason for implementing these processes.  This looks like an exercise of SP.
However, once the process is set in motion, voices incompatible with orthodoxy and
electoral success (because they are too left-wing, too gay, too black) become excluded
through a more ‘systematic’ process of monitoring and assessing candidates, suggesting
that what begins as an exercise of SP, sometimes ends up as BC.  The long-running
debacle over the Bermondsey selection should be contrasted with the way in which
Vauxhall was handled by the party six years later.   Although the process was no less
controversial, and even resulted in the local party sitting out the election, it was swifter,
more efficiently done and with less overall damage to the party.   Thus the will and
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intention that failed in the Bermondsey case are in a sense replaced, or at least
supplemented, by organisational machinery working in favour of the existing balance of
power.  It is in this sense that organisation is ‘conservative’ and tends to preserve
existing inequalities.   The establishment of the NCC is another good example of this.
By ‘letting go’ of the process of discipline and passing it over to a new bureaucratic,
rule-based committee, leaders actually got more of what they wanted from it.
Discipline became a process by which organised voices in particular were excluded and
ruled out.  Thus power is evident not in confrontation but in routine function. Thus rule
changes may initially be an exercise of SP in which elites use rules for their own
purposes.  However, once implemented, these rules and processes take on a life of their
own and discipline everyone.  They may still indirectly benefit the elite in most cases
because they militate against change, but they cannot be wielded by them directly, for
personal ends, or as a resource for aggrandising their own positions.
Limits of Bureaucratic Control as an Explanation
BC focuses on how processes and procedures strengthen inequalities of power, excludes
voices and disciplines non-orthodoxy.  However, it seems reasonable to ask how much
of this is really an outcome of process and procedure and how much of it is in fact the
outcome arbitrary interventions.  Part of this depends to a degree on the motives that
one believes underpin rule changes: whether they really are conscious elite strategies
designed to serve their own ends, or whether the reasons behind these essentially
administrative reforms are to make the organisation a more effective electoral machine
in an age in which media scrutiny of parties is non-stop and often hostile.  Would the
imposition of Kate Hoey on Vauxhall have happened otherwise?  Was the creation of
the National Constitutional Committee anything other than a device for getting rid of
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people that the leadership did not want in the party?  Did the suspension of Walsall
follow ‘due process’?  The answer to all of these questions could be, on a different
reading of these events, no.  However, the fact remains that these are outcomes of
processes that may have been established for similar reasons, but which over time
become embedded in the party organisation: the events in Vauxhall would not have
occurred without a mechanism for them to be carried out (or at least not easily); the
NCC established an ongoing process of discipline that follows the rules of natural
justice which continues today; the suspension of Walsall was only possible because
there was a means for Frank Dobson to do it.  In other words, what may begin as SP
soon becomes BC, that is a means control which is dislocated from individuals and
immanent in organisational functioning.
Example 1 Conclusion
In order to achieve electoral objectives, the party leadership needs to gain more control
over party members and organisation.  In order to do so, stronger organisation is needed
that supports their ability to intervene and manage the whole organisation. BC is a form
of power that is inherent in the extension of these organisational functions and processes
and offers much enlightenment about how the power of elites is indirectly strengthened
and supported by the nature and logic of organisation and how certain groups are
disciplined and excluded by it.  It explains how the relationship between leaders and led
is embedded in the logic of organisation.  However, this logic does not stop there
because over time, leaders and elites will also find themselves constrained by the rules
that govern the organisation and unless they are especially charismatic or strategically
skilled, they too are likely to fall into line.
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Although it illuminates the importance of organisational power, what this dimension of
power does not always demonstrate adequately is how discipline and control actually
works at the individual level.  Political parties are voluntary organisations and people
cannot easily be forced to do what leaders want: they are free to leave if they find
participation unsatisfying, and an analysis of power in these settings needs to
accommodate this.  One small step in this direction is to examine the extent to which
participation in political parties becomes subject to organisational imperative.  In the
following section, I will examine some examples of how the organisation’s functioning
actually disciplines individual members by regulating, regularising, and structuring their
actions.
Example 2: Organisational Imperatives, Meetings and Canvassing
Being a member of a political party, as one long standing Labour Party member put it,
requires ‘disciplines’ and involves compromises.30 The individuals I have spoken to
joined the Labour Party for a variety of reasons: Mark Taylor, for example, was
motivated to join and become active in the party by causes such as anti-racism but ‘the
thing that really got me going was the poll-tax, about 1990’;31 Stephen Beckett was
‘inspired and energised’ by Tony Benn’s bid for the Deputy Leadership in 1981 and the
pressure from the left at the time for organisational and political reform.32 Being a part
of that change and contributing to it was something that ‘drew me into the party’ and it
was this particular strand within the party ‘that attracted me’, he told me, because ‘if
30 Interview, John Burnell
31 Interview, Mark Taylor
32 This included the campaign for Labour Party Democracy’s demands for the mandatory re-selection of
MPs, an electoral college for electing the Party Leader and control by the NEC over the manifesto.  The
first two of had been achieved by early 1981.
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you want to see that change you’ve got to be part of it.’33 For others, joining the party
seemed to be the ‘natural thing to do’ given their family background.34 But however
inspired, energised or natural the reason for joining, much of the reality of party life is
more prosaic and routine: attending meetings, campaigning and canvassing (including
getting out the vote and leaflet delivery); being a branch officer, constituency officer, or
a conference delegate; being an organiser, an agent, or a candidate; assisting MPs or
councillors and doing administrative work.  Much of the work of the party activist is
routine and fairly dull, consisting perhaps of ‘a bit of canvassing, a lot of leaflet
delivery, attending meetings’ and so on.35 In the rest of this section, I will briefly
examine two examples: the conduct of meetings in local party organisations and routine
campaigning and canvassing activities.  The reason for focusing on these is because
they are staples of party life that most active members will participate in at one time or
another.  Some may go on to become representatives or party officers, some may go no
further, but (nearly) all will have participated in these activities first.
Example 2.1 The Conduct of Meetings
Meetings are perhaps the primary means by which members and activists experience
and participate in the party and (therefore) by which the actions of individuals are
shaped and directed.   Meetings take place at all levels of the party, from the local
Branch to the Cabinet, and perform many crucial functions: from making and
legitimising decisions to electing officers and providing accountability; from planning
initiatives and distributing responsibilities to monitoring and evaluating tasks. They are
central to the party’s routine operation and the likelihood is that all active members of a
33 Interview, Stephen Beckett
34 Interview, Dennis Twomey
35 Interview, Mark Taylor
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political party will participate in meetings of one kind or another at various points in
their participatory life.
A Branch meeting (at the electoral ward level) is, for many, their first contact with
active party life.  For some it may be the limit of their commitment, but for others it is
the springboard to deeper involvement, as a campaigner, officer or candidate.   When
the new generation of activists came through in the early 1980s, many of them did so by
getting involved in their local branches.  By this route, they discovered a talent for, say,
campaigning or organising, or became party officers or candidates.36 Branch meetings
are, in this way, an initiation into the party as a whole, the means through which
members become more deeply involved in the organisation.  For example, if you want
to hold office in the party then you have to start at branch level because
you get on the GC by being a ward delegate … You get on the LGC
(Local Government Committee) through being on the GC … Generally
speaking there would be one or two per ward.  Some ward positions on
the GC were hotly contested, some they were not so hotly contested.  It
just depended what ward you were in, what the nature of the GC was,
whether it was divided or not.37
Meetings are key contexts in which formal roles are carried out and are therefore helpful
points at which to examine the functioning of those roles.  The Constituency Secretary’s
role, for example, largely centres on the servicing of meetings, which includes
convening meetings, booking rooms, drawing up agendas and papers and ensuring they
are distributed to participants, taking minutes, ensuring communications with local
36 Interview, John Burnell
37 Interview, Mike Davis
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members are carried out.  The Secretary also acts as the main point of contact for
internal and external bodies and individuals and ensures that party rules and procedures
are correctly administered.  The job, therefore, involves a great deal of administration
and paperwork and failure to do so can bring party activity to a halt.  A prominent
Labour blogger and Hackney councillor recently suggested that a ‘weak or incompetent’
Constituency Secretary can mean ‘Labour’s constituency organisation collapses’
whereas a ‘strong and dynamic’ one can ‘change the culture of a local party to make it
far more outward-looking and vibrant.’38 This is something that Mike Tyrrell witnessed
himself in Tower Hamlets in the 1980s:
After the 1987 election, the party became a bit moribund; we had three
or four GCs that were inquorate because the Secretary never sent out
the notices.  The Treasurer and Secretary completely fucked up, so a
group of us got together … with all sections of the party represented,
just to get the thing going again.39
The general conduct of meetings can be understood as an established ritual governed by
standing orders, and it is the responsibility of the Chair to manage them.  Typical
standing orders for a Constituency Labour Party stipulate that the Chair, whilst ensuring
that meetings begin and end on time (‘meetings shall normally commence at 7.30pm
and end at 10pm’) and are quorate, ‘shall commence all meetings by welcoming
delegates and introducing any new delegates and observers present at the meeting and
calling for any apologies tendered by delegates absent from the meeting’.40 The Chair
38 Akehurst L., October 31 2011, The 636 Unsung Heroes of the Labour Party, labourlist.org. Accessed
November 26, 2011. http://labourlist.org/2011/10/the-636-unsung-heroes-of-the-labour-party/
39 Interview, Mike Tyrrell
40 Quotes are drawn from Bethnal Green and Bow Constituency Labour Party, 2002.
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will then go through the agenda item by item, introducing each one, perhaps summing
up or thanking the appropriate contributor at each stage before introducing the next item
and so on down the list.41 As well as particular duties, standing orders stipulate rules
for general conduct and behaviour: meetings should be ‘organised in a comradely
fashion in such a way as to maximise participation from members’ and be free from
‘harassment or intimidation of members on the basis of sex or race’. Discussion of
policy follows definite rules, and where motions are being proposed there is a formal
structure to discussion: motions must be ‘proposed by a delegate from the originating
organisation [such as a Branch party] present at the meeting and seconded before debate
can proceed; ‘delegates must be recognised by the chair’ and ‘shall stand where able
and shall address the chair’; ‘no delegate may speak more than once on any motion
except at the chair’s discretion’ and only after everyone else who wants to speak has
done so.  Furthermore, ‘speakers shall have a maximum of three minutes each’.  It
amounts to fairly detailed guidance on conduct.
One of the most important functions of these meetings, and the most common item on
the agenda is the provision of accountability.42 Executive Officers (such as the Chair,
the Treasurer and the Secretary), local Councillors and other representatives are all
expected to provide reports for scrutiny by GC delegates.  It is the main means by which
local members can hold local officers and representatives to account as well as learn
about what decisions are being or have been made in local government or in other units
of the party organisation (such as the Constituency Executive or the Local Government
Committee).  For example, the agenda of a meeting of the Bethnal Green and Bow
41 Standing orders also lay down that the usual order of business which ‘shall be 1. Apologies; 2.
Speakers / Discussion; 3. Minutes of the last meeting; 4. Matters arising; 5. Motions; 6. Parliamentary
Report; 7. Labour Group Report; 8. Executive Committee Report; 9. Other Reports Not Already Covered;
10. Campaigning Report; 11. Any Other Business’
42 See previous footnote
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Labour Party GC held in July 2002 consists (apart from one submitted motion) entirely
of reports: from members of the Executive Committee – including the Campaigns and
Membership team’s plans for a new leaflet, requests for nominations to a campaign
planning committee, the Treasurer’s report on the state of local party’s accounts – and
from representatives, including Councillors and the local MP. They are an important
and often valued part of party meetings for many activists because they are an
opportunity for activists to be heard.  Stephen Beckett, an activist from Bethnal Green
and Bow argues that between representatives and members,
you have to have lines of communication, opportunities for input [and]
some kind of accountability to know that input in is being considered.43
The process of reporting is important at Branch level too, especially since it is a means
of communicating the decisions that have been taken by the GC as well as a way of
keeping abreast of the work of local councillors and Branch officers. One of the main
advances that activists like John Burnell, Mike Davis, and Stephen Beckett felt they had
made in ‘getting rid of the real old right wing Tammany Hall types’44 was in ensuring
that there was some kind of accountability, to the local Branch, for example in which it
‘sent delegates to GCs that did attend and did come back and tell people’45 Indeed,
unlike many of his predecessors, Mark Taylor, who was a councillor in Tower Hamlets
from 1994 until 2002
43 Interview, Stephen Beckett
44 Interview, John Burnell
45 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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used to make a real point of making sure that I would attend the ward
meetings for the party and I wrote them a report every ward meeting
that there was.46
However, reports are generally conducted in a business-like way, the information
contained in them fairly dry and banal.  Mark Taylor reported on ‘things I thought were
important’ and, he told me, ‘some of that’s going to be dull’47.  A typical example
included an attempt to re-open dormant laundry, a proposed new resident parking
scheme, racial attacks on a local estate, meetings of two committees of which he had
become chair, the Labour Group’s budget making discussions.
The danger of this culture of meetings and reporting is that political discussion or action
yields to the official kind: for example, reports on party matters, procedures,
membership, attendance at other official party meetings, budgets and fundraising, the
election of officers and delegates and so on.  It therefore has a depoliticising effect and
instils a level of tedium and routine into meetings.  In the end individuals come out of
meetings politically disempowered rather than the reverse.
Example 2.2 The Tasks of Canvassing and Campaigning
An important way in which local party organisation contributes to the party’s overall
goals is to ensure the Party vote is maximised at local and national elections.
Canvassing and election campaigning is central to this and a key role of activists.  For
some it is a route to further and deeper participation, and even a kind of rite of passage.
46 Interview, Mark Taylor
47 Interview, Mark Taylor
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Jan Burnell put it to me that ‘unless you’ve delivered leaflets in the European election
you can’t call yourself a true activist.’48
For Marjorie Paling in a marginal Labour area in Nottinghamshire, canvassing is an
ongoing and time-consuming activity that is hard work to maintain:
I do telephone canvassing once a fortnight … [but] we really scrape by
and we need to keep our MP in.  There’s a small group of four or five
of us who are joined by around twenty others, but there are never
twenty of us!  It really is hard work.49
Canvassers need to ask the appropriate questions and mark canvassing cards correctly
so as to ensure that the party’s vote can be accurately and quickly identified come
polling day.  They also need to make sure that Labour voters can get to the polls, are
willing to put posters up and if possible help the campaign or even join the party
(Labour Party 1992).  It is a routine job, which can be quite daunting and ‘People are
frightened in case someone asks them a difficult question.  And some are difficult.’ 50
People therefore need reassurance and encouragement, but most of all they need to be
organised.  John Burnell has been an organiser of campaigning and canvassing almost
from the time he joined the Party and counters that even if party members are
‘frightened to phone or doorstep canvass amongst the general public’ the party has the
right to ask:
48 Interview, Jan Burnell
49 Interview, Marjorie Paling
50 Interview, Marjorie Paling
205
so I will ask them and have no compunction about that.  I won’t take
no for an answer. I say ‘we’re going leafleting, what time will you be
there?’51
In Burnell’s view proper organisation is crucial, more so than candidates, in winning
elections.52 For a General Election campaign for example, it requires the careful co-
ordinating of ward organisers, a central team of press officers, weekly meetings, the
setting and monitoring of targets. Organising is effectively a full-time job, as Mike
Tyrrell remembers:
I can’t believe it took up so much of my time!  It took up a hell of a lot
of time. I’d leave work, go down the party office and do a whole raft of
paperwork. 53
It is perhaps inevitable, therefore, that a well-organised, well-funded local party is one
in which bureaucratic ‘party’ roles are clearly distinguished from ‘political’ ones: one
‘delivers votes’, whilst the other debates policy.  Operational functions become
paramount and canvassing is understood as an administrative activity rather than a
political one.  Party guidance on the conduct of canvassing advises that the job of a
canvasser is ‘to identify [a] voter’s intentions, not to argue or convert’ and to be ‘the
public face of the Labour Party’ which means conducting oneself  in a manner which is
‘polite and friendly at all times’ (Labour Party1992). ‘Voter i/d’ as canvassing had been
re-branded by 1997 was not ‘designed … to change people’s minds, but to secure more
votes for Labour.’  It was treated not as a political activity because ‘it’s organisational’
51 Interview, John Burnell
52 Interview, John Burnell
53 Interview, Mike Tyrrell
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(Labour Party 1997, 11).  In other words, the process is depoliticised and individual
initiative is kept firmly in check.   The significance of this kind of organisational
arrangement in party life is that it creates the conditions for an administrative
detachment of the kind Weber attributes to bureaucracy, even in a party political body
like the Labour Party.  John Burnell sees his role today more as an impassive official
concerned only with organisational objectives:
I’ve almost totally given up on the policy field.  I am now just a machine
politician out of my gut, tribal loyalty to the Labour Party.  For me, the
political objectives are to have a smooth operating machine that gets
leaflets delivered and canvassing done.  I don’t frankly care what the
message is at all.  I’m depoliticised.  And that’s because of so many
things the Labour Government has done that makes me feel
uncomfortable.  But the party is bigger than its leader.  That’s the line
I’ve always taken.54
Strengths of Bureaucratic Control as an Explanation
Third Part: Organisational Imperatives
a) How do the activities members participate in as part of party life discipline them
and govern their conduct as political actors?
b) How do the positions people hold in the party or the jobs they do restrict their
capacity for free and independent political action?
Meetings are perhaps an obvious way in which the conduct of members and their
political activity is governed by organisational imperatives.  Meetings are the main way
54 Interview, John Burnell
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in which members participate and a gateway into the party.  It is the route through
which they can access positions of authority and responsibility, and a springboard for
becoming  involved in more activities, especially campaigning and canvassing; in other
words, becoming activists.  Meetings also provide opportunities for members to
participate in policy-making and in holding representatives to account.  Thus meetings
also discipline representatives, MPs, councillors and officers by requiring them to attend
and account in some sense for their actions and to be questioned by delegates and
members.  However, the delegates themselves are closely disciplined too, since these
crucial functions of the party meeting are tightly governed by rules of conduct and
procedure, particularly through devices like standing orders and the responsibilities of
the Chair to ensure that they are followed.  Indeed, party officers like the Chair and
Secretary are perhaps the most disciplined of all.  They are apparently consumed almost
completely by the organisation and their duties are designed to serve the needs of the
organisation’s continued functioning.  Failure to do so leads potentially to
organisational failure which can, far from ‘freeing’ individuals to act freely, curtail their
ability to act politically at all.  However, for officers in particular there is little if any
time for ‘free’ political action in terms of ideological deliberation or policy-making any
case since their time is dominated by administrative work, which is organisational rather
than political
It should be remembered, however that all this organisation has a purpose.  The
empowerment of the party machine is the means by which wider political power is
sought.  After all, to achieve its aims in a representative democracy the party needs
power: to gain power the party needs to maximise votes.  Campaigning and canvassing
are therefore also vitally important activities for the basic substantive aims of
democratic party organisation.  They require substantial organisation and contribute to
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the influence of BC.  It not only provides routines that keep activists occupied in the
service of the party, but substantially directs the energies and attentions of its most
talented activists into almost purely managerial functions.  The party organisation
therefore needs functionaries, administrators and workers following set codes of
conduct, gathering clearly defined administrative information.  Despite the fears some
people have, therefore, Labour Party guidance explicitly and expressly steers them away
from engaging the public politically, and towards sticking closely to defined
administrative tasks.  However effective this may be for the pursuit of political office, it
shows how organisational management strengthens at the expense of political initiative.
Limits of Bureaucratic Control as an Explanation
There are two main limits to this approach which need to be resolved.  Firstly, BC tends
to focus on the negative, restrictive aspects of power’s operation and exercise.  Whilst it
does not ignore it entirely, it does not emphasise strongly enough the aspects of
organisation that support the exercise of power in other dimensions too (i.e. IP and SP).
Rules govern conduct, but knowing and learning the rules means that individuals have a
powerful weapon in their hands with which they can defend themselves and attack
others.  Bureaucratic organisation is (as Michels and Weber both acknowledge) the
lifeblood of major political parties like the Labour Party and other large institutions.  It
is difficult to envisage any serious alternative.  But is it reasonable to see the direction
of organisation being only one-way?
Example 2: Conclusion
BC illuminates power’s organisational dimension and is therefore more structural than
agentic.  It is a more anonymous and subtle dimension of power that operates in the
209
day-to-day organisational functioning often taken for granted in parties.  Thus this part
of the analysis has been directed towards routines: party meetings and activities like
canvassing as well as the functional administrative roles that party officers perform.
This supplements the focus on the effects of centralisation discussed earlier in the
chapter by shedding light on how individual members are disciplined by the routine
functioning of BC.  However, it is a fairly negative conception of power that arguably
does not put enough emphasis on how individuals can also be empowered by
organisation and how resistance to it can ensure that there is some room for manoeuvre
in terms of action, even if at times it is highly restricted.  Nevertheless, the unique
perspective that this particular aspect of BC provides enriches the framework of party
power and contributes to the depth of understanding of the dimensional complexities of
power.  It is not sufficient on its own, but it is an important aspect in a complex
framework of multi-tiered power operating in the modern party.
Conclusion
As well as groups of individuals mediated by rules, democratic political parties are
ongoing organisations with some kind of stability.  To be successful organisations, they
need to maintain continuous presence between elections in order to develop policies and
promote them; to market themselves, fundraise, select candidates, build support,
maintain campaigning resources and so on.  In order to support these subsidiary goals,
parties have to become permanently organised and develop a continuous administration.
In short, they become bureaucracies. In this chapter, I have considered how analysing a
dimension of Bureaucratic Control allows power’s organisational dimension to be taken
into account when studying the political party.  It focuses on the tendency of
organisations to centralise and restrict the freedom of political actors within it.
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However, it also illuminates how this kind of power works more subtly through the
routine procedures and functioning of party organisation to discipline individual
members.  I have suggested that it nevertheless needs to be seen not as an inevitable
‘iron law’, but as an important dimension of power that works alongside those I have
already analysed.
Despite its benefits, there are four main lacunae in the concept of Bureaucratic Control
which demonstrate that on its own, it is insufficient.  Firstly, it is unable adequately to
account for how power can be constitutive as well as oppressive: the emphasis on
restriction means that it cannot accommodate the extent to which party life may actually
be a positive source of political identity and subjectivity rather than simply a means of
stifling it.  Secondly, it does not fully recognise the extent to which organisational
power is not omnipotent and can be resisted by exercising Strategic Power: for example,
rules are written down, and members can learn them in order to effectively deploy them
in their own favour; representatives or officers can also, perhaps, resist scrutiny by
reporting only innocuous information.  Thirdly, bureaucratic instruments are (therefore)
by no means entirely independent and can be used as a resource, too.  Fourthly,
Bureaucratic Control is effective at illuminating a certain kind of organisational power
and its effects but it is still too general and impersonal to elicit the details of its
operation on individual behaviour.  Thus, discipline has not yet been fully exploited as a
mode of power.
There are two final points I wish to emphasise which point towards the next stage of my
analysis.  Firstly, although the kind of centralising and dominant internal power
described in this chapter is important for achieving electoral goals, the associated
danger is a loss of vitality in the life of the party and its activists.  The party therefore
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needs to find ways of building capacity for itself in this context, i.e. it needs to be able
to change in response to wider social shifts of power and opinion. Secondly, the
negative focus of Bureaucratic Control creates the impression that parties do little more
than destroy political freedom for activists.  If this were the case, it would be
counterproductive.  Further analysis needs to identify the extent to which the party
constitutes its activists and in so doing provides useful capacities for itself by
empowering them in a variety of ways that they may also value.  This is why a
dimension of power that is more constitutive and positive in character is required.  It is
to the task of developing this fourth dimension of power that I turn in the next chapter.
212
213
Five: Constitutive Power
As my analysis has unfolded, power in parties has taken on an increasingly anonymous
and pervasive character.  I began with Individualistic Power, which is effective at
explaining loyalty and conflict in direct, competitive relationships.  Strategic Power
provides insights into how organisation amplifies these relations, and Bureaucratic
Control explains how party members are kept loyal and obedient by the controlling
power of hierarchy and bureaucratic process.  However, the relationship between
members and the party is not purely mechanical, nor is it oriented solely around
relationships of command and obedience.  These approaches leave unanswered two
important questions.  Firstly, the analysis has so far focused on how the interests and
desires of individuals are expressed in conflict, denied, organised out, manipulated or
repressed, but how can the ongoing loyalty of members be accounted for? Secondly,
once parties have reached a certain level of organisation, with an efficient bureaucratic
system of control, how does it then build the kind of capacities that it needs?
These are the kinds of questions that the fourth dimension of power in my framework
seeks to address.  My interest here is in how individual subjectivities (and therefore
their beliefs and interests) are constituted and shaped by power.  In order to pursue this,
I will take the search for power’s operation beyond individuals and institutions, which
only give a partial picture.  Instead, I am concerned more with how power produces
interests than with the specific outcomes of their pursuit in any particular situation.
In the rest of this chapter, then, I firstly set out the key attributes of this dimension of
power.  Once the task of definition is completed and some thought given to the kinds of
questions that should be asked I, secondly, test its explanatory scope by applying it to
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the experiences of party members. Thirdly, I also discuss how it fits into the overall
framework, what strengths it brings and what gaps in explanation it leaves.
It is this dimension which is most closely related to Lukes’ (2005) ‘radical view’ of
power because it is designed to identify the unobservable forces and processes that
shape agents’ understanding of themselves and their interests.  However, there are
important differences between his conception of power and mine: Lukes understands
power in negative and repressive terms, in which individual’s ‘real’ interests are
obscured by an insidious, hidden ideology;1 in contrast, I seek in this chapter to
illuminate power’s more positive and constitutive side.  My immediate task, then, is to
find some initial theoretical support for this idea. Whilst Lukes can be understood as
drawing on one aspect of Marxist thought to support his notion of ‘objective interests’, I
turn to another: the explanatory possibilities opened up by structural Marxism, in
particular Louis Althusser’s concept of ideology.  This will allow me to ask not so much
where power is located, but how it operates.
What is Constitutive Power?
Althusser’s overall concern is with how certain ‘apparatuses’ (including organised
politics) reproduce the dominant ideology of liberal-democratic-capitalism for the
ultimate benefit of capital. Althusser argues that certain kinds of institution can be
classified as an ‘Ideological State Apparatus’ (ISA).  ISAs are a means by which the
‘dominant ideology’ is spread in subtle ways.  The concept of ISAs covers a multitude
1 This aspect of Lukes’ theory was based on Marxist ideas of ‘false consciousness’.  However, he
modifies this later in his 2005 edition of PRV, arguing that what he is interested in is ‘the shaping of
agents desires and beliefs by factors external to those agents’ (Lukes 2005, 134) in ways that are not
necessarily intentional or intelligent.  This is not ‘false consciousness’ as such, but still makes use of the
notion of ‘real interests’ albeit in a slightly different way.  Instead, he uses it to mean what an individual
would choose under ‘conditions of relative autonomy’ (Ibid., 146). Thus ‘power’ may include power to
mislead, censor, disinform, infantilise judgement and so on.
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of institutions, but certainly includes religious institutions, education, family, the legal
and political system (including political parties), trade-unions, communications
(including press, radio and television), and cultural institutions.  Although ISAs ‘present
themselves to the immediate observer in the form distinct and specialised institutions’
(Althusser 2008 [1971], 17) that are not directly connected with state power, they are no
less important to it than the police, the army and other repressive means of domination.
Crucial, here, is his attention to how ISAs constitute a form of subjectivity or agency
that is congenial to capital.  The concern of this thesis is nevertheless more precise: the
specific dimensions of power which are at work in the political party.  It therefore
focuses not on the construction of subjectivity per se, but on the way particular kinds of
subjectivity are constituted within parties in order to provide them with the subjective
capacities needed for them to function in an efficient and effective way.  Despite its
generality, Althusser’s concept of ideology is a valuable and provocative source for
understanding power in this way and I accordingly draw on some key aspects of it in
order to develop my own conception of Constitutive Power.
Althusser’s notion of ideology has some notable correspondence with Gramsci’s
conceptualisation.  Gramsci proposed a dynamic and sophisticated understanding of
ideology as a means by which hegemony is maintained in society.  He argued that ‘man
is … the process of his actions’ and that human nature arises out of the complex of
social relations (Gramsci 1971, 351).  People are ‘organised’, he continues, by
ideologies, which ‘create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their
position, struggle etc’ (Ibid., 377).     Underlying Gramsci’s discussion is a notion of
ideology as ‘a practice, producing subjects’ (Mouffe 1979, 187) and this informs
Althusser’s approach too.  When he uses the term ‘ideology’, Althusser does not refer to
a system of ideas or principles, or a creed that one might choose to follow, nor does he
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describe a notion of ‘false consciousness’ by which the ‘real’ is obscured (Hirst 1979,
41), as Lukes does.2 Rather, he refers to structures of social practices in organisations
which shape and produce individual subjectivities.  This is the main source of what I
will call ‘Constitutive Power’.  Constitutive Power gives form to certain modes of
subjectivity that in turn provide the basis for the beliefs that follow it. Therefore, rather
than being concerned about who is ‘getting their way’ or not and under what
constraints, Constitutive Power is focused on how social forces work to produce certain
kinds of subjectivity needed to reproduce the current system: an altogether more
clandestine and effective form of power than notions of ‘false consciousness’ and
without its dubious theoretical and epistemological baggage.
Constitutive Power has a material existence in an apparatus like a political party
(Althusser 2008 [1971], 39-40), because it refers to a ‘structure of social relationships’
that is ‘as real as the economy’ (Hirst 1979, 28).  A political party can be understood as
consisting of a series of practices in which the role of a party member, an activist, a
local representative, a party officer, is carried out or performed. In this context, the
term ‘practices’ is understood to mean the performances and rituals in which
behavioural norms are sedimented and repeated: it refers to habitual, or customary
actions or patterns of behaviour, including established procedures or systems; it
includes shared repertoires and norms of language and speech and makes use of words,
objects, physical equipment and other material.
These practices may be understood not as expressions of prior beliefs, but practical
manifestations and inculcations of the belief itself.  Althusser illustrates this by referring
to Pascal’s formula, in which ‘Pascal says more or less: “Kneel down, move your lips in
2 See previous footnote.
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prayer, and you will believe”’ (Althusser 2008 [1971], 42).  Belief from this perspective
is initially an effect of repeated, ritualised actions.  This once again echoes Gramsci who
argued that faith is retained through repetition and a continuity of relations which ‘is the
best didactic means for working on popular mentality’ (Gramsci 1971, 340). ‘Belief’ is
in this sense a material phenomenon derived from the participation of an individual in
certain practices in the context of a particular apparatus. In other words, for Althusser
human ‘ideas’ exist and are maintained in and through action, where actions are
elements of a wider complex of ideologically circumscribed practices, performances
and rituals  (Ibid., 42-3).  The significance of these is that they serve to reproduce the
existing system in ways that render the power involved invisible because it is imbricated
within everyday behaviour.  It is their repetition that makes them seem natural and
therefore taken-for-granted as an ethos or modus operandi.  They therefore smoothly
(for the most part) reproduce the status quo and its prevailing structures and hierarchies.
In this sense it is similar to what Bourdieu calls a habitus and its potency lies precisely
in its familiarity.
This constitutive dimension of power is helpful for examining how the party produces
subjects who are voluntarily loyal because they have or share certain values and ideas
about the world which are not innate or a priori but have been produced.  In other
words, this kind of power concerns not their ideological normative values (concerning
for example social justice) but belief systems concerning what it means to be a loyal and
effective party member.  Here it is not political ideals which are at stake but their
behavioural norms within the party machine, where obedience, commitment, efficiency
and hence the engendering of appropriate capacities and forms of agency are the crucial
ingredients comprising party membership.  To put it another way, this is about practical,
behavioural norms of subjectivity, rather than ideational or ideological ones.
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Constitutive Power as an approach to analysis suggests that individuals are not
necessarily pre-disposed to loyalty, or to certain values or structures; rather, through
following the practices of party life the party member is made over as a loyal and
proficient activist.  This can therefore be thought of as a kind of socialisation but in a
wider sense than the term might normally be understood, congruent with the role
Althusser gives to schools, family or church in inculcating norms of obedience or
leadership.  This does not, therefore, denote a distorted reality (like false consciousness)
but a real, living relation to the world (Thompson 1984, 90) that has nonetheless been
constituted.
The structure of social practices in the party contributes to the production of specific
subjectivities that the party needs for its own reproduction: particular interests, desires
and capacities, like organisational skills, or a particular talent for campaigning, say.  It is
not monolithic because it accommodates differences and variations in the kinds of
activists it produces and the different roles they play.  This is possible because
Constitutive Power is not a negative force that seeks to restrict and contain, but a
positive one that seeks to shape and build.  It is a mode of power that is understood as
productive and constitutive rather than being merely repressive. Indeed, a political
party would not be able to function were it to consist merely of obedient automatons,
and it would be impossible for even the most charismatic of leaders to have direct
command over a vast machine made up of docile ‘placemen’ waiting to be directed.
Through this more positive mode of power, one can begin to understand how the party
constitutes activists and members by creating new agentic capacities for itself.  This
does not require merely obedient subjects, but also empowered ones.  The same can be
said for the fact that the practices through which Constitutive Power is exercised do not
stay unchanged forever, but are challenged, overturned and renewed from time-to-time
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as new circumstances reward modified or novel practices.  Far from being evidence of
resistance to power, change is precisely how Constitutive Power is sustained and
renewed and how parties retain their grip.  It demonstrates its effective operation as a
positive force and provides a way out of the problems of ‘stasis’ with which critics of
Althusser like E.P. Thompson (1978) were concerned.  In political parties, these kinds
of evolutions are especially apparent as new generations of members come through with
different responses to their roles as party activists, leaders and representatives as
circumstances and technologies change.  Party life, in other words, is in part an ongoing
reinvention and reconfiguration of practices, and subjectivities change accordingly.
Individuals are unaware of power’s role in this and freely accept their subjection
(Althusser 2008 [1971], 56) because they are empowered within limits and make
appropriate choices.  However, this is also a means by which individuals are controlled
and directed.  This, therefore, is a very economical and subtle way in which power is
systemically reproduced.
The Key Components of Constitutive Power
Constitutive Power provides my framework with a means of filling an important gap
left by Bureaucratic Control: that is, how does power actually function within
organisations and how does the efficiently organised party build capacity for itself?  It
does so by constituting subjects in manifold, material ways through its ordinary
everyday practices.  As such, Constitutive Power has two main components:
1. Constitutive Power is immanent in the material, lived practice in organised party
politics. It includes conduct, patterns of behaviour, the rituals and performances
of party life. The focus of Constitutive Power therefore is on the everyday
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material practices of party life in which subjects, different kinds of political
actor, are constituted and the party structure is reproduced.
2. Constitutive Power is positive and constitutive.  It does not block or restrict, but
rather empowers individuals thus endowing them with skills and capacities to act
according to its political objectives (i.e. getting elected).  This has the effect of
further reinforcing and reproducing the party structure and its requirements.
Yet, at the same time it (thereby) acts as a subtle form of control over members,
who cannot afford to fail in their tasks and who must negotiate a fine line
between obedience and agency.
Identifying Constitutive Power
How, then, do political parties utilise and exemplify Constitutive Power [henceforth
CP]?  How can it be applied to political parties and party members?  How do parties
produce the right kind of party activist?  From this perspective, activists’ subjectivities
are constituted by participating in the practices that make them activists: by attending
meetings, campaigning and canvassing; by becoming a branch or constituency officer,
or a delegate; perhaps by becoming an organiser, an agent, or a candidate; by assisting
MPs or councillors (e.g. running constituency surgeries) or doing administrative work.
Activists may participate in internal groups or factions, read certain publications, get
involved in specific campaigns and so on. Through such means is the individual
constituted as a ‘party activist’, but crucially, an activist of a certain exemplary kind:
efficient, on-message, sometimes passive, but perhaps more importantly, loyal.
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‘There has to be loyalty in politics’ said one former Cabinet Minister I spoke to,3 and
indeed, loyalty is a central principle of politics, especially party politics.  But it is also
hard to define and could mean a number of different things at different times in a party
context.  It could mean loyalty to objectives that might be immediate or tactical (like
winning a specific vote), strategic (like winning power) or ideological (like pursuing
social democratic objectives).  On the other hand, loyalty may be given to legitimate
party structures or rules in which the test of an initiative or policy is that it comes
through the proper party policy-making structures and channels.  It may also mean
loyalty to the party leadership. This is also important in party politics, especially in an
age where the leadership is ever more the focus of public and media attention.
However, the loyalty of members to political parties cannot simply be explained by
obedience, as BC might suggest, or the self-interest of political careerists, as IP might
propose.  Whilst loyalty, particularly in terms of obedience or commitment, clearly has
some attributes that might be associated with other dimensions of power I discuss, it is
not fully or satisfactorily explained by the three I have so far considered in this thesis.
Generally, even the most recalcitrant MP will concede that it is ‘no good being against
the leadership for the sake of it’.4 Indeed, a ‘basic assumption’ of loyalty to leaders is
not a result of being suppressed or defeated, but is part of the culture of party politics5.
It is on this basis, as something which party members are constituted as, that I explore
the concept of loyalty in this chapter.  The next step is therefore to apply these ideas,
and I do so by working through two stages of analysis.  The initial stage is concerned
with the constitution of subjectivities and identifies the practices, rituals and
performances in which party members regularly participate and draws connections
3 Interview, Gavin Strang.
4 Interview, Gavin Strang
5 Interview, Michael Meacher
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between these and the kinds of party members, activists and representatives that a party
needs.  The second stage examines the way the party builds or renews the capacities and
skills it needs in what might be considered to be its ‘workforce’ or store of human
capital.
Guide Questions for Analysis
CP operates in social practices in parties to constitute the particular modes of
subjectivity that produce useful political actors.  The focus of analysis shifts away from
individuals and institutions and towards the day-to-day practices of party life.  Other
dimensions of power focus on what makes certain groups or individuals dominant and
others obedient, but by ignoring these important details they miss what it is that makes
people willingly loyal and effective agents.  I begin the process of rectifying this by
using the following series of questions (based on the stages of analysis I have set out
above) as a guide for my analysis:
Stage One: Constituting Subjects
a) Through what habits and practices in everyday party life is party structure
reproduced?
b) How do these taken-for-granted repetitions become sedimented tools of control?
Stage Two: Building Capacities
a) How are individuals empowered with capacities to act within this scheme?
b) What benefits does this bring to the party?
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Application: Testing Constitutive Power’s Explanatory Scope
I will conduct this analysis by using examples which range across different practices in
party life.  As I have suggested, the party needs to produce effective, empowered
subjects rather than merely obedient ones.  However, the subjects it produces must also
be constituted as loyal.  The investment the party makes in producing and constituting
useful subjectivities relies on the fact that they remain within and serve the party
loyally, which is a means by which parties exert subtle means of control.  Thus, for the
rest of this chapter, I examine the different ways in which, and the different habits and
practices by which, parties are able to build useful, effective and loyal subjects.  I will
use three examples: firstly, meetings and how they contribute to producing certain
subjectivities through everyday activities; secondly, I will look at how subjectivities
change as party needs change by highlighting how the career structure of the modern
party helps produce effective and loyal members that suit the requirements of
contemporary political life; thirdly, I will examine how training has developed as
modern technique for constituting the right kinds of ‘mainstream’ subjectivities that
professional, electorally-oriented parties need.
Example 1: Meetings
The most obvious, ongoing material means by which a political party like the Labour
Party can be said to have existence, for its own members at least, is by meetings.  As I
discussed in the last chapter, meetings are a primary means by which members and
activists experience the party, and participate in it.  Meetings are so ‘normal’ and so
much part of a ‘common sense’ way of running an organisation that they are not often
thought about in terms of power.  The ‘efficiency’ or otherwise of  particular formats of
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meetings or whether they achieve a particular outcome or not may be argued over from
time-to-time, but the extent to which meetings per se play a role in producing useful and
loyal activists is rarely either considered by academics or noticed by participants.  In
this chapter, meetings are considered as ‘practices’: regular, repeated and governed by a
series of written and unwritten rules and conventions that contribute towards the
production of useful subjectivities.  Meetings are seen, in part, as a ritualised means of
communication between participants and an important means of socialising new
members.  As such, they are points at which party activists begin to emerge and are
constituted even as they are disciplined.
There are many different kinds of meetings, governed by different rules, situated in
different parts of the party apparatus, with different functions: at the branch level, at the
constituency level, at the national level; also within the Parliamentary Labour Party and
the (Shadow) Cabinet itself.  As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Branch meeting
is for many members their first point of contact with active party life.  Some regularity
of attendance at branch meetings is perhaps the most basic level of commitment that an
activist can show the party.  Some will go no further, but attendance at local branch
meetings is the first step towards much deeper involvement and activism, such as
becoming a delegate to the constituency General Committee (GC) or being recruited to
participation in local campaigning and electioneering, fundraising and so on.  It is
therefore empowering regarding future possible roles, but it is also a way in which the
individual begins to be subtly opened up to control: by virtue of the requirement to
emulate and absorb the practices and the language of the party meeting.  This is just the
beginning for those who will become ‘committed’ to the party, but it is a vital first step
towards constituting them as loyal activists.
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The meeting is a point at which individual involvement is validated; through which
individuals are recognised as participants by other party members and brought into its
scheme.  The informal induction and orientation of new members is an important part of
this.  New members might learn by observation, or be guided by a ‘mentor’.  In his
introduction to GC meetings, for example, Stephen Beckett recalled that it
was quite difficult coming in … the procedure took a little bit of time to
get round.  But pretty much dependent on your politics, someone
would pick you up and show you the ropes … telling you how this
worked, that worked, that sort of thing. 6
This is a way, therefore, in which individuals are not only subjected to subtle control but
at the same time are empowered to be effective agents.  The party member must become
familiar with the detailed practices of party life as if they were a ‘natural instinct’.  That
familiarity and the ease of communication and interaction that goes with it in the
context of these rituals are part of what constitutes an individual as a local activist, a
trusted party member: as one who is ‘fit’ to be a representative.  In other words, this
means conforming to certain understandings of what a political activist should be and
being empowered to do so.  There is something of this idea to be found in the
importance that Beckett, now a long-standing activist in Tower Hamlets, attaches to the
regular attendance at party meetings:
being a member doesn’t mean to say you have to go to a meeting, you
have to be involved … [but] I think it should be a little bit of that.
Clearly, there shouldn’t be any compulsion, but I think if you want to
represent a political party … you should have to show some evidence
6 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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of local involvement … however you want to describe that:
campaigning at election time, being involved in your branch or at least
attending your branch.  I think if you don’t, how do you know what
other Labour party members want … or what their ideas or views are,
how you represent them or how you build a team that’s going to go out
and win an election or whatever? Political parties are about people
coming together … that’s what I think a political party should be.7
Underlying this quote is an assumed association between meetings and the production
of useful and able party workers and representatives.  These meetings therefore are at
the centre of local party life: their regularity and their role as a structured ritual of
communication between local activists and other parts of the party organisation, are
central to the constitution of individuals as ‘activists’ (and their recognition as such) and
to the party’s ability to build for itself useful capacity via campaigners, organisers,
representatives and others.  These are, in a way, models for coming to belief in the
Pascalian sense, inasmuch as performing the acts associated with loyal, effective party
agency engenders commitments to and skills in these particular roles.
However, as I argued earlier, these performances and roles are not unchanging.
Established practices may sometimes be challenged and subject to change in line with
the party’s needs as these respond to wider social imperatives.  Faucher-King (2005),
for example, points out that there is a particular ‘reverence for rules’ in the Labour Party
(although many of these practices have been defined by custom and learned by
experience).  ‘New Labour’, however, was (initially at least) characterised by an
ostentatious disrespect of rituals: as archaic, unprofessional and noninstrumental
7 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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(Faucher-King 2005, 69).  But despite the iconoclasm of the early Blair era, the
practices and rituals which make up party life have nonetheless hardened over time with
conventional ways of doing things.  In the earlier stages of reform in 1988, for example,
the party leadership launched a campaign to recruit a million new members.  Part of the
problem of attracting and maintaining new members, however, seemed to be a certain
rigidity and formalism in its routines:
Joining Labour can mean a succession of bureaucratic meetings rather
than active involvement … Among supporters who should and could
be joining the party, this is a strong perception (Labour Party 1989).
It was therefore suggested that the normal habits of meetings could be broken, for
example, by asking members involved in other local community organisations to lead
discussions; by having a ten minute ‘soap box’ slot in which members could present on
a topic that concerned or interested them; by paying ‘special attention to new members’,
for example, by inviting them to the pub afterwards.  It was further proposed to make
meetings more ‘interesting’ by arranging a programme of talks on ‘subjects based on
Labour’s key priorities’, or inviting visiting speakers like the local MP; perhaps trying
new formats like ‘joint meetings with other branches, meetings open to the general
public or breaking meetings into small groups or study circles for part of the time’
(Labour Party n.d., Recruiting Members).  In addition, it was suggested that
There’s more to life than meetings. As well as improving your
meeting, there should be opportunities for members to be involved in a
range of other branch activities … try a regular quiz night;
entertainment at Christmas; a social for elderly members – perhaps in
the afternoon, or a party for members’ children … why not a trip to the
228
local pub?  New members will welcome the chance to get to know
people in their area (Labour Party 1990).
Meetings were portrayed here more as barriers to outsiders and as off-putting to new
members, and thus as ineffective in attracting the kind of more active member the party
needed in the late twentieth century.  In other words, it was not enough just to fit into
established organisational patterns, as an approach centred on BC might suggest: in a
fast developing media age, more active, even creative, skills were needed from the party
membership.  The new activities prescribed were therefore designed to produce these
new forms of subjectivity.  As I will discuss in the next example, the needs of the party
were evolving: the kinds of new members that parties needed to attract and the means
by which it was thought they would be attracted, maintained and made useful was
changing.
Strengths of Constitutive Power as an Explanation
Stage One: Constituting Subjects
a) Through what habits and practices in everyday party life is party structure
reproduced?
b) How do these taken-for-granted repetitions become sedimented tools of control?
The language, structure, relationships and habits of communication that are built into
branch meetings reproduce the relations of power in the party as a whole.  The
appropriate levels of deference towards and respect for authority are played out in the
relationships between the Chair and the other attendees of the meeting, for example.
Relations of authority are reproduced through the formal control ascribed to the Chair:
the formal, third person, language employed in referring to the ‘Chair’, the practice of
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speaking through and deferring to the Chair and so on.  Another example is reporting
which is an important part of any party meeting (see previous chapter).  The reporting
roles of officers, representatives and delegates communicate the party’s structures of
authority: the delegate to the constituency GC repeats the discussions and decision of
the CLP; the councillor informs members of his or her actions and the decisions of the
Labour Group; they may be scrutinised and subject to questions (presided over by the
Chair).  This communicates an ‘apartness’ and a relationship of formal accountability
between these different parts of the party and in the constitution of that relationship, the
subjects themselves are also constituted within its scheme.  Meetings operate as tools of
control because they establish norms of conduct, but they also empower by constituting
participants in particular roles: whether Chair, Secretary, a councillor, delegate or
ordinary member.  This is part of what makes individuals into ‘proper’ activists,
empowered in particular roles and loyal to the party in a much deeper sense than just
alignment with particular leaders or ideologies.  In other words, it becomes a way of
life, a culture.
Stage Two: Building Capacities
a) How are individuals empowered with capacities to act within this scheme?
b) What benefits does this bring to the party?
Being constituted in this fashion empowers agents to act according to the party’s
political objectives because as members, they are deeply imbued with the party’s culture
and practices, marking them out as subjects of the party structure, but also making them
into effective political actors: recognition as trusted, loyal, or talented, for example,
empowers agents because it opens doors to much deeper involvement and activism.
However, for the same reason, it also controls them.  From the party leader down,
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including executives, party officers, organisers and grass-roots party workers, they are
constituted as agents capable of fulfilling the kind of roles the party needs to strengthen
and support its perpetuation.  These individuals are therefore reinforcements of party
structure as well as vehicles for it.
Attempts to challenge ‘traditional’ practices in the 1980s and 1990s can be understood
in this light as the party’s logical response to changes in politics and technology and the
need to maintain subjects as supports.  By adapting to changing technologies and social
practices, the party structure maintains its capacity to attract individuals into its scheme.
As part of this, there is an attempt through training and guidance to ‘reconstitute’
existing members and activists, making them more useful, especially in terms of
outreach to potential new members. This makes them a significant support for the party
in reproducing its own structure and building greater capacity for itself. An evolution in
the party’s practices helps to produce more relevant, and thus more effective,
subjectivities loyal to the emerging language, structure and practice of Labour Party
politics.  Party life, in other words, is not just a series of unchanging rituals, but is in
part an ongoing reinvention of ritual and it is in this very reinvention, and in the
conflicts and tensions that it sometimes throws up, that the contours of CP can be
traced.
Limits of Constitutive Power as an Explanation
Because this dimension of power is concerned with the constitution of subjectivities, the
level of analysis is one in which individuals are regarded as effects of structure.  This
highlights an important difference between CP and the other dimensions that have
preceded it, and therefore the greater richness it brings to my analysis.  However,
because of its structural focus, what this approach lacks is a clear and detailed sense of
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how these practices actually invade the human body to constitute the particular
subjectivities the party needs.  Therefore, although CP provides the analysis with
valuable insights into the constitution of loyalty and its role as a subtle form of control,
it does not explain how this actually happens at the micro-level leaving important gaps
in the explanation to be filled.
Example 1 Conclusion
This example illustrates how, in general terms, CP adds to the overall framework of
power: it aids understanding of how party subjects emerge as effects of the routine
practices and rituals of party life, such as meetings.  Meetings are practices that help to
structure everyday party life and relationships.  They reproduce that structure and they
contribute towards the constitution of appropriate subjectivities, thus refining the kinds
of organisational capacities and acumen required to perform different relevant roles
within the party.  This, furthermore, contributes and adds to the culture of loyalty which
is such a prominent feature of the party ethos and which exercises subtle control over
those subjects.  However, while this dimension of power that Althusser inspires is
extremely provocative in suggesting how internal party rituals engender loyal and
effective members, it does not yet provide the means to examine the process in
sufficient detail.  This is a gap that the framework will need to address in order to be
truly comprehensive in its coverage.  A question that this particular example has not
answered that perhaps can be addressed from the perspective of CP, however, is how
the kinds of subjectivities constituted in the practices of party life change with the
party’s needs.  This is what I will look at more closely with the help of my second
example.
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Example 2: The Party Career Structure
The trend towards centralisation and professionalisation that I discussed in the previous
chapter has a repressive and controlling aspect as BC demonstrates.  However, what this
third dimension of power is unable to recognise is that such a development may also
have a positive, productive and constitutive effect.  As I have argued, even though the
party’s electoral orientation means that it becomes more tightly controlled from the
centre in an administrative sense, it cannot operate efficiently or effectively if it is
simply populated with obedient automatons.  It therefore needs some capacity to train
and develop new kinds of activists and members who will be useful to it in the
contemporary political landscape. CP is able to illuminate this.
One signal of this kind of change and its effects on the party is the sense in which, since
the period of reform in the 1980s and 1990s, there appears to have been a significant
change in the kinds of people who become active party members.  This has been
remarked upon by noted observers of the Labour Party:
I was at a Scottish conference recently … there was this influx of
young, well-dressed, clearly middle-class people who seemed quite
incongruous with the rest.  But these were people who were employed
in some kind of political capacity … This is a trend that has carried on
since the 1980s really, and it signifies perhaps that there is a different
conception of what it means to be a party member today.8
As British politics has changed, especially in relation to its relationship with modern
media, Labour politics and party administration have changed too, becoming more
8 Interview, Eric Shaw
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professional and focused around Westminster, attuned to the needs of a round-the-clock
national media.  This has engendered a shift in the party’s focus away from local
politics and towards the national arena.  As one activist has put it,
the party is increasingly centralised because of the nature of politics,
which is a lot more Westminster focused … Local Government,
running the local state, used to be a powerhouse in the party but it
increasingly became less important.  There is much more central
government control and little discretion now. 9
If part of the party’s role is to perpetuate and reproduce its internal structure and its
efficiency within the wider political field, then local parties and representative structures
need to be reordered in line with these developments.  Furthermore, the roles that are
performed and the way they are organised and managed are important ways of training
and building new kinds of party activists, workers and representatives who are more
suitable supports for the Party’s contemporary orientation.  Thus since the 1990s, a new
generation of members who are much more professionally minded and Westminster
focused have emerged. These young activists, says John Burnell – a lifelong local
organiser in London and Hertfordshire – regard local activism more as a means of
building up a political CV, than a commitment to local government and politics.  There
are ‘probably no more than two or three thousand of them in the whole party’, he says10
but in an era when many parties are ‘lucky to get ten people at a meeting’11 they
represent an important core group of activists.  The Vauxhall party (of which Burnell’s
daughter is a member), for example, is ‘full of Labour Party staffers’ and so ‘people still
9 Interview, John Burnell
10 Interview, John Burnell
11 Interview, Stephen Beckett
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turn up to branch meetings, which is quite unusual’12. Marjorie Paling has noticed
these ‘young men in suits’ in Nottinghamshire, too, who are
new from university, having done their degrees, offering to be this
officer, that officer, but they want to change their officerships so their
CV looks like it's got this broad breadth of everything under the sun
before they actually get their first seat.  We have a lovely young
organiser where I am.  He finished university where he had done
politics and history and he wants to get his experience in the Labour
Party, so he’s working as an organiser getting paid a pittance as well
as being his branch secretary.  But he’s doing it because he wants to
get known.13
This, says Burnell, is a reason why ‘our generation and this generation is different …
for me, organising was done for the good of the party, but for [them] it is about building
a career.’ 14
Taking a wider view and using the lens of CP might, however, lead one to draw a
slightly different conclusion from John Burnell’s.  As I have shown in previous
chapters, during the 1980s and 1990s, in response to the changing media and political
landscape, the Labour Party reformed its decision-making structures, its membership
administration, and practices, so that it became more controlled and centralised.  It
follows, therefore, that as the party itself is restructured, so the capacities it requires to
pursue its political objectives will change too.  Thus, under Kinnock’s and Blair’s
12 Interview, John Burnell
13 Interview, Marjorie Paling
14 Interview, John Burnell
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leadership the trajectory of the party’s development was such that even in Labour’s
local government heartlands local party politics became less about producing capacities
for winning power locally and running local councils and more a means of constituting
new generations of effective political agents with the right blend of skills and
experience for a more nationally oriented politics.  In other words, to be mainstream and
professional, the party needs members who look and act the same way; who express this
party ethos because they really are professionally ambitious and regard the party as a
vehicle for professional success.   Thus ‘professionalisation’ is reflected in the way
party elites are trained and produced:
One of the main things that has changed in the party is the way people
get to the top, ‘the assisted places scheme’ as many of the old guard
call it.  Certain people like the Milibands, Ed Balls and people like
that are all professional politicians who are fast-tracked via the back
office, parachuted into a safe seat and walk straight into the Cabinet.15
Strengths of Constitutive Power as an Explanation
Stage One: Constituting Subjects
a) Through what habits and practices in everyday party life is party structure
reproduced?
b) How do these taken-for-granted repetitions become sedimented tools of control?
The habits and practices of party activism, the structure of roles to be performed in the
party locally and nationally, and their relation to the wider structures of authority were
subject to significant evolution during the 1980s and 1990s.  In line with the party’s
15 Interview, Paul Farrelly
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changing needs, new and different kinds of subjectivities with suitable capacities have
been produced. Organisational centralisation has been an important development, but
so has the business-like orientation and professionalisation of party life.  Party life is in
part seen as building a career, with importance attached to a sense of progress up a
hierarchy, or promotion in which individuals are assigned roles with greater
responsibility and authority in the party structure.  If party activists wish to become
Parliamentary candidates at some point in their career, they are expected to have a
‘good CV’, which includes a range of responsibilities, a breadth and depth of experience
in the party in all its aspects.  Simply having one job for ten years as an organiser, for
example, would most likely be regarded as poor preparation for Parliament.
It might be argued that, contrary to an anonymous constitutive form of power, what can
in fact be observed here is just individual people pursuing their ambitions and desires
for advancement, competing with others to achieve that by getting as much experience
as possible.  However, from the perspective of CP, it could also be argued that it is the
party that has helped to constitute them as such and which commends itself as a career
ladder whilst also using members’ ambitions to reproduce itself and its power through a
new professionalised ethos.  This argument underlines the way in which these practices,
as they became sedimented and an integral part of party life, are both a subtle means by
which control is exercised and a response to the changing needs of the party that draws
on individuals’ own socially motivated goals.  Oriented towards the specific needs of
the party, they produce specific skills and capacities that are useful to it.  Subjects, as
they progress up the ‘career ladder’, then become more enmeshed in the party structure:
their loyalty to the party; the fact that they are constituted by and dependent on it; the
extent to which they are effectively ‘locked-into’ its scheme, are tightly entwined. This
could be seen as complementary to a more Michelsian concern about bureaucratic
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oligarchy in which the professional ambitions of these new activists within the party
organisation endows them with certain modes of elite power.  Viewed from the
perspective of CP, however, this is also a way in which the party both ensures their
loyalty and reconstitutes them in its own preferred image: as young, ambitious talent
within a professional, and thus competent and trustworthy, political party.
Stage Two: Building Capacities
a) How are individuals empowered with capacities to act within this scheme?
b) What benefits does this bring to the party?
The practices of party life that I have described are empowering because they engender
the skills, abilities and knowledge party activists need to fulfil their roles and climb the
hierarchy, and therefore become advisers, researchers, officials, MPs, even cabinet
ministers and leaders.  Indeed, these are precisely the kinds of ways in which party
leaders today are produced.  The benefits to the party are that it produces loyal,
knowledgeable, experienced subjects who live and breathe the party’s culture and
priorities; who are ambitious and focused on winning elections and therefore political
power for the party.  Furthermore, it is also a means by which both old-fashioned
paternalistic elites (see Chapter Three) and  troublesome left-wing activists can be
marginalised because they do not fit the model of the ambitious, modern, professional
party activist which is the product of the party’s ideological scheme.
Limits of Constitutive Power as an Explanation
This example demonstrates some complementarity between CP and BC because it
shows how, within a more tightly organised party, new kinds of subjectivity and loyalty
emerge in the practices which develop.  Members and activists are not simply obedient
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fodder for leaders (as BC might suggest) but are constituted as loyal actors effective and
congruent with the party’s political objectives.  However, once again, there are few
specifics offered about what kinds of individuals this produces and how they are
actually constituted in practice (e.g. in the way they act, interact, dress; what they look
and sound like and so on).  Thus, although the introduction of CP into the framework
answers some of the questions left open by the previous three dimensions of power, it in
fact opens up new questions about power that the framework needs to address in some
way.
Example 2 Conclusion
In this section I have argued that the reorganisation of the party and the way in which
subjectivities are produced are linked.  Despite the relatively high level of analysis and
minimal detail, what this dimension of power helps illuminate is how party reform and
change (in response to changing technologies and political circumstances, for example)
engenders changes in the kinds of capacities and skills the party requires to achieve its
political objectives. New practices become sedimented and established as an integral
part of party life and as such are both a means by which the party builds capacities and
pursues its goals.  However it is also a means by which the party is able to exercise a
subtle level of control over its members. But a question that this analysis opens up, is:
by what specific means in the modern, professional party, is capacity built?  What are
the kinds of techniques used to generate the skills and capacities required in party
members and activists?  This is a question to which I will turn my attention in the third
and final example in this chapter, which looks at training.
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Example 3: Training Councillors
As the party’s structures of power have become more controlled, the practices by which
the constitution of useful and loyal subjects is achieved have also evolved.  Since the
1990s, training workshops and courses have become increasingly prominent
contributions to this process.  Training is itself a practice which develops useful
capacities in members by instilling appropriate habits and ‘know-how’ that contribute
towards their constitution as effective agents. Training empowers members but is also a
way of exerting control over them in this nexus of empowerment and discipline I have
been describing. Such practices might be used to support the recruitment of members,
getting out the vote, and even training people in how to be councillors: it on this latter
example that I focus in this section.
The position and role of councillor is a very prominent one in local parties.  Even in a
highly centralised party, councillors play an important role because their perceived
competence (or otherwise) in the local political sphere is a reflection on the image and
aims of the party nationally.  Councillors are also a potential source for the renewal of
national elites, providing potential MPs and perhaps even senior leaders. Although for
some, ‘councillor’ may be as far as they go, for others it is a step on the ‘career ladder’,
especially for the ambitious young activists I have discussed above.  In other words,
local government is another point in the party’s structure where effective agents are
needed and at which further agentic capacity can be built. As such producing
competent and effective councillors who are likely to be loyal to the mainstream party is
an important and necessary function supported by the practices of training.  By instilling
in them the right kinds of habits and working practices early on, the party’s needs are
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responded to and embedded in the practical cultures of local representation; that is, the
‘know-how’ of being a councillor.
Training appears to have become a more prominent feature of the party’s approach as
the organisation has become more formalised and centralised. When Dennis Twomey
first became a councillor in the 1970s, things were a lot more informal.  A ‘word-in-the-
ear’ from a local official would suffice as advice on how to be a good councillor:
The party then had a full-time agent, Bob Searle and what Bob
actually said was, if you get selected and become a councillor this is
how you need to behave.  What he said was … something like this:
‘you must never do anything improper, you must never do anything
that appears improper and you must never do anything that anyone –
however ill-disposed to you – can portray as improper’…  So it was a
fairly hard line, but I was always grateful to him because I found it
immensely useful in sort of saying ‘No. Can’t do that’.16
But as far as training was concerned, ‘that was about it.’17 Later, however, things began
to change. Phil Maxwell, who was a councillor between 1986 and 1998, recalls that
towards the end of his time in office this approach began to change.  He remembers
going to a workshop where we all had to do this role-play in the 1990s
… it must have been about 95/96.  Everybody was divided into groups
and we had to come up with policy ideas and things. It was a kind of
framework which facilitated the managerial approach to politics, and I
16 Interview, Dennis Twomey
17 Interview, Dennis Twomey
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stopped and thought to myself, ‘why am I here? What has happened?
What’s going on?’  It’s almost as if the Labour Party sleepwalked into
a different kind of culture.18
From the perspective of CP, however, it was not a sleepwalk as much as a logical
outcome of changing circumstances and the structural requirements of party efficacy.
Thus, by the 1990s the Party was producing training packs for Labour candidates with
titles like On the Council (Labour Party 1992a), which prescribed workshops, group
tasks, role plays and exercises based on the kinds of situations members might be likely
to encounter. The purpose of this was primarily to instil particular habits and practices
of problem solving, decision-making and co-operation, helping to ensure that the party
was not only producing individuals willing and capable of fulfilling the role of
councillor (which satisfies the party’s function of winning local elections and running
local authorities), but the right kind of councillor who acts in a way that fully
exemplifies, represents and communicates the party’s ‘brand’ and its approach to
politics (i.e. mainstream and moderate). By way of illustration, in the On the Council
training pack there are two exercises for candidates to carry out: the first is a group
discussion on the role of the councillor, including what the job entails, what the
relationship with other councillors, officers and unions should be (see Figure 5.1
below); the second is a task-based exercise on how councillors in a Labour Group (in
power or in opposition) could work together in a contentious decision-making situation.
18 Interview, Phil Maxwell
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A close look at the statements provided to guide the discussion in Figure 5.1 seems to
indicate that there is a clear direction in which any discussion is likely to lead: that is,
that council officers should be listened to, respected and their advice taken seriously;
that trade unions are not always right; that non-Labour voters are at least as important to
the deliberations of representatives as Labour voters; that nitty-gritty issues like local
environment and litter are more important than abstract ideas about building
Group Discussion: The Role of the Councillor
Aim
To decide what is the Councillor’s job. To decide what the relationship between councillors,
officers and unions should be.
Task
Listed below are a number of statements about the role of the Councillor
In your group discuss each statement and decide if you agree or disagree.  Put your comments
on a flip-chart to show the rest of the group.
(Don’t worry – be as frank as you wish!)
Decide who will report back to the rest of the group.
1. It’s clear officers can’t run the council’s services. With my experience on lots of
management committees I can show them how it should be done.
2. I didn’t join the Labour Party to attack workers.  If NALGO are refusing to open
libraries for longer hours, then I will back them all the way.
3. I got elected by Labour voters.  If the local Resident’s Association don’t like my
youth centre discos that’s their problem
4. Councillors aren’t elected to deal with silly issues like dog dirt in the parks.
We’re there to build socialism.
5. If my ward wants me to vote against cuts then that’s what I will do. The
members are what counts, not the Labour Group.
6. Our manifesto said the Labour Party would decentralise the management of
housing estates. We must implement this pledge even though it’s going to cost us
twice as much as we thought and put £30 on our poll tax.  That’s real political
principle for you.
Reproduced from the Labour Party (1992a).
Figure 5.1 Example of Candidate Training Activity
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‘socialism’; that the Labour Group’s decisions and unity take priority over the wishes
and whims of local branch members; that the local tax burden should be a priority over
expensive schemes.  Put simply, the party is seeking to produce pragmatic, practical,
moderate councillors: like Mark Taylor, who became a councillor during the period in
which this guidance was being used in the party (in 1994), and argued that whilst ‘some
people want to sort of create a socialist utopia … all [we] were interested in was
making sure that the streets were clean, and we didn’t care less how certain things got
achieved.’19
The second task is a workshop that takes the form of a role play, in which participants
practise ‘working together as councillors’ (Ibid.).  It sets out a scenario, and provides
associated documentation and briefing materials, in which a special meeting of the
Labour Group must deal with a local planning problem.  It is, in the scenario, just before
local elections and the issue ‘threatens to be the major issue of the campaign unless the
Council gets its act together quickly and sorts it out’ (Ibid.).  They are set the task of
coming up with a position for the group to present at a public meeting on the issue and
attempting to prevent the possibility of ‘a big public row just before the election’.  It
divides the participants up into those playing the parts of rival positions in the debate,
including Planning Committee members, ward councillors supporting residents
objecting to the scheme, Policy Committee members, and those who support the District
Party and the unions.  Each sub-group is asked first to make a decision about a unified
position to put to the whole group, compromising as necessary.  In front of the whole
group, they are asked to present and explain their decision.  Finally the whole group
must come to a decision about what should be presented to a forthcoming public
meeting.
19 Interview, Mark Taylor
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The benefit of this kind of training is that the participants are not instructed as such, but
explore and find the answers for themselves through group discussions and exercises,
discussing previous successes and problems and so on. In other words, they learn how
to become certain kinds of agent through a directed process.  Once again, the emphasis
is placed very strongly on a willingness to compromise; on a self- and group-discipline
that holds in public, and on a co-operative form of decision-making that takes into
account the views of a wide range of interests, not necessarily just what might have
traditionally been thought of as ‘Labour’ ones.  For the party, this produces self-
disciplined political subjectivities with a ‘mainstream’ approach to politics and political
problem-solving, the very things that the modern, professional, electoral party needs to
be.  Through the process of training, candidates and councillors that support and
reinforce that professionalism are produced and the practices that engender them are
embedded in party culture.
Strengths of Constitutive Power as an Explanation
Stage One: Constituting Subjects
a) Through what habits and practices in everyday party life is party structure
reproduced?
b) How do these taken-for-granted repetitions become sedimented tools of control?
Training programmes like this are part of a process by which the party instils
appropriate habits and conduct, not through mechanisms of hierarchical command, but
by constituting useful agents with useful capacities.  In this case, the training of
potential councillors is a way of constituting moderate, pragmatic representatives who
conduct themselves in ways that reflect well on the modern, professional electorally-
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oriented party.  This is useful to the party because it constitutes them as decision-makers
who can come to their own conclusions which nonetheless are congruent with the
party’s dominant value systems. This is much more efficient and effective than direct
control.  It produces the kind of party representation the party needs in order to project
and sustain an image and approach to politics which is moderate, mainstream and
professional.  These kinds of practices, despite the sense of free discussion,
independence and decision-making are also, however, highly insidious tools of control
because the habits and practices into which individuals are inculcated are imbricated
with the party’s political priorities.
Stage Two: Building Capacities
a) How are individuals empowered with capacities to act within this scheme?
b) What benefits does this bring to the party?
Individual subjects are empowered because they are imbued with the confidence,
knowledge and skills to approach problems in the professional, pragmatic manner in
which they have been trained.  Thus, individual councillors are empowered in different
ways according to how their activity is oriented: they are in a position to achieve
political ends because of their ability to contribute to group decisions, to compromise
and come up with ‘practical’ implementable solutions to everyday solvable issues (like
dog dirt and litter); subjects may also advance further in the party – for example
becoming a Parliamentary candidate – by being  the ‘right kind’ of  person, imbued with
the right kind of personality, skills and experience to do so.  This benefits the party
because it helps to make it more congruent with the mainstream political system and
also because (as part of this) it produces trained representatives who may be able to go
further in the party, thus building more potential leadership capacity.  Although many
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local representatives will go no further than this, they are still essential to even the most
nationally-oriented party culture: the moderate, managerially competent local Labour
authority contributes to the party’s compatibility with the wider political power
structures.  An embarrassing, maverick, radical or ‘incompetent’ council may create
problems for the Party in this respect.  This is illustrated by the way in which many left-
wing Labour councils were portrayed in the 1980s, dismissed as ‘loony left’ more
concerned with fashionable left-wing causes than ‘ordinary people’ (Curran 2005).
Limits to Constitutive Power as an Explanation
The weaknesses of CP revealed by this example are very similar to those I have
mentioned already in this chapter. I therefore have little to add to them, except to say
that whilst this example illuminates how a technique like training helps to constitute
subjectivities congruent with the party’s priorities, it does not provide the kind of
empirical detail that shows how these practices impact in a very direct way upon the
participants themselves.  In order to gain some understanding of how these processes
work at a much more detailed level, this, the framework needs some additional
development.
Example 3 Conclusion
CP here complements my analysis of party power and has an important role to play in
my overall five-dimensional framework because it shows something of how the
production of loyalty is part of a constitutive process.  Individual subjects from this
perspective are not obedient automatons but trained agents.  They are empowered to act
in certain ways congruent with the party’s political objectives and image, and they are
imbued with the capacities it needs to reproduce itself while commending itself as an
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instrument of government.  The training given and the culture in which councillors and
potential councillors have been constituted also forges and maintains a loyalty, not
specifically to party leaders or a particular policy or even rules, but to the party as a
culture and a way of life.
Conclusion
Constitutive Power is a means by which parties build for themselves useful capacities.
They do so through the constitution of subjectivities in the performance, repetition and
learning of relevant practices, behavioural norms and conduct. On this level,
Althusser’s insistence on materiality is very important because it does not entail
subjectivities merely as consciousness but also as embodied actors whose corporeality is
also incorporated into their performances. The examples I have used in this chapter –
the practice of meetings, the party’s career structure and the training of councillors – all
provide examples of how members are constituted in practices as useful supports for the
party’s goals, structure and value systems.  In contrast to the other dimensions of power
that I have elaborated so far, Constitutive Power is not concerned with how individuals
are disciplined through systems of command or become influential actors because of
their ability to achieve goals and internalised priorities.  Instead, it focuses its attention
on how appropriate subjectivities are produced through the practices of everyday party
life.  As well as subjectivities that are useful for perpetuating the party’s value system
and endowed with capacities that are needed for achieving its goals, the party needs to
constitute voluntary loyalty among members in order to benefit from the capacities, or
human capital, that it has ‘invested’ in.  As an analytical frame, Constitutive Power
recognises this dimension of power by noting that attachment to party culture is
achieved through the very constitution of party agents as particular kinds of actor who
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obey party norms because they are embedded in the behavioural patterns they take for
granted and perform in the daily rituals of party life.  Loyalty is not necessarily a
relationship of obedience between leader and led or an attachment to particular policies
or rules, but is a part of party culture and is constituted in the practices in which party
members participate.
Whilst I have put aside the wider role of the party in the reproduction of capitalism that
is one of the main concerns of Althusser’s work on ideology, I have extracted from his
work ideas about how the logic of party structures drives the production of certain kinds
of subjectivity through the practices and habits that form and give shape to party
culture.  This helps to explain why and how the party and the power immanent within it
constitute loyal, effective members and activists. Nevertheless, whilst Constitutive
Power adds a subtle and structural dimension of power to my framework, on its own it
does not yet adequately provide the details of how this happens.  It adds theoretically to
the understanding of power in political parties by explaining dedication to the party in
terms of a constituted loyalty that also acts as a subtle mode of control, rather than
describing mindless obedience or rational self-interest.  However, because it remains
somewhat abstract, it still leaves some questions unanswered.
Where Bureaucratic Control was able to demonstrate how obedient subjects are
produced by the party, Constitutive Power has demonstrated something towards the
understanding of how effective subjects are constituted and remain loyal.  But the
structural focus of this dimension of power needs to be supplemented with a more
intimate sense of how individuals are subjectified and an account of how they are
reconfigured according to the party’s needs.  In other words, whilst Constitutive Power
explains theoretically how subjectivities congruent with party requirements are
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reproduced, a more ethnographic, empirical account of the ways this occurs in the
context of modern parties is also required if this dimension of power is really to bear
fruit.  A way to bring the individual ‘back in’ in some sense without undermining the
insights that have been added by this dimension of analysis needs to be identified.
Therefore I would argue a final, fifth dimension of power is needed  to link Constitutive
Power with Bureaucratic Control and fill in the specifics of how parties produce
subjects who are embodied actors both effective and disciplined down to the finest
detail.
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Six: Disciplinary Control
Through its first four dimensions, power has become progressively more anonymous
and structural in nature, but at the same time less negative and more constitutive.  The
analysis has moved steadily further away from the individuals on whom the first
dimension of power is centred: by-passing confrontations between them in the second
dimension of power, disciplined and confined by organisation in the third, and
constituting their very subjectivity in the fourth.  In this fifth, and final, dimension in
my framework, power becomes more anonymous still, and yet there is a sense in which
I come full circle to focus once again on the individual: in particular on how individuals
are forged and invested with the capacities to be effective political actors.  I will call
this dimension of power Disciplinary Control. It shares some common ground with
Bureaucratic Control because of its concern with the consistent and regularised
operation of systems of control, and with Constitutive Power, especially in its focus on
power’s more constitutive side.  However Disciplinary Control fleshes out and deepens
the understanding of power developed by these third and fourth dimensions in important
ways.  In the former case, it provides the specifics of how the kind of control that
Bureaucratic Control represents actually is applied at a detailed level.  In the latter, it
homes in on the fine-grained detail of the micro-processes of power, to elaborate with
empirical detail what is largely a theoretical argument.  My analysis in this chapter
therefore seeks to identify the specific means by which control is exercised and
subjectivity is sustained and reinforced.  To develop the concept of Disciplinary Control
I draw on the work of Michel Foucault and others working within his framework,
especially contemporary feminist theorists.  Following that, I will set out the key
component characteristics and the questions which will guide my analysis, based on
interviews, archive research and contemporary accounts.
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What is Disciplinary Control?
Up until now, I have examined how power might be seen as a property of individuals,
an effect of structural forces or embedded in organisational dynamics.  For Foucault,
power is not possessed by any individual nor located at specific points in the structure.
It is instead conceived as a relation which is productive of reality and truth and not
necessarily oppressive of it (Deleuze 1988, 22-7).  Foucault is more interested in the
question of how power operates beneath such structures and ‘systems of command’.1
Power is, for him, a strategic force that ‘brings into play relations between individuals’
(Foucault 1994, 337).  However, these relations are given effect by the ‘divisions,
inequalities and disequilibriums’ immanent in everyday relationships (Foucault 1979,
94), including economic, or sexual relations.  This dimension of power cannot therefore
be understood in political parties by an analysis of structures and leaders, which is why
Foucault argues that in political theory ‘we need to cut off the king’s head’ (Foucault
1994a, 122) and redirect analysis towards the immanence of power within networks of
relations, in the mundane day-to-day details, even banalities, of party life.  Especially
important to this thesis is how Foucault’s unique perspective illuminates the circulation
of power through the party fabric in micro-processes: small pressures and petty
humiliations, advice on practice via manuals and guides, for example.  Looking solely
at the formal constitution of a party, its leaders and procedures is insufficient here, then,
because this perspective facilitates a level of analysis which focuses on these micro-
techniques rather than particular locations. These techniques can be identified at points
often overlooked or skimmed-over by traditional political analysis and more structurally
1 During his ‘middle’ genealogical period, between the publication of The Archaeology of Knowledge
(first published in 1969; in English in 1972) and the first Volume of the History of Sexuality (first
published in 1976; in English in 1979) in which he elaborates his general conceptualisation of power (see
Foucault 1979, 92-102).
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oriented approaches to power. It therefore provides a valuable supplement to the more
macroscopic outlooks of Bureaucratic Control and Constitutive Power.
Foucauldian scholars have too often neglected the study of formal political institutions
like parties.  This is a pity, because his work provides an interesting new dimension to
the operation of power by focusing on the micro-level.  This is to some extent being
rectified in contemporary political research: for example, through studies of ceremony
and ritual in Parliament that draw on his work (See for example Rai 2010).  I intend to
rectify this further by making particular use of Foucault’s concept of discipline to shed
light on the operation of micro-power in modern political parties. There are two main
ways, I would argue, in which Disciplinary Control operates in this dimension: firstly
through detailed control in organisation, and secondly through surveillance and
normalisation.
Discipline and Detailed Control
Discipline is a strategy, or technology, of power which organises and manages agents in
relation to time, space and tasks (for example, by means of timetables) and in relation to
other individuals so as to obtain as efficient a machine as possible. Time is a precious
commodity which must be ‘without impurities or defects.’  It must be not only filled but
of ‘good quality, throughout which the body is constantly applied to its exercise’
(Foucault 1977, 151).  The body itself must be employed to its full capacity and
‘nothing must remain idle or useless: everything must be called upon to form the
support of the act required’ (Ibid., 152). Space is enclosed and divided in such a way as
to accommodate the efficient distribution of agents into roles and functions. In this
way, discipline is ‘a question of extracting, from time, ever more available moments
and, from each moment, ever more useful forces’ (Ibid., 154). In short, discipline is a
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‘political anatomy of detail’ (Foucault 1977, 138) which is directed towards the careful
management of individuals, space, time and knowledge, so that
each individual has his own place; and each place its individual … one
must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled
disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable
and dangerous coagulation (Ibid., 143)
In other words, it produces an efficient machine down to the finest detail.
At first glance, this appears similar to Weber’s concept of discipline, which I discussed
in Chapter Four.  Weberian discipline is, after all, about extracting the optimum
‘physical and psychic power’ from individuals through rational calculation (Weber
1948 [MD], 254).  However, whilst Weber is concerned with the integrational,
totalising aspects of discipline in which individuality and the capacity to act is
overwhelmed by its machinery, Foucauldian discipline is productive, being a means by
which individuals are empowered as agents to act within its scheme. Instead of
crushing individual capacities and turning people into automatons, it constructs them as
useful agents.  Discipline does this by making use of devices like timetables that control
activity, organisational techniques that compose and distribute individuals, and targets
that provide the basis for monitoring them.  For example, by providing individuals with
the correct training and guidance, and by allocating them into appropriate tasks, they are
empowered with capacities to be effective political actors.  Another key difference
between the two conceptualisations of discipline is that, whereas Weber’s approach
suggests discipline is the product of a general trend towards societal rationalisation, the
latter cannot be described as a scheme of any kind. For Foucault, the techniques I have
described are applied ad hoc in response to specific problems of control and
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organisation, essentially problems of rational organisation. There is no grand strategy:
there is not (as Weber understood it) a general process of societal rationalisation which
affects political parties as it does every other organisation and institution in society, but
specific rationalities (Foucault 1994, 329), which consist of rational responses to
particular problems encountered by petty officials. They may link together into a
network of power relations that might appear as ‘major dominations’ with ‘hegemonic
effects’ (Foucault 1979, 94) but in fact what can be seen is the intersection of specific
micro-powers arising from relatively mundane and specific points and their
‘congealing’ into a system.
Discipline, Surveillance and Normalisation
As well as these mechanisms of detailed organisation, Foucauldian discipline can also
illuminate how power constructs and constrains bodies at an exceedingly subtle and
insidious level of detailed control (Coole 2007, 414). Politics is largely played out in
the media, especially on television and in the press and as such has many of the
characteristics of a performance.  Erving Goffman’s account of ‘performance’ in
everyday life can be a helpful source for elaborating some of these ideas.   He
emphasises the importance of the ‘expressive equipment’ employed by ‘performers’,
which includes insignias of office or rank, clothing and so on, but also posture, speech
patterns, facial expressions, bodily gestures (Goffman 1990 [1959], 32-34).
Furthermore, physical attributes like sex, age, racial characteristics, even size and looks
are included (Ibid., 32-34). For Goffman, these different pieces of ‘equipment’ are
employed to communicate status, and provide the means by which performance is
‘socialised’ so that it fits the understanding and expectations of the society in which it is
presented (Ibid., 44).  However, I would argue that these are ways in which the body is
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marked out and classified, primed for conveying messages that manifest the party’s
brand through gestures, appearance and conduct.  Discipline thereby excludes and
normalises those that fail to fit expected norms as well as being productive.
Such ideas are exemplified by Judith Butler, who draws on Foucault to argue that ‘the
gendered body is performative’: a fiction that has ‘no ontological status apart from the
various acts which constitute its reality’ (Butler 1990, 136).  In particular, the effect of
this is such that what appears to be the essence of femininity or masculinity is in fact ‘an
effect and function of a decidedly public and social discourse’ which creates ‘the
illusion of an interior and organising gender core’ (Butler 1990, 136).   This is important
to the understanding of modern party power in particular because it is an aspect of
discipline which is intensified by the attentions of television and the representation of
politicians in the press, which the party internalises and reinforces in marketing
techniques.  In such a way, the norms of performance are internalised by the party and
its members. Contemporary feminist analysis in particular has made use of these ideas
to highlight how the body is
subjected to the look, the gaze, the surveillance of the other.  Its
surfaces are marked and inscribed by others, such that different bodies
are recognised and categorised, disciplined and excluded (Coole 2007,
416).
Two mechanisms, surveillance and normalisation, work together to produce this effect.
Surveillance plays a role as a mechanism of Disciplinary Control by subjecting
embodied agents to the gaze of the ‘other’: individual politicians are under ongoing
visual scrutiny by the television and press not only for what they say, but also for how
closely they conform or not to expected norms.  This does not mean there is an explicit
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or even conscious evaluation of their appearance, but it does mean that any deviation
from an expected norm of performance or appearance is noticed: weight, age, clothing,
hair (or lack of it) may all be included on this list.  In this way, political actors are
perpetually supervised and observed. The term ‘normalisation’ refers to the
construction of norms of conduct into which actors are disciplined and ranked according
to whether or not they conform to them. Thus, people are differentiated, ranked and
graded as a means of reward and punishment.  Those departing from norms are subject
to a finely calibrated series of sanctions such as humiliation or embarrassment, which
undermine their performance and therefore their status within the party; those who
conform, on the other hand, are rewarded. As part of this process, ‘good’ and ‘bad’
subjects are thus hierarchised in relation to one another (Foucault 1977, 181).
These two mechanisms signify a particularly effective form of power: using the kind of
information gathered in surveillance produces judgements with which agents are ranked
and disciplined around a norm. Thus the kinds of pressures that come from outside
surveillance become, firstly, internalised by the party and turned on its representatives
as they are reproduced through the application of marketing and presentational
techniques and, secondly, inscribed directly on the individuals themselves, so that
conformity to these norms become automatic.  In such a way, the performances of
politics constitute its reality. This is especially apparent when it comes to gender and
racial norms in (British) political life.  Nirmal Puwar argues that the ‘female body is an
awkward and conspicuous form in relation to the (masculine) somatic norm’ (Puwar
2004, 78). In the spaces in which politics is conducted, especially in the media there is
doubt cast on the role of women and ethnic minorities.  They are ‘not automatically
expected to embody the relevant competencies’ and thus are subject to additional
scrutiny in which ‘their every gesture, movement and utterance is observed’ since they
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are viewed suspiciously and judged more harshly (Puwar 2004a, 73).  Building on
Butler’s themes, Puwar reminds the reader that masculinity, too, is performative and,
the ‘maleness of the state is an ongoing performative accomplishment’ in which
‘sedimented masculine rituals’ act as a norm around which the performance of feminine
roles are judged and become subject to discipline:
The position of an MP has been performed as a highly masculinist act
… conducted in a spectacular, exaggerated and theatrical manner; a
form of exhibitionism that is underscored by a bureaucratic form of
violence.  Needless to say, the hero of this performance is a white male
usually displaying in a manner and style of speech of the upper/middle
classes.  As this is the norm, this is the template against which the
speech, gestures and bodily movements of female and black and Asian
bodies are measured. (Ibid., 74-5)
Hostility and exclusivity is expressed, not by formal barriers to entry, but by
surveillance and judgement on the basis of these templates at a less formal level: for
example, remarks made about women’s clothes, hair and make-up, or deploying
gestures to put women off their stride when speaking and so on (Coole 2007, 428).  In
modern politics, however, the role of visual media means that surveillance and scrutiny
is not just conducted by colleagues:
As the media become more important in the making and breaking of
MPs, they continue to keep a watchful eye on the bodily image,
gestures and postures of the women MPs … women’s bodies matter in
the body politic, and … their bodies are always with them. (Puwar
2004, 95)
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Thus if women want to be accepted they have to display the ‘acceptable’ face of
femininity: they cannot just do an impression of men or clone male leaders; and they
cannot be ‘too feminine’ either (Bartky 1988, 75).  Indeed, Diana Coole, too, has argued
that simply aping masculine styles does not work in conventionally gendered spaces
(Coole 2007, 428), and women are encouraged in such situations ‘to adopt the very
styles of traditional femininity that are used to demean them’ (Ibid., 428).  Coole is
referring to the House of Commons when she makes this point, but I would argue that it
equally applies to the representation of female politicians in the media.
Despite its pervasiveness, this kind of power is hard to detect using ‘traditional’
methodologies that seek to locate power: it is ‘everywhere and it is nowhere; the
disciplinarian is everyone and yet no one in particular’ (Bartky 1988, 74).  It is in a
sense less ‘visible’ methodologically speaking because it works directly on the body,
‘an oft-neglected actor within democratic processes’ which is ‘for the most part ignored
by those who study the interpersonal relationships that animate the political domain’
(Coole 2007, 413).  That is, political theory (which looks for power’s legitimate
possession and location) and methodological individualism (which seeks it in the
securing of identifiable interests) cannot detect it. Furthermore, a key means through
which this kind of power operates is in the relatively mundane rituals, informal rules
and practices of political life (Spary 2010, 341). These too, being unwritten, even
unspoken, are less visible, less open to scrutiny in traditional political analysis, and thus
they may also be more resistant to change (Franceschet 2010, 405). However, despite
this, the effects of power are always visible, because it is etched on the body and
performed in its conduct. This visibility is an especially important feature of
Disciplinary Control’s mode of operation, especially in relation to performance.  As
Shirin Rai points out, there is always ‘the presumption of an audience or spectators in
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built into the performance of ritual’ (Rai 2010, 294), and it is this constant assumption
of visibility that results in ‘a self-policing subject, self-committed to a relentless self-
surveillance’ and thereby producing individuals who exercise discipline ‘on and against
their own bodies’ (Bartky 1988, 81). Thus codes of dress, speech (including gesture)
participatory norms and behaviour can all be means by which individuals are
disciplined (Rai 2010, 288) and rendered useful party members.  At the same time
subjectivities that do not ‘fit’ the norm are marginalised and excluded and newcomers,
for example, may therefore seek to minimise difference by adopting the habits of the
dominant group (Franceschet 2010, 395).
Thus, in modern politics visibility is a ‘double-edged sword’, necessary and
advantageous for success, but a means by which individuals are subject to ever more
detailed discipline in which ‘every gesture, movement and utterance is observed’
(Puwar 2004, 145).  What this highlights, in Foucauldian terms, is how discipline
‘invades the body and seeks to regulate its very forces and operations, the economy and
efficiency of its movements’ (Bartky 1988, 61), right down to the finest detail of body
language speaking ‘eloquently , though silently, of [woman’s] subordinate status’ (Ibid.,
74). Furthermore, it illuminates how Disciplinary Control is exercised not by one
individual on another but in the application of self-discipline by individuals.
The Key Components of Disciplinary Control
Disciplinary Control adds to my framework of power within political parties, then,
because of its ability to breathe life into structural approaches to power by focusing
attention at the micro-level.  It is
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a type of power, a modality for its exercise, composing a whole set of
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is
a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology. (Foucault 1977,
215)
It invites examination of the sociology of parties in their ordinary, everyday processes
by looking for the scattered but pervasive signs of power that construct subjectivities
and capacities but, above all, discipline party actors to conform.  Its characteristics are
as follows:
1. Power produces party actors, who are at once disciplined, effective and
‘empowered’.  It does this through detailed techniques and strategies of control
that develop some capacities and dampen others.
2. Disciplinary strategies include the application of technical knowledge to
problems of organisation.  In particular, the meticulous organisation of time,
space and bodies aids organisational efficiency and at the same time disciplines
individual conduct at a fine-grained level.  In this sense, discipline fills in the
finer details of conduct that Weber’s broad account of bureaucratic
rationalisation skims over.
3. The site and focus of power is the body and its conduct.  The body (or the
‘embodied actor) is trained and surveyed at a micro-level.  Its gestures and
appearance are carefully articulated and configured in accordance with the
disciplinary strategies highlighted above.
4. Disciplinary Control ‘normalises’ agents by subtly (re)constructing the body and
its gestures and thereby constructing certain modes and expressions of
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subjectivity or identity.  This is underpinned by surveillance, in which actors
believe they are visible all the time and adjust their behaviour accordingly, thus
disciplining themselves at a detailed level.
Identifying Disciplinary Control
The visible effects of power to which I have referred means that it should be possible,
by drawing on Foucauldian ideas, for the observer to identify the effects of Disciplinary
Control [henceforth DC] in two ways: firstly, by taking a genealogical approach to
examining the kinds of documents, guidance and so on that engender it – from this kind
of analysis the techniques and technologies of DC’s operation will emerge; secondly, by
observing the conformist style of bodies and the experience of party actors, who
themselves may not identify the particular pressures they are subject to as power
exactly, but may nonetheless be aware of the pressure to conform, for example when
worrying about what to wear, or how they look or sound. Bearing this in mind, the two
key aspects of discipline that I have highlighted will be applied to the Labour Party in
two main ways.  Firstly, in the pursuit of its electoral goals, the party needed to organise
people efficiently in the fulfilment of specific tasks like canvassing and election
campaigns. For this purpose, detailed guidance and advice was produced, which I
analyse using a genealogical approach to elicit how they engender DC.  Secondly, party
politics is largely conducted in the full gaze of the media, especially television which
demands articulate, charismatic and presentably attractive figures. The party responded
to this by adapting its presentation, its message and even policies, but more importantly
to this analysis, its representatives. My examples will focus on how the constant
visibility of politicians is a critical aspect of discipline’s ‘normalising’ role: the ongoing
surveillance and assessment of individuals adjusts and directs behaviour, particularly
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through the direct application of marketing techniques and sensibilities which invade
and reconstruct the body. To conduct this two-stage analysis, I will draw on a mixture
of experience as communicated through interviews, materials like election campaign
timetables, briefings and guides issued by the party, as well as contemporary media
reports and biographical accounts.
Guide Questions for Analysis
There are two sets of questions, then, each oriented towards the stages of analysis that I
have set out above.
First Stage: Detailed Control
a) What technical problems does modern political organisation seek to solve?
b) What kinds of solutions have been designed and applied to those problems?
c) What is the disciplinary effect of the solutions and techniques applied (e.g.
through surveillance, examination, management, organisation, classification and
ranking)?
Second Stage: Surveillance and Normalisation
a) How are individuals and their bodies exposed to surveillance and judged?
b) How are bodies made conspicuous, scrutinised and subjected to exclusion and/or
normalisation?
Application: Testing Disciplinary Control’s Explanatory Scope
Now that the main characteristics and components of DC have been elaborated, and the
basis of my examination set out, the task is to apply it to my chosen examples. For the
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first stage of analysis, I find an example of detailed control in how the organisation of
electoral campaigning ensures an efficient, disciplined campaigning team. My second
example draws on the experience of two women MPs in order to elicit ways in which
surveillance and normalisation are applied with disciplinary effect, and how such modes
of power are reinforced by the application of marketing strategies and norms.
Example 1: Election and Campaign Planning
The most important part of any campaign is planning. Richards (2001) emphasises that
whether it is a ‘thick wad of papers’ or just a side of A4,
at local, regional, or national level, you must have a plan … Without it,
your election campaign will lack focus, squander resources, burn out
your activists and volunteers, and suffer from what the military call
‘mission drift’.  You will also find yourself buffeted by your
opponents and always reacting to their agenda and on the back foot.
(Richards 2001 46).
The effective targeting of resources demands planning to provide direction and the
efficient use of time and party workers. A particular feature of modern political
campaign planning is what has become known as ‘the grid’, which has ‘assumed the
role of Bible, Koran, Torah … is guarded with the secrecy of ‘Enigma’, and like the
holy books of Medieval times, can only be viewed by the chosen few.’ It is
the nuts and bolts of the party’s campaign plan, distilled from a
thousand meetings and discussions, from the wisdom of pollsters,
advisers, strategists and politicians, and forms the strategy that a party
will follow during a campaign. (Ibid., 47)
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The grid is ‘the heart of an election campaign’ according to Philip Gould, a key
strategist and adviser for the Labour Party between 1987 and 2005.  More than a
timetable, it is where ‘strategic and message imperatives … connect with the planning
logistics’ (Gould 1999, 335-6).  Without it ‘the campaign cannot really be said to exist.’
(Ibid., 337) In short, it is the campaign plan.
Because the actual mechanics of an election, i.e. getting voters to the polls, is organised
locally, nowhere is planning more important than at the local level.  Local campaigns
are, and need to be, planned meticulously and in the rest of this section I will present
some different elements of this.  Drawing on briefing documents and publications
distributed to local parties, organisers and activists, it can be seen just how important
planning is in terms of timing, task allocation and distribution of workers, the targeting
of voters, and finally the monitoring of all this activity.  The purpose of all this
organisation is not to turn members into obedient automatons.  Far more efficient is
ensuring that party workers are kept occupied to the optimum effect and in such a way
that they do not need to be continuously instructed.  In other words DC, through
detailed organisation, turns them into effective actors equipped with the ability to fulfil
specified tasks on the party’s behalf.  However, in doing so it exerts a finely detailed
level of control on them at the same time.
Timetables
The first principle of effective campaigning is timing.  It therefore follows that at the
centre of any campaign plan, is the timetable.  Timetables establish the rhythms of the
campaign, impose occupations on individuals and regulate cycles of activity (Foucault
1977, 149), just as a school timetable orders the activities and movements of the school
day.
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Figure 6.1 (below) is a reproduction of a carefully timetabled polling day battle plan
distributed in daily briefing notes to Election Agents called Organise to Win (Labour
Party 1987). What this represents is typical, but just an outline.  There are in addition to
this a long list of instructions, advice and directions which fill in the gaps, ensuring that
as far as possible, not a moment is wasted, nor a worker underemployed and that every
detail is taken care of.
A closer look at the instructions reveals a more detailed series of activities that need to
be meticulously organised within the overall timetable, including:2
2 All following references are from Labour Party (1987).
POLLING DAY CAMPAIGN BATTLE PLAN
6:00am-9:00am Deliver polling day ‘Good Morning / Today
is Polling day leaflets’
7:00am Your Polling Station Tellers should be at
their allotted stations now
9:00am-12 noon Concentrate on collecting the elderly /
infirm to take them to vote before they
disappear to their Luncheon Clubs and
Pensioner Federation Clubs.  Loudspeaker
tours / decorated vehicles in selected
areas.
10:00am Start knocking up from Reading Sheets
Mid-day onwards Continue and intensify knocking up.
Second polling day leaflet drop
5:30pm Main thrust of evening knock-up begins
7:30pm onwards This is the time to pull off your (able-
bodied) number-takers if you’re short of
workers and get them onto the doorsteps
for that final push.  Keep on at it till
the polls close.
KEEP ON CAMPAIGNING RIGHT UNTIL THE POLLS CLOSE!!
Figure 6.1 Polling Day Battle Plan
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A leafleting programme with drops in the morning ‘to be on the mat with the
newspaper and post’, lunchtime ‘so that they can’t forget’ and teatime, their ‘last
chance’ to get rid of the Tories;
A Number-taking operation (where tellers record which individuals have cast their
vote at the local polling stations) with a ‘proper schedule … don’t leave a worker there
too long, work out proper shifts … Number-takers must be at the polling stations by
7am’;
Tannoy tours (a loudspeaker fitted to the roof of a car) which should ‘make the
maximum use of your loudspeakers. However, workers should be careful to ‘use them
systematically’ and ‘target areas with the appropriate message.’  Attached to the
briefing is a brief guide, containing ‘30 things to say’.  It tells campaigners ‘what to say
outside the hospital, the schools, the post office, at the bus stop.  Stop and say it and
then move on.  Use the general slogans as you travel around.  Use the loudspeaker to
encourage people not only to vote Labour, but particularly in key areas like housing
estates, to come out and vote’;
‘Knocking up’ voters which should ‘start … early in the morning … put the maximum
effort into those areas that need persuasion … apathy cannot be a feature of this
campaign.  To be effective send teams of knockers-up on to an estate, going round and
round the estate until every Labour vote has been cast’;
Making ‘car calls’ (driving less mobile voters to the polling station): ‘don’t miss any
and be on time.  If a time has been fixed for the call, be there at that time’.
Finally, and most importantly,
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Workers must be used effectively – have everything ready for workers
coming in to do a job.  Don’t have them hanging about, don’t sit them
down or have them drinking tea.  The voters are out there – not in the
committee room, and every five minutes not on the doorstep can win
or lose you the election … Every vote counts – Keep on campaigning
right until the polls close (Ibid.).
Task Allocation and Distribution
Whilst the above sets out in detail activities for almost every minute of the day, it still
does not show the full extent to which election campaign organisation is finely detailed.
As well as what needs to be done and when, the campaign battle plan specifies where it
should be done and how. The campaign’s success will depend not just on ensuring that
all the necessary tasks are completed, but also on allocating the right people to the right
jobs at the right time, including the organisation of canvassers into streets, areas, and
polling districts, concentrating on particular groups of voters.
Each ward committee room should be well stocked with equipment including ‘Reading
pads’3 and a board to paste them on, various stationery items, number-taking rotas and
pads, canvassing packs, legal notices, electoral registers, a telephone, rosettes, maps,
clipboards, leaflets (Labour Party 1995).  The layout and organisation of the room is an
essential element in the management of a good and successful election campaign:
An efficiently organised committee room with a good atmosphere can
make the difference on polling day.  For helpers, there is nothing
3 A means by which canvassers can record voting intention.  The ‘Reading System’ is so-called because it
was devised by Reading Constituency Labour Party for the election of Ian Mikardo in 1945.
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worse than walking into a crowded, untidy room and to having to wait
around before being dispatched to knock-up (Ibid., 30).
The guide continues,
A good committee room is an empty one, or nearly.  Helpers should be
kept working, not standing around … Use every minute of the day
constructively.  You only get one chance!  (Ibid., 35-6)
Ward Organisers need to ‘make sure workers are allocated most effectively’ (Labour
Party 1992).  Indeed, one campaigning manual revealingly sets the imperative to ‘fill
jobs with people’ (Labour Party 1995, 5) to ‘allocate workers according to the promise
you need to get out’ (Ibid., 5), rather than the other way around. Responsibilities should
be distributed carefully and workers properly trained and instructed: canvassers should
be well ‘briefed to identify Labour voters’, polling station number-takers and polling
day helpers properly briefed on recording votes and ‘knocking up’. It is especially
important therefore that committee room organisers are ‘identified well in advance’,
fully briefed, trained and competent; and equally so that volunteer organisers are
appointed who will allocate other workers their specific roles (Ibid., 14).
The kind of co-ordination required needs constant updates with up-to-the-minute
information in order to arrange tactics most effectively.  It is a dynamic process,
changing as new information comes in.  In the constantly shifting situation of election
day, the campaign co-ordinator needs to
make arrangements for your committee rooms to ring you at least
every two hours, at a different set time for each committee room.  You
want to know the turn-out in each area, areas that are difficult, the
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number of workers.  You can then move workers about from area to
area to give the maximum help where it is most needed. (Labour Party
1987)
Efficient Targeting
The election campaign is looking fairly comprehensive now: there are a series of
timetabled tasks laid out in a clear sequence throughout the day; there are workers
allocated to the right tasks in the right places at the right time, even using the right
words; the committee room is properly equipped.   However, there is one further detail
that has not yet been elaborated: for truly optimal efficiency, targeting needs to be more
detailed than just allocating workers to certain streets in the hope that they will find the
right people to get out and boost the Labour Party vote.  In any case, how are campaign
organisers supposed to know which streets to target in the first place?  The answer is by
targeting individuals.  Voting is an individual act.  Therefore, organisation needs to
centre on which individuals are to be targeted with what messages at what time. In the
Party’s 1997 General Election Handbook for local campaigners, the sophistication of
the methods used is apparent. The process of canvassing that takes place throughout the
year in many constituencies, wards and boroughs is an ongoing information gathering
exercise ultimately designed to support the party’s work on polling day.  Voters are
segmented by previous voting behaviour: firm Labour voters; weak Labour voters;
Liberal Democrats; undecided voters; Conservatives; won’t say, non-voters; and a
number of sub-categories indicating, for example whether ‘weak Labour’ voters are so
because they are irregular voters, or because they have voted for other parties in the past
(Labour Party 1997, 12).  Voters are coded and ranked in order of their likelihood to
turn out and vote Labour.  They are targeted with different approaches, messages and
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media accordingly.  For example, ‘weak Labour’ voters need to be encouraged to turn
out by ‘stressing the difference a Labour government will make to them personally’;
‘waverers’ are particularly important (weak / potential Labour voters) and ‘we need to
pay them particular attention’.  On the other hand ‘it goes without saying that we will be
ignoring voters who are Conservative’ and others who are firmly in another camp
(Ibid.,14-15), ‘we should not canvass them, deliver leaflets to them or even send them
anything in the Freepost service’ (Labour Party 1994).  This information about voters is
‘best analysed at the level of polling districts’4 which supports ‘getting the best possible
return from the investment made’ i.e. not having to campaign everywhere with one
blanket message (Ibid.).  Thus ‘with good records it should be possible to canvass only
a particular type of voter’ such as ‘weak Labour’ voters (Ibid.).  This furthermore
provides a background for the accurate distribution of individual volunteers and workers
in the campaign itself. Once targets are calculated, teams can be organised or
articulated in the most efficient way possible.
Monitoring
This detailed level of efficient activity works because participants and their activities are
constantly observed, assessed and adjusted accordingly. Observation and supervision of
this kind is made possible by the development of the detailed kinds of targets I have
discussed. At the same time, targets are effective because they produce the criteria
which support observation and supervision. Therefore two central requirements of
election campaigning are the activity of monitoring and the provision of tools for that
purpose: monitoring sheets which show on an hourly basis how many ‘promises’ have
actually voted; progress charts that keep track of how many houses have been visited
4 A polling district is an area which is created by the dividing a constituency or ward into smaller units,
within which a polling station convenient to electors is located.
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each hour of the day.  These are the kinds of tools available for monitoring the progress
of a whole campaign, and ranking individual party workers by their performance and
progress.  Using tables and charts like these, progress through territory is monitored,
house by house and hour by hour (Labour Party 1995).
Having demonstrated the means by which techniques of organisation are brought to
bear upon the particular problem of identifying and getting out the vote on election day,
I will next explain in more detail how this produces disciplinary effects by investing
party workers with detailed techniques of control that ensure neither a moment, nor a
gesture is wasted.  In doing so, DC does not simply restrict and repress action, but
empowers individuals as agents, investing them with the appropriate capacities to be
effective on the party’s behalf.   This sense of empowerment and self-discipline is
reflected in how Jan Burnell (an activist in Hackney) felt about the 1987 election
campaign in which she participated:
It was a model of how to run a team.  We were more or less free in our
wards but we had targets to meet.  We’d meet every week to begin
with, more often towards the end.  There was no question who was
leading it, but it was all done with us in charge of our own patches
with our own set of tasks to complete.  It was very inspirational, and
it’s not just me saying that.  Other ward organisers from then that we
are still friendly with say so too.5
5 Interview, Jan Burnell.
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Strengths of Disciplinary Control as an Explanation
First Stage: Detailed Control
a) What technical problems does modern political organisation seek to solve?
b) What kinds of solutions have been designed and applied to those problems?
c) What is the disciplinary effect of the solutions and techniques applied (e.g.
through surveillance, examination, management, organisation, classification and
ranking)?
To prevent agents from going outside the party’s scheme, timetables establish rhythms,
impose particular occupations, and regulate the cycles of repetition of an act.  The
example shows how control works at the micro-level by instituting a specific series of
tasks that must be followed in a particular order and completed within a specific
timeframe.  Every aspect is managed carefully and nothing is left to chance: when
certain leaflets should be delivered, when car calls and tannoy tours should take place,
and when knocking up starts.  Whilst engaged in these tasks, there is little time allowed,
preferably none at all, for rest or for individuals to do their ‘own thing’.  The timetable
is the scheme that sets a standard by which agents are assessed and by which their
efficiency can be measured.  It details the roles, tasks and functions to which agents are
allocated as functionaries of this machine.  There is no room left for individuals to take
their own initiative because there is a process and a precise routine which must be
followed.  In short, it provides a scheme whereby agents can be prevented from going
off-track and that disciplines them into following the route mapped out by the party.  It
thus determines the optimum level of operation for each individual.
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As well as time, agents must also be organised in relation to space to ensure that every
individual is fully occupied in useful tasks (a serious problem according to the guidance
is having campaign workers standing around waiting for something to do).  Jobs need to
be ‘filled with people’, workers ‘allocated’ according to calculations of required
outcomes, and moved around where they can be most effective.  Efficient organisation
means that workers are distributed to the right place at the right time, and are managed
to ensure they are working at the optimum level in the most effective places, with the
most useful voters.  It once again eliminates ‘waste’: not only is the time of actors fully
occupied but the places in which tasks are carried out are carefully circumscribed.  This
is absolutely essential to the efficient completion of the tasks in hand, but the effect is a
highly detailed level of control that keeps agents disciplined at a micro-level.
The productivity of disciplined party workers can be enhanced by providing them with
the kind of information that enables them to structure their door-knocking even more
efficiently. The accumulation and organisation of knowledge about voters through
night after night of canvassing or ‘voter identification’, which classifies and ranks
voters according to the likelihood of their voting Labour, equips party workers with the
information they need to target not just specific streets but particular individuals.
Furthermore, the ranking of those individuals by voting intention is the basis for how
and with what messages they are contacted, thus also providing workers with what to
say as well as who to say it to.  This further subjects agents to highly detailed
organisation whilst at the same time providing criteria by which their performance can
be measured (i.e. who has been ‘knocked-up’ and, with the information from polling
stations, which of them have actually voted).  This is essential since it determines the
ongoing allocation and distribution of party workers throughout the day.
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Thus, monitoring is fundamental to DC.  For this scheme to function effectively, it must
be monitored carefully.  All the techniques used to ensure an efficient, disciplined
campaign – timetabling, allocation of tasks, the setting of targets, coalesce in their
observability.  Individuals have been trained, their programmes of activity designed and
set out in timetables; tasks have been distributed and agents allocated to them.
Although, election campaigns do not ‘enclose’ people in an observational space like a
hospital, a prison or a school (Foucault 1977, 171-2), there is a sense in which, for a
time, and for those working within its scheme, the whole polling district becomes a site
of observation and examination. Discipline is conducted by observation, by measuring
and ranking workers aided by monitoring forms, progress charts and statistics,
observation and measurement.  This supports the timetabling, allocations and targeting
discussed above.  The committee rooms are the central supervisory point observing,
monitoring activity; recording, collating and processing information which feeds back
into the overall scheme. Thus for the duration of the campaign, the streets themselves
become part of the mechanism, a functional site in which disciplinary power operates,
distributing and monitoring individuals. Individuals have to be in a certain place at a
certain time, thus their lives are regulated down to the smallest detail.
By this point, party workers are completely invested with power at a highly detailed
level: the tasks they have to complete are allocated; the rhythms and timing of their
activity is set; they are distributed into the most useful and productive places; they have
been endowed with the appropriate skills and provided with the appropriate words to
direct at specific individuals.  However, it is important to remember that they are not
automatons, or otherwise empty shells directed by an all-powerful party hierarchy.  This
level of highly detailed organisation makes deviation from the track laid out more
difficult, it is certain; but it also makes it less desirable for the party activist because of
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the sense of empowerment that such organisation can stimulate, as exemplified by Jan
Burnell’s words quoted above.
Limits of Disciplinary Control as an Explanation
DC differs from other approaches to power because of its level of analysis and because
of its approach to the location and possession of power.  It offers a truly radical view of
power that conventional approaches do not recognise.  Thus as this example has shown,
where DC is really effective as a dimension of power is in conjunction with another like
BC, filling in the details of how power works at the day-to-day micro-level to control
and direct individuals, and imbue them with capacities to act in the party’s scheme.
Where it falls short, arguably, is that in focusing so resolutely on the details of how
discipline functions in the everyday and mundane activities of party life (because DC
comes not out of intention or logic, but is a contingent outcome of the application of
certain kinds of knowledge to specific problems like organising elections), it misses the
extent to which agents operating with intent might have a direct effect on the intentions
of others.  It also bypasses the importance of institutions and structures that operate with
a particular logic.  By homing in on the micro-level it does not (because it is not
designed to) recognise the importance of meso-level and macro-level influences on
power relations, including the party organisation itself, and its culture and practices on a
structural level.
Example 1 Conclusion
The aspects of DC that I have discussed so far are in some ways closely linked to the
concerns that underpin BC.  That is, it understands power as a controlling force that
works through continuous organisational routine.  However, DC differs from BC in
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several important respects.  Firstly, it has a positive element: this dimension of power
plays an important role in building the capacities of individuals and the party.  Thus,
rather than repressing otherwise ‘free’ political actors, DC empowers individuals as
effective political actors by organising bodies in conjunction with time, space and tasks
in fine detail.  This investment helps to make individuals into useful and effective
agents able to deliver on party priorities and provides the basis for discipline through
the monitoring and assessment of activity.  Secondly, therefore, this dimension of power
directs attention away from the functioning of organisational structures and towards the
low-level, apparently minor and banal details of mundane party activities, like run-of-
the-mill canvassing and election campaigns.  It is in these continuous, day-to-day
regularities in which power can be detected.  Thirdly, DC comes about in the
application of knowledge to the solution of specific organisational problems.  Party
actors become disciplined, not because they have been beaten into submission or
overwhelmed, but through being trained and invested as agents.  The detailed micro-
control of activity in parties, then, does not come about by command and direct
manipulation, nor through an anonymous structural logic, but as a contingent outcome
of practice. It is, as Digeser has put it, ‘a kind of unintended consequence of intentional
action’ (Digeser 1992, 984).
Example 2: Media, Marketing and Normalisation
The second example focuses on how DC functions through surveillance and
normalisation: it looks at how the body is understood as a political construct and a
marker of identity which in its visibility is subject to discipline, reconstruction,
marginalisation and exclusion. Politics is in many ways a performance and through
performance, discipline inscribes itself on the body in gestures and appearance.  There
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are two main ways in which it does this.  Firstly, it marginalises and excludes those who
do not ‘fit’ the expressive needs of the party because of their gender, race, age or
appearance.  It does this not through prohibition or expulsion, but often by petty
humiliations or minor slights and omissions.  Secondly, it disciplines those it does not
exclude by ‘normalising’ them so that they fit more precisely the expected norms of
appearance, sound and gesture.  This underlines the visibility of politics, especially in
an age of television and other visual media.  I shall approach this aspect of DC by
analysing examples that illustrate how important presentation and marketing techniques
have become to the representation of politics in the media.  During the 1980s and 1990s,
the period on which this thesis is centred, there were important developments in visual
media and professional marketing which has had a knock-on effect on the way politics
is reported in the press and the way in which politics itself is practiced.  The advent of
twenty-four hour news and the proliferation of marketing techniques have brought with
them particular norms and practices which have been absorbed and internalised by
modern parties, and as such they represent an important mode of DC in parties which is
subtle and detailed in its operation.  These trends had a profound impact on the way in
which the Labour Party ‘did’ politics (See Shaw 1994, Chapter 6).  Some of the
consequences of this are examined further in the rest of this section.
Television and politics are certainly bedfellows, but politicians’ relationship with the
former is not always a happy one.  Mildred Gordon, before eventually becoming MP for
Bow and Poplar in 1987 had been a party candidate in a number of different elections
and as such had previous experience of just ‘how perfidious the television was’.  In the
Greater London Council elections just before abolition in the 1980s, Gordon was
particularly stung by a television news report: ‘I never trusted the television after that.
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Ever.’ She and her opponent both made a speech at a meeting being filmed for the
television news.  After she had made her speech
I left for the pub where all my supporters were and they asked why I
didn’t speak.  I said I had spoken for 20 minutes, but they insisted that
I had left without a word.  The TV had waited until I left and made out
that I went without speaking in their report.  I wore these big glasses
at the time and I had to push them up and they had a picture of this,
saying ‘Mildred Gordon wipes away a tear’.  They made me look like
a whipped dog … They did the same to me once again: asked me to
shop in Tesco’s in my constituency.  When I finished shopping they
said ‘would you walk slowly towards the door?’  I did, thinking that
was going to be a shot and they said ‘Mildred Gordon walks slowly
and wearily…’  They pulled all kinds of stunts.6
As well as television, the detailed attentions of the press subject female politicians to
unprecedented levels of scrutiny in the media.  This is well illustrated by the case of Mo
Mowlam (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland following the 1997 General Election).
Her case highlights the conspicuousness of women’s bodies in politics, especially if
they do not fit with the expected norms of femininity. Earlier in her career, Mowlam
had been ‘the clever blonde who sits for Redcar’,7 ‘a bit like a raunchy Julie Christie’8
and ‘the femme fatale of the People's Party’9 (quite apart from being a political science
PhD, a front-bench spokesperson from early in her parliamentary career and clearly set
6 Interview, Mildred Gordon.
7 Andrew Rawnsley,  ‘Labour Unleashes Cannon Fodder.’ The Guardian, November 11 1987.
8 Lynda Lee-Potter, ‘Love and Labour's Little Mo.’ Daily Mail, August 4 1992.
9 Alan Watkins, ‘The Gang of Four Would be at Home with Tony.’ The Independent, Jan 5 1997.
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for a glittering political future).  However, by the start of the 1997 general election
campaign, she had begun treatment for a brain tumour which had caused her to gain
weight and lose her hair, which she covered with a wig.  This began to attract the notice
of the press, and the Labour Party’s manifesto launch in London in April 1997 was ‘a
defining moment’ for her, she says:
the attention in some of the press the next day was less on the detail of
the manifesto and more on what I looked like. ‘What has happened to
Mo Mowlam?’ they asked with a circle around my head in the cabinet
picture (Mowlam 2002, 41).
Some of the press comment was at best uncomplimentary, at worst, ‘unpleasant’10. The
initial speculation suggested that it was down to giving up smoking a few months
earlier.  Alongside ‘before’ and ‘after’ photographs (Ibid., 41), Vicky Ward in the Daily
Mail wrote:
As she wins the war of the weed, she is losing the battle of the bulge.
When she sat next to Jack Straw at the Labour Party’s manifesto
launch on Thursday, some speculated that Mr Blair had found himself
a new front-bencher.  With her striking new bob hairstyle and dramatic
weight gain, some observers needed a second look to confirm she was
indeed the party’s vivacious 44 year old Northern Ireland spokesman
… In the three months since kicking her 20 Silk Cut-a-day habit, her
weight has ballooned from 12 stone to 14 … Miss Mowlam has always
been fond of food and drink but only started to become slightly
10 Stephen Castle, ‘Press Taunts Force Mowlam to Reveal Secret Illness.’ The Independent, April 13 1997
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overweight five years ago when she moved in with banker Jon Norton,
whom she married in 1995.11
Nuala McKeever in the Sunday Mirror suggested that her ‘drastic makeover’ had ‘left
her looking like the twin brother of alternative comedian Eddie Izzard.’12 Lynda Lee-
Potter in the Daily Mail drew attention to the fact that ‘she’s developed several chins’
had shoulders ‘like Frank Bruno’ and ‘bears an undeniable resemblance to an only
slightly effeminate Geordie trucker.’13 Once she decided to reveal that it was her
treatment for a brain tumour that was the cause of her changing appearance, it suddenly
became acceptable: instead of a ‘Geordie trucker’ she became ‘a born fighter - and a
winner’14 and ‘Queen of Redcar’ who ‘since she revealed a few days ago that she has
had a non-cancerous brain tumour, she has acquired something near the aura of a
saint’.15 And so the press that ‘only woke up at the election when I was still fat and had
a wig on’16 maintained close attention to her appearance, especially her almost
legendary disarming of intransigent Unionist and Nationalist negotiators in Northern
Ireland by ‘throwing off her wig’,17 ongoing speculation and stories about how much
she ‘detested’ it,18 her weight, whether her hair was growing back or not and so on.19
11 Vicky Ward, ‘Mo Mowlam Pays in Pounds for Giving Up Her Cigarettes.’ Daily Mail, April 5 1997.
12 Nuala McKeever, ‘Mo’s a Stand-Up Joke.’ Sunday Mirror, April 6 1997.
13 Lynda Lee-Potter, ‘Christine Gets Her Claws Out.’ Daily Mail, April 9 1997.
14 Leader. Sunday Mirror, April 13, 1997
15 Simon Hoggart, ‘Sketch: “Oo, Yer Are Looking Good.” A Regal Progress as the Queen of Redcar
Takes to the Streets.’ The Guardian, April 16 1997
16 Emma Cook, ‘Desert Island Mowlam’s Choice.’ The Independent on Sunday, March 21 1999
17 Andrew Rawnsley, ‘The Best Man to Lead Everyone Through a Minefield is the One Who Doesn't
Know How Much Danger He is In.’ The Observer, April 12 1998
18 Sue Carroll , ‘Mo: I'm Tough, But I Listen. Like Most Women, I Trust My Gut Instincts.’ The Daily
Mirror, April 23 1998
19 ‘My Fight With Cancer By Battling Mo.’ Sunday MirrorMarch 21 1999
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And indeed, her appearance became a focal point of her representation as a politician
and her ‘unfeminine’ behaviour became a kind of positive attribute.  A description of
her written in 1998 by a sympathetic journalist described her thus:
she acts like one of the boys but, because she is not one of the boys,
she both gets away with things that none of them would and insulted
for things they wouldn't. Her sheer bravery over her illness, her matter-
of-factness about her appearance, the famous slapping of the wig on
the table reveal a woman who knows that there is more to life than
feminine vanity.  She is thus curiously vulnerable and unbelievably
hard at the same time.20
This is a pressure that comes from outside the party initially but which becomes
internalised as a means of disciplining party actors.  Appearance, image and
presentation were at this time becoming an increasingly important part of political life,
especially as visual media, particularly television, proliferated.  Frank Dobson, a former
Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet minister and party campaigns co-ordinator, sees it as
having had a crucial influence on many of the changes that the Labour Party made to its
decision-making arrangements, for example.  He argued that because what the public
sees through the media is highly influential on what they think, there was a subsequent
focus on presentation as well as policy.  The exposure of events like conference through
television and press made their control and alignment with that strategy crucial.  The
party leader, Neil Kinnock
20 Suzanne Moore, ‘Mo Mowlam's Disarming Ways May be Just What is Needed Today.’ The
Independent, January 9 1998.
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pointed out that we must have been the only party in the Western world
who got all that exposure on television for a week of conference and
actually went down in the polls as a result.  So there was a real effort
on how to present, a lot of thought put into the whole package of policy
and presentation: thinking more strategically.21
Another former minister and a leading member of the ‘soft-left’, Michael Meacher,
argues similarly that key political figures were willing to subject themselves to such
discipline:
there were great, profound changes needed and Kinnock knew this,
and he was willing to play down some of his left-ness to do this and
most in the party would go along with that. 22
The key to this was developing a professionalised marketing approach, in which the
Party needed to ‘identify our target audience, have a simple central logic which
underlines everything every spokesperson says, [and] repeat it over and over again’
(Shadow Communications Agency Strategy Note, 22 January 1987), which had huge
consequences for how and by whom the message was communicated. At the centre of
this was strategy was television.  ‘We needed to make people like us’ said Meacher, and
therefore
it was important who was put on television. It was sensible to put
people up that the public liked.  The way people looked, dressed, the
way things are presented and designed became more important. 23
21 Interview, Frank Dobson
22 Interview, Michael Meacher
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Thus, there was a certain amount of favouring those who fit a certain mould and an
increasing importance attached to personal presentation and ‘likeability’ rather than
passion and political talent. Thus some, like Mildred Gordon, a left-wing, Jewish
woman of pensionable age from a working class background, were excluded from the
process altogether.  Her selection as Prospective Parliamentary Candidate for Bow and
Poplar in 1987 had surprised many:24 ‘obviously, the establishment really hated my
selection,’ she said, because instead of someone young and ‘respectable’ they had a new
candidate who was ‘sixty four by the time the election came, Jewish, radical’ and with
undeniable Trotskyite associations.25 Not surprisingly, she was ‘the last person they
wanted’.26 Thus, she says, when journalists contacted the Communications Directorate
to ask who they would recommend to interview on one issue or another, ‘they would
never ever recommend me … I was never put forward.’27 Peter Mandelson, who became
the Party’s Director of Communications in 1985 ‘was important to this’ new approach
to the media.28 It meant that a more calculated approach to communication which was
more than just about the ‘content’ of the message.  Mandelson underlined this point
when he explained that
communications means throwing your net much wider than publicity.
It means deciding what we say, how we say it, and which spokesmen
and women we choose to say it.29
23 Interview, Michael Meacher
24 Interview, Mike Tyrrell
25 Her first husband was founder of the American Socialist Worker’s Party and the Fourth International.
26 Interview, Mildred Gordon
27 Interview, Mildred Gordon
28 Interview, Michael Meacher
29 Kathy Myers, ‘The Media: Mandelson's Overtures for a Labour Victory.’ The Guardian , November
25 1985.
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Vital to this, is appearance, which is emphasised strongly in the detailed advice that
Paul Richards, a former Labour candidate and communications professional gives to
candidates appearing on television:
If you are appearing uninvited in people’s living rooms via their
television set, the least you can do is look smart.  Put a suit on, and
look professional and business-like.  For men that means a shirt and
tie; for women a suit and blouse … You should go for neutral, unfussy
colours and patterns, and avoid anything too bright or lively.  Go for
dark suits, and pale shirts or blouses.  Women should avoid distracting
brooches or Pat-from-Eastenders ear-rings … Men should avoid
clunking cuff-links, bracelets or tie-pins … If it is sunny, take off your
sunglasses – you are a candidate, not a member of U2.  (Richards
2001, 128)
For Mandelson image and branding, such as the dropping of the red flag as the party’s
symbol and the introduction of a red rose as its new logo in 1986, was about more than
just appearance but a clear statement:
The red flag symbolised everything Labour represented in the public
mind: socialism, nationalisation, state control.  Everything, that is, that
voters now liked least and mistrusted most about us.  The red rose
wasn’t just a design change: it represented a transformation in how the
party would present itself (Mandelson 2010, 92).
286
More than simply changing policies and ‘image’ behind which ‘conventional’ activity
continued,  the application of marketing techniques represented the entry of a particular
logic, a set of techniques which therefore had implications for the character, style and
look of leaders and members of parliament; the behaviour, opinions and activities of
members too (Lees-Marshment 2001, 27). As Meacher put it,
we went from the ‘heaving heart’ of the Labour movement to
something much more accommodating, well-behaved and with a more
presentable image.  It was about ameliorating the party’s jagged
edges.30
The experience of the 1983 election and that of candidates like Mildred Gordon, were
exactly the kinds of dangers that the Party wished to avoid and they made use of all the
tools of modern political communications and campaigning to transform Labour’s
approach (Mandelson 2010, 127). However, whilst the Party’s 1987 election campaign
was a great improvement and recognised as highly professional, it was felt to be
something of a compromise (Ibid., 89).  ‘It wasn’t quite the comeback, but it was the
beginning,’ as Gerald Kaufman puts it, ‘which allowed us to maintain a holding a
position.’31 By the time of the 1997 campaign, however, things had changed more
fundamentally.  A professionalised marketing approach was absolutely at the centre of
the campaign, with the party’s representation in the press and the media at the forefront.
This was exemplified by Philip Gould’s focus groups, which he ran for six nights per
week for the entire six-week campaign. Almost every night Gould ‘wrote two notes,
one to the campaign … and a second, personal one to Tony Blair’ (Gould 1999, 344).
30 Interview, Michael Meacher
31 Interview, Sir Gerald Kaufman
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Below, I reproduce a selection of some of the typical comments from Gould’s memos,
as reported in his account of the campaign:
20 March ‘Day one excitement has fizzled out … five of the eight did not like you’
(Ibid., 349)
24 March ‘We easily won the news … Major looked tired and carping.  TB was fresh,
confident and positive.  This contrast swamped the Tory message.’ (Ibid., 352)
4 April ‘This was not a good day for us, probably the least successful day of the
campaign.  People felt you looked defensive and momentarily wrong-footed … This
one incident is not a problem for us, [but] if a pattern develops of Labour policy
uncertainty … we will be harmed’ (Ibid., 361)
9 April ‘People have lost some confidence in us; they are getting fed up with the
campaign and disconnected.  They see it as over-managed, over-packaged, and obsessed
with point-scoring.  People are thinking we are taking victory for granted … they want
to see more fight and grit from us … People want to renew their faith in Tony Blair.
They want to see him tested in real situations, facing real pressure’ (Ibid., 365-6).
16 April ‘There is uncertainty about us.  People do not know what we stand for.  We do
not look confident enough’ (Ibid., 371)
25 April ‘In general your attacking stance of the last week has been effective.  But soon
you must make the turn and focus on your positive message.  In general your position is
very strong.  But it is not yet secure.’ (Ibid., 381)
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28 April ‘You got your message and tone absolutely right … There is a discernible
sense of a deeper turn towards us … They still have doubts, but they are going to do it’
(Ibid., 383)
30 April ‘Even today you should not let up … You are still taking nothing for granted,
you are still dismissing the possibility of a landslide … You must never deviate from
your New Labour project’ (Ibid., 387)
Thus, news media, which is so vital to the practice of modern politics, keeps politicians
under constant surveillance.  Through the internalisation of norms and their application
in marketing and public relations techniques, parties themselves develop the means to
discipline their own members, excluding those that do not look right or fit the ‘brand’.
Women, especially if they do not conform to the acceptable face of femininity (because,
say, they are old and Jewish, or fat), are subject to a particularly insidious kind of
surveillance.  However, it also shows how the leader, even when exemplary material,
conforming precisely to the white, male, middle class norms of politics, is subject to a
detailed level of surveillance and discipline on an almost continuous basis.
Having now presented some examples that illustrate how this second aspect of DC
operates, I will now analyse its strengths and weaknesses as a dimension of power by
discussing the examples in relation to the criteria I have set out earlier in this chapter
and the framework as a whole.
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Strengths of Disciplinary Control as an Explanation
Second Stage: Surveillance and Normalisation
a) How are individuals and their bodies exposed to surveillance and judged?
b) How are bodies made conspicuous, scrutinised and subjected to exclusion and/or
normalisation?
Politics is a publicly performed act of constructing identity and subjectivity through
self-discipline.  Discipline is applied by the monitoring of performances, for example,
through the attentions of the press and the use of research techniques like focus groups.
Each of these examples highlights ways in which what Foucault calls ‘normalising
judgement’ accounts for, judges, ranks, punishes and corrects. In other words, they
illustrate how ‘the gaze of the other’ recognises and characterises certain bodies in
certain ways so that they are disciplined into a certain configuration of performative acts
that constitute their subjectivity as a politician.  Politicians need to sell ‘themselves’, but
DC is a means by which ‘themselves’ is restructured as a faithful representation of the
party’s brand which is itself aligned with powerful external norms.  In these cases,
discipline articulates itself on the body: the actions it takes, the way it speaks, the way it
looks. Through the ‘art’ (or perhaps science?) of presentation and marketing, which is
part of party political life at every level, bodies are disciplined to fit with norms and
expectations and marginalised and excluded where they do not.  The way they look and
sound and the gestures they employ are important aspects of communication.
Presentation techniques, marketing and branding strategies and image control became
increasingly applied to politics in the 1990s especially in how politicians and even
grass-roots participants in party politics were expected to look, sound and behave.  As
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Peter Mandelson’s words and Paul Richards’ advice suggests, the way in which an
individual expresses and presents him or herself is an important carrier of the party’s
message and brand.  Politicians are therefore required to pay more attention to the way
they look and how they carry themselves in public, right down to the gestures they
employ, how their voice sounds, the clothes they wear, their hair-style and so on.  The
role of candidate or politician is frequently played out on television and other visual
media such as advertising, and the printed press has, with its greater use of ‘paparazzi-
style’ photography, taken a similar route, as Mo Mowlam discovered. With the
development and application of marketing techniques, focus groups, for example, have
become important ways in which the images and words of politicians in the press and
on television are reflected back at them through the prism of marketing.
The process of marking and inscribing bodies brings into view their differences and
delineates between those acceptable and appropriate for the delivery of political
messages and those who are not.  The former are selected to act as spokespersons for
the party in the media, thus gaining exposure and representation. Their self-discipline is
rewarded and they are held up as an example, a disciplinary tool to be applied to the
latter, rejected as incompatible with the party’s requirements, perhaps because of the
way they dress, their age or race. They are sidelined, marginalised or in need of
‘reconstruction’.  Even those selected are subject to ongoing discipline: as to acceptable
and unacceptable gestures, appearance and attitudes which comes via the consumer
feedback built into marketing-based approaches to politics; as to acceptable and
unacceptable shape, size and hairstyle via the exposure and criticisms of the tabloid
press.  Subjected to the gaze of the ‘other’, bodies are marked, categorised, ranked,
favoured and disfavoured, reconstructed and disciplined into acceptable norms.
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These disciplinary mechanisms apply particularly to women who are conspicuous in
relation to the masculine norm.  Female bodies are expected to conform to particular
ideals: Mo Mowlam is at one time seen as a raunchy femme fatale, and when her looks
begin to change as a result of her illness she is subject (initially) to hostile and
unpleasant attention.  Finally, when it is known that she is ill, her body becomes
acceptable, but still subject to ongoing attention in that light.  In other words, attention
is always on the body and its incongruity or otherwise with political life.  This is why
DC and particularly this aspect of it is such an important and salient addition to my
framework of power.  This kind of attention became even clearer later when, once in
power, women Labour MPs, almost regardless of the context of the story became
‘Blair’s babes’, a term which was initially used to describe the Daily Mirror’s scantily
clad cheerleaders for Labour’s election efforts.32 To summarise, politicians must fit the
‘brand’, be a certain kind of male, a certain kind of female.  They are marked out and
classified, primed for conveying messages that manifest the party’s brand through
gestures, appearance and conduct.  Those that do not fit – because they are ethnic
minorities, women, or ‘deviant’ men  who do not conform to a ‘respectable’
heterosexual norm – or fail to adjust to it are, like Mildred Gordon, excluded and
marginalised or, like Mo Mowlam, subject to petty, invasive and sometimes cruel
humiliations.
My final point here highlights an important marker of difference between DC and BC in
particular.  Unlike BC, DC is something that even the leader of the party is subject to,
perhaps even more so the ‘charismatic’ leader.  The internalisation of media norms in
modern research techniques like focus groups have become ever more precise
disciplinary tools applied at the highest levels of the party hierarchy, exemplified by the
32 The Mirror, 1 May 1997.
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observation and judgement of the behaviour and appearance of the party leader, Tony
Blair. Blair’s subjection to daily observation during the 1997 election is an excellent
example of how in this fifth dimension, elitist notions of power are turned on their head.
Whereas in Weber’s scheme, the leader is the one individual that has some freedom of
action, in this one he is still a subject, perhaps the ultimate subject.  Under constant
media attention, this modern political leader is a great individualisation, a production of
power and power relations, created, shaped and scrutinised under the panoptic gaze of
media, parliament, public, party.  Thus, he is not in reality a sovereign or a hero, but a
subject and a production of disciplinary forces. All the way through the campaign, the
performance, looks, and sound of the leader is directly scrutinised, criticised and made
over.  Subjected to ongoing surveillance, observation and judgement, requiring a daily
adjustment and correction of the body, its movements and behaviour are adjusted and
reorganised in line with the findings of research.  The ‘prince’, who was the symbolic
expression of sovereign power, its display and representation, expressed in spectacle
and demonstration, is replaced by perhaps the ultimate subject: individualised,
scrutinised and documented.  This ‘leader’ is subject to the fullest expression of
disciplinary power, distinguished from the ‘mass’ and singled out, not in order to
command, but in order to be exposed, penetrated and known.
Limits of Disciplinary Control as an Explanation
In this example, DC’s departure from other conceptualisations of power is again
demonstrated by its micro-level of analysis.  It shows its value once more as a
dimension of power that supplements and brings alive another, in this case providing
the empirical detail that the more abstract structuralism of CP cannot.  Rather than an
approach that stands on its own, therefore, DC provides a level of analysis that makes it
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an essential supplement to the other dimensions of power in my framework.  It enables
the analyst to detect how the more elusive power of structural forces operates at the
individual level.  Conversely, what DC by itself lacks is a wider vision of structural and
organisational logics, not to mention individual action and their relationship to power.
DC therefore is best used in conjunction with the other dimensions of power in my
framework rather than by itself.
However, another potential problem with this approach lies precisely in one of its key
points of difference with other conceptualisations.  This concept of power, derived from
Foucault’s work is centred on relations.  That is, power is not to be found in the
possession of individuals or immanent in structures but in the relations between them.
There are many analysts who have objected to this idea.  Dowding (1991) has argued
from a rational choice perspective that ‘individuals' relations to objects and other
individuals cannot have power’ (Dowding 1991, 7).  However, I would counter that
briefly by arguing that it is not so much that relations themselves have power as that
they are indicative of it.  The effects of power can be detected, as I have argued, through
the analysis of documents or by its appearance on the bodies of individuals.
Furthermore, power in this dimension operates very differently to individualistic
conceptions in particular which makes its possession or otherwise less relevant here.  It
is not just concerned with how behaviour is affected by actions or structures but how
individuals are invested with capacities and empowered to act.
Example 2 Conclusion
The kinds of problems to which this approach to power has been applied (by Foucault
and others who have used his work) are practical, day-to-day questions to which power
in behavioural or structural terms are rarely applied.  It is this that makes it an especially
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valuable tool for understanding some of the less noticeable, yet potent and intense
power that operates in the detail of political life. This part of the analysis has given an
account of how parties discipline members through the internalisation of media norms
and the application of marketing-oriented strategies and tactics.  What it demonstrates is
how, in detailed ways, power works on individuals to produce representatives congruent
with those norms, its brand and values.  In this sense, it adds richness to the analysis of
power because it brings to life the means by which such control is exerted, which more
abstract approaches to structural power are unable to do adequately.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have elaborated a fifth dimension of power and demonstrated two
salient aspects of it. Firstly, it shows that power operates in the apparently mundane
and banal detail to control, organise and distribute individuals so that they are not only
disciplined, but useful subjects, empowered to act effectively as party activists.
Secondly, power is also something that can be detected in the practices of surveillance
which are integral to modern politics.  The conduct of politics has strong theatrical
elements and norms of appearance. Performative behaviour, which is gendered and
racialised, is a means by which bodies are disciplined or subject to normalisation,
marginalisation and exclusion and is conducted at this level in a highly regulated way.
The party’s response to increasing external scrutiny is to internalise it, applying
marketing and publicity strategies which attempt to anticipate the scrutiny that
politicians may be subject to.  As a result, the processes by which bodies are
disciplined, corrected and adjusted are magnified and intensified.  Training, advice and
other material contribute to the internalisation of this kind of discipline so that
eventually the actors themselves are the ones both administering and subject to it.
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Together, these traits underline the detailed disciplinary aspects of politics that are often
missed by those approaches that situate power in particular locations (such as
individuals or institutions).  Disciplinary Control enriches the framework because it
reveals the micro-processes and ‘hidden’ relations in which power is immanent.  It
brings to life the abstract structuralism of Constitutive Power by examining the detailed,
capillary forms that power takes in the production of subjectivities and it fills in the
gaps left by the broad institutional sweep of Bureaucratic Control by pinpointing the
specific means by which control is exerted on individual subjects.  In short, it
demonstrates how power produces agents who are both congruent with the party’s
values and helpful to its objectives.
Having now discussed and examined all five dimensions of power that constitute my
framework, it now only remains for me to discuss its overall salience for the analysis of
power in political parties.  That will be my task in the next, concluding chapter.
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Seven: Conclusion / A Multi-dimensional Framework of Power in Political Parties
In this thesis I have outlined, discussed and analysed the five dimensions of power in
my framework, applying them to my own research on the Labour Party.  Each
dimension offers a unique perspective of power and how it is exercised in political
organisation: Individualistic Power is a property of agents deployed in the pursuit of
individual interests and preferences; Strategic Power is mediated through rules and
values which are subject to strategic manipulation and control by powerful actors;
Bureaucratic Control is an inherent property of the anonymous functioning of
organisation that disciplines and controls the capacity of individuals to act; Constitutive
Power produces the specific subjectivities and skills the party needs in the practices of
party life; Disciplinary Control organises and reconstructs bodies at a microscopic level
of detail in order to produce disciplined and effective agents.  In this concluding
chapter, I will revisit and summarise the argument I have made throughout the thesis.  I
will begin by revisiting my initial assertion that power as it is understood in the context
of the political party literature is under-theorised.  I will then summarise the core
argument before going on to revisit each dimension of power in turn, assessing its
contribution to the overall framework.  Finally, I will consider how effective the
framework as a whole is by applying it to the specific example of the Partnership in
Power reforms which significantly restructured the Labour Party’s policy-making
processes.
Power and the Party Literature
In chapter one, I used the framework that I outlined in my introduction to examine the
assumptions about power contained in some of the most influential literature on
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political parties.  What I demonstrated was that although sometimes power is explicitly
discussed, references to it are often oblique and explicit conceptual development is
lacking.  In terms of power, much of the literature is centred on the relationship between
leaders and led and thus emphasises elitism, which was the subject of Robert Michels’
study in the early part of the twentieth century (Michels 1962 [1915]): the accounts of
Duverger (1959), Panebianco (1988) and Katz and Mair (1995), for example, all have a
strong elitist vein running through them.  However, that does not mean that they are all
one-dimensional in their approach to power.  To differing degrees, elitism and oligarchy
are sometimes tempered and sometimes enhanced by other dimensions of power.
Duverger, for example, seems to hint at more constitutive dimensions that intensify the
power of hierarchy, whilst Panebianco’s approach infuses hierarchical power with
elements of more direct, individualistic conflict and strategic elements that keep it in
check.  Indeed, in contrast to Michels, even the more ‘elitist’ of modern accounts (such
as Katz and Mair’s) indicate that members are not simply submissive, but do have some
power of their own.  On the other hand, another tranche of literature specifically
concerned with party discipline considers how leaders use the institutional resources
available to them to support an exercise of individualistic power, and employ strategies
to ensure that the individual power of members is curtailed.
Despite the range of approaches to power used, the conclusion I drew from my analysis
was that they are limited and what the literature lacks on the whole is an explicit and
systematic theorisation of power as it is exercised and operates in parties.   This is
important because the key texts I have mentioned are and remain amongst the most
influential on the literature on political parties and party organisation in general.  The
result of this is that the study of parties has not developed as it could have done, because
whilst the analysis of power and power relations in political theory has become richer,
299
more complex and more sophisticated, the literature on political parties has tended to
stick with a rather truncated account relying on older theories which originated during
earlier phases of the development of parties.  Furthermore, many of these conceptions
are somewhat negative in their understanding of power.  Being subject to power is to
find oneself defeated or restricted; therefore the sense in which power can be
understood also as positive, productive and empowering is under-explored, although it
is hinted at in some cases.  The failure to recognise how power works through
constituting subjects who are empowered as effective agents with appropriate skills and
capacities is, I would argue, a major shortcoming in the work on political parties.
My argument in this thesis has been that different ontologies of power apparently in
tension with one another – as negative or positive; as agentic or structural – can be
understood as different dimensions of power.  An inclusive, multi-dimensional analysis
can shed greater light on how power works in political parties in particular and
contribute something to the debates about political power more generally.  In this thesis
I have developed a framework to facilitate just such an analysis and tested it on a real-
world case.  This has provided a unique and, I would argue, much richer perspective on
the exercise and operation of power in political parties than has been offered elsewhere.
Summary of the Core Argument
At the outset of the thesis, I posed four questions: firstly, in what different ways is
power exercised in a political party? Secondly, how can power adequately be
theorised? Thirdly, how best can this theory be tested? And fourthly, what contribution
does this make to the understanding of power in political parties and debates about
power generally?  In order to address them, I proposed a framework of power oriented
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towards different dimensions of its operation in an organisational context, specifically
political party organisation.  Drawing on a wide range of theoretical resources, I argued
that power is exercised and operates in five distinctive dimensions in which it becomes
increasingly subtle and less identifiable in the terms that conventional political science
addresses the concept.  In its first dimension, Individualistic Power, power is understood
in conventional, agentic terms focusing on individuals who act freely on their
preferences.  However, as the analysis goes on, power is turned upon individuals in
increasingly insidious ways: Strategic Power is mediated through rules and values
which are subject to manipulation and control; Bureaucratic Control is inherent in the
anonymous functioning of organisation. However, at the same time as it becomes
progressively more anonymous, power also becomes more productive and positive. In
the first three dimensions, power is a negative force that is exercised by defeating
others, or by blocking or suppressing action in different ways.  The fourth dimension,
Constitutive Power, empowers agents to act by investing them with the capacities the
party needs, and Disciplinary Control, the fifth and final dimension of power in my
framework, exerts control at a micro-level so as to normalise subjects and produce
effective agents who are disciplined down to the finest detail of appearance, gesture and
activity.
In order to test this theory, I applied each dimension in the framework to different
aspects of Labour Party life during the long period of reform, roughly between 1985 and
1997.  I chose this period because it immediately follows the end of the Miner’s Strike –
which Neil Kinnock argued ‘lost a year’ out of the party’s reform and policy renewal
process (Jones 1994, 207) – and covers the period up to the Partnership in Power
reforms which entrenched many of the organisational changes that were made after
1985. I wanted to see how, in relation to a particular phase of the party’s development,
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different modes of power are simultaneously at work.  Conversely, I also wanted to
examine how a multi-dimensional analysis enhances the understanding of how political
parties operate in terms of their internal power relations.  My task was not to conduct a
comprehensive analysis or a detailed history of Labour Party reform, but to use this
phase of the party’s development as a point at which to situate an analysis of power.  I
drew on interview research, using the experience of Labour Party members, activists
and representatives at both local and national level to help demonstrate my argument
that the complexities of organisational life cannot be satisfactorily explained with a one-
dimensional approach to power, but requires something more sophisticated.  Within this
period the changes that took place had a significant effect on the party at different levels
– individual, organisational, cultural and technical – which my framework of power is
designed to illuminate.  In the next section, I will review the framework as a whole
before going on to discuss its application.
The Framework of Power
In reviewing the overall framework, I will briefly re-examine each dimension of power,
summarising five things that my analysis has shown: firstly, the basic characteristics of
power including its relationship to agents, institutions and structures of relations;
secondly, the existing theory it draws on and how it was adapted for use in the
framework; thirdly, how it can be identified, what kinds of questions need to be asked
and where analytical attention should be directed; fourthly, how those questions can be
applied to real-world examples that illuminate this dimension of power; fifthly and
finally, what each contributes to the framework as a whole. For the convenience of the
reader, I re-present below the tabular summary of the framework originally presented in
my introductory chapter.
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Dimension of Power Description Characteristics Identification / Questions Examples
Individualistic Power
[IP]
Centred on individuals and their
preferences, power is exercised when
an actor is able to secure interests at
the expense of those of others.
Agentic, rational, causal,
decision-oriented, voluntarist,
resource-dependent.
Identify key issue(s) over which there is
clear conflict; examine parties involved and
decision outcomes.   Who was involved?
Who prevailed? What resources did victors
use?
Leaders rewarding and punishing
through control of patronage;
deploying resources to overcome
a rival in conflict.
Strategic Power
[SP]
Actions are mediated by rules and
norms, power is exercised by their
control and manipulation and by the
ability to set and control the agenda.
How rules used to gain and maintain
advantage.
Conflict-oriented, subject to
rules, mobilisation of bias (via
norms, rules and their
manipulation).
Identify unheard conflicts / grievances; use
of process and rules to block or engineer
defeat.  Who is disfavoured?  How is power
perpetuated by rules and their
manipulation?
Alteration of rules, manipulation
of decision-making procedures,
formal and informal barriers
preventing access to influential
positions.
Bureaucratic Control
[BC]
Rational, impersonal, routinised
power; works against agentic and
strategic power by subsuming
individuals under rules. Associated
with control and obedience of an
automated, mechanised kind.
Process-oriented; anonymous
and routine; formal and
conservative; constrains,
disciplines and excludes; driven
by organisational imperative.
Exploration of key party procedures: how
do key party functions become formalised?
How do bureaucratic responses to
problems impose control and discipline?
How does this impact on the freedom to
act politically?
Formal centralisation and
intervention; rule-based ‘non-
political’ disciplinary mechanisms
or decision-making processes
with exclusionary effects;
administrative jobs and routines.
Constitutive Power
[CP]
A ‘structural’ force which constitutes
subjectivity and reproduces power
through the everyday material
practices of party life.
Immanent in practices;
constitutive, positive and
empowering.
Examines practices and habits of party life.
How do they constitute loyal political
actors with appropriate skills and
capacities?
Meetings as repetitive, structured
rituals of communication;
developing capacities through the
‘career structure’; training
potential representatives.
Disciplinary Control
[DC]
Power as a micro-level phenomenon
which works in detailed practices and
knowledge and surveillance to
discipline and control in fine detail.
A relation rather than a property;
produces disciplined, effective
agents through fine-grained
control of conduct and
normalisation.
What technical solutions are applied to
problems of organised political action?
How are bodies exposed to surveillance,
inscribed and marked?  What is the
disciplinary effect of these processes?
Management of campaigning
activity through timetables and
audits etc.; application of
marketing and presentational
techniques.
Table 7.1: The Framework of Power
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Individualistic Power
My analysis has shown how the first dimension, which I have called Individualistic
Power, can be understood as a dispositional property of individual rational agents.
Power is exercised by these agents episodically where situations of interest-driven
conflict with other individuals arise.  In such conflicts, agents make use of available
resources to secure their own interests over rivals.  Theoretically, I drew largely from
the behaviouralism exemplified in the work of Robert Dahl (1957; 1968), supplemented
with the insights offered by rational choice theory (Dowding 1991; 1996).  Rational
choice theory in particular contributes a sense of how the ordered preferences of
individual agents are translated into conscious goals, thus providing a coherent theory of
action that strengthens the behaviouralist approach.  These approaches are largely
designed to tackle methodological problems: that is, the different ways in which
phenomena (like power) can be observed and measured (Farr 2003, 443; Parsons 2005).
However, these methodological priorities have ontological implications from which I
drew the component characteristics of this dimension of power.  Through my analysis, I
constructed an account of Individualistic Power which is behavioural and rational in
that it is concerned with action based on the ordered preferences of agents.  It is also
voluntarist because it is a function of the will: power is exercised by an individual in
order to secure interests and this cannot occur unless an individual chooses to do so.
Furthermore, because this dimension of power is decision-oriented, it requires a clear,
decisive outcome in which one protagonist defeats another by deploying resources in
his or her favour.
In order to identify Individualistic Power, then, I had to identify, first of all, a key issue
over which there was a clear conflict, examine the parties involved and the outcomes.
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In short, I needed to find out who was involved, who prevailed and what resources they
used to do so.  I tested this with two cases.  The first one, a backbencher’s thwarted
attempt to be appointed to the Home Affairs Select Committee, was a demonstration of
how an individual protagonist with superior resources is able to exercise power over an
adversary by preventing him from fulfilling his preferences or desires and thereby
achieving his desired goal.  The Party leader did not wish the backbencher concerned to
be appointed, apparently because he felt that it would reflect badly on the image of the
party.  He therefore used his resources of control over patronage to ensure that the
appointment did not take place.  The second concerned a conflict between two members
of the Labour Group on Tower Hamlets Borough Council over an important point of
policy.  This initial conflict precipitated a tussle between them over the leadership of the
Group, which was clearly resolved in favour of one of them (albeit with an important
role being played by a third party).  These are both excellent examples of individualistic
power because they clearly pinpoint conflicts between preferences and therefore where
power relations between individuals come into play.  Modelled like this, they are both
clear-cut and parsimonious: confrontations between two actors with opposing
preferences and a decisive, zero-sum outcome.  These are precisely the kinds of
situation to which this dimension of power can be applied effectively.
My argument, then, is that Individualistic Power is important to the overall analysis
because, despite the organisational context, power in parties cannot be fully understood
without accounting for the acts of individuals.  This dimension of power is built around
the pursuit of interests and conflict, and it is effective for understanding how power
relations operate between specific actors in clearly defined and observable conflict
situations.  Because of its emphasis on the deployment of resources, it can also help the
analyst identify what the respective strengths and weaknesses of the protagonists are
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and how that supports a successful exercise of power.  Thus, a party leader with the
appropriate powers of patronage and appointment is clearly in a stronger position than a
newly elected backbench Member of Parliament vis à vis committee appointments.
However, on the downside, it does not easily accommodate additional influential
participants who may have interests that differ from the two main protagonists.  Nor
does it account for some of the more structural inequalities that may make the outcome
of an exercise of power, if not a foregone conclusion then certainly heavily weighted in
favour of one over the other.  These can always be included as resources that support or
undermine the goals of participants, but the result is that the approach cannot always
distinguish easily between what genuinely are ‘resources’ and what actually might be
another potential source of power, e.g. another actor or the organisational context in
which the confrontation takes place.  Furthermore, the parsimoniousness which is its
chief analytical strength can also be a source of weakness: in order to access this
dimension of power, situations must be structured in a certain, formal way, and
although this is a helpful simplification tool which cuts through complexity it ignores
important aspects of power’s operation in parties.  Firstly, it fails to account for the
wider context in which conflicts and decisions might be taking place, and secondly,
unobserved elements are overlooked (for obvious reasons, given this dimension’s
emphasis on visibility).  This means that conflicts are analytically isolated and any
possible underlying influences on them (such as other ongoing conflicts, hidden
tensions, differing social and cultural attributes and so on) are ignored.  Therefore,
whilst it shows its value in pinpointing power relations between individuals, there are
ambiguities in its ability to explain some of the complexities of power’s exercise in
parties.  It treats the party as no more than an aggregate collection of individual actors,
each with their own interests, rather than as a party, which is a collectivity with shared
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interests.  It treats a specific conflict as a closed system, ignoring the point that beneath
the surface may be many battles and struggles, alliances between groups and factions
and other complexities.
Strategic Power
The shortcomings of Individualistic Power are addressed in part by the second
dimension of power in my framework, Strategic Power.  This approach is in part an
attempt to explain the structural inequalities present in situations of conflict and how
particular individuals or groups predominate.  What my analysis demonstrates is that
although power is still centred on interest-driven conflict, it is mediated through
organisational rules and norms in which a pre-existing inequality is embedded.  It
centres on how this advantage is used by those in a position to do so in order to gain and
maintain advantage over others and how this affects the capacity and opportunity of
actors to express interests.  Power is more occluded because it is exercised by
manipulating rules and norms in order to foreclose certain issues or exclude certain
voices from the political process.
To develop this dimension of power, I drew initially on the work of Schattschneider
(1960) who argued that power is identifiable in means rather than ends.  All
organisation, he said, is a ‘mobilisation of bias’ that benefits some individuals and
groups over others.  This argument is built on by Bachrach and Baratz (1970), whose
approach was initially a response to Dahl’s behaviouralism.  They argued that power
has a ‘second face’ which accounts for how certain groups can exert power by
preventing potentially threatening issues or voices from being heard in decision-making
arenas.
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This dimension of power is still based on conflicts of interest but it understands power
as more mediated and complex than a mere confrontation between two individual
agents.  Indeed, a successful exercise of power means that conflicts may not always turn
into confrontations because they are ruled out, excluded or go unrecognised.  Strategic
Power is therefore concerned more with the scope and the means of decision-making
than ends because power is dependent on the ability to control aspects of the process
rather than open conflict.  Using power to avoid confrontation may be seen as far more
effective and successful than being forced to confront rivals directly.  Power is therefore
not always observable, being ‘hidden’ to the extent that it is not exercised in open
conflict.  However, this does not mean that it is anonymous or invisible; in fact, it can
be detected and attributed in a relatively straightforward way.
In order to identify Strategic Power, analysis needs to establish how prevailing
organisational norms support the ability of some groups to block and exclude certain
voices and perspectives or engineer the defeat of others.  It is also concerned with how
manipulating existing norms or challenging and adjusting them affects this ability.  In
other words, analysis needs to ask what opportunities members have to express
preferences and at what point these may be thwarted and thus fail to make their way into
open confrontation.  Rather than who wins, it asks who is disfavoured and how existing
inequalities are perpetuated by norms, rules and their manipulation.
I used three examples to illustrate the different ways in which Strategic Power can be
exercised.  In the first, I examined how key reforms to the decision-making process had
the effect of shoring up leadership authority: the replacement of the conference-based
system of policy-making with one built around the National Policy Forum altered the
prevailing organisational norms in such a way as to make the policy process more
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predictable and easier to control.  Decision-making would now (at least ostensibly) be
more deliberative, consensual and considered in approach than confrontational and
adversarial.  This helped to prevent public confrontation, but at the expense of silencing
voices that may have been able to get themselves heard under the old system.  This had
the effect of thwarting demands and silencing non-mainstream views and voices
unacceptable to the leadership before the process of policy-making even began.
My second example was concerned with the introduction of One Member One Vote
(OMOV) as a means of electing leaders and selecting candidates.  I found that the
reform itself thwarted or reduced the influence of certain voices by altering
organisational norms. The influence of both trade union leaders and the hard core of
activists was circumvented whilst that of the mass of ordinary members was extended.
The effect of this (it was expected) would be a reduced potential for challenges to the
leadership and a broader, more mainstream membership to counterbalance the influence
of the more committed (and left-wing) activists.  However, this particular case adds to
the understanding of Strategic Power in particular because its passage into the party
constitution provides an example of how procedures can be manipulated in order to
engineer a favourable result.  The OMOV rule-change was only narrowly accepted by
party conference, and it may have been defeated had resistance not been neutralised by
the manipulation of procedure.  By combining in one composite two key questions on
which the MSF trade union delegation had contradictory instructions, the latter were
forced into a position where they either had to abstain or be forced break their mandate.
This dilemma and the negotiations within the MSF delegation on how to resolve it
demonstrates that exercises of power cannot be limited to straightforward public
confrontations with binary outcomes but may also be mediated by a more subtle and
complex series of negotiations and manipulations.  In this case, the manipulation of the
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decision-making process by party officials on the one hand and covert bargaining within
the delegation on the other effectively blocked the MSF from being able to freely
express their mandate to oppose the leadership’s favoured policy.
In the third case I showed how Strategic Power can be deployed to exclude particular
voices from the party altogether by putting up barriers to membership against those
considered threats the status quo.  I also showed how changes in rules and procedures
restrict access to ‘sensitive’ areas of influence and authority (such as becoming a
candidate for elected office).  However, this example also points towards the
effectiveness of formal rule-based power over the informal kind.  The old system of
locally organised membership recruitment allowed paternalistic local party elites to
control access to party membership, but with some effort this could be overcome by a
determined enough opposition, as the new generation of activists coming through in the
1980s demonstrated.   The eventual replacement of the old system with a relatively
open, centrally organised one, supplemented by a rule-based system of candidate
selection, was a much more effective tool for restricting access to crucial elite positions.
The example demonstrates how informal authority can be used up to a point, but that
rule-based processes for excluding undesirable voices can be much more effective
because they are entrenched in party rules and norms.
My analysis of these different examples thus showed that although individual agents are
important to the exercise of power, they do not act in a closed system.  Context is an
important consideration because inequality is embedded in the organisational structure
of the political party.  It is an institution with rules and procedures, over which some
have more influence than others.  Strategic Power notices organisational procedures as
vehicles that give agents subtle modes of power.  Securing one’s interests is not just
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achieved by prevailing in confrontation but by preventing others from doing so through
the deployment, manipulation and reform of organisational rules and norms.  Strategic
Power accounts not only for the confrontations between individuals therefore, but for
who benefits from or has control over rules and norms and who is disadvantaged by
them.  It is therefore not just a question of whether demands are met, but what
opportunities exist for certain groups to make those demands in the first place.
To the extent that it is concerned with how power operates at a more strategic level (i.e.
with the means by which party actors attain desired ends), Strategic Power is an
advance on Individualistic Power.  However, it is not adequate on its own because it
adheres to the same agentic ontology.  What it does not explain is what happens when
rules and norms are ‘bedded-in’ as routines that function independently of agents and
might actually shape human behaviour and courses of action. The third dimension of
power in my framework illuminates this.
Bureaucratic Control
Bureaucratic Control focuses on the anonymous, structural ways in which organisation
itself might function as a form of power rather than an instrument of particular actors.  It
draws on Max Weber’s preoccupation with societal rationalisation in which rational
calculation overtakes all aspects of life, in particular the way in which human beings
organise themselves.  This is typified by bureaucracy which, for Weber, is the exemplar
of a disciplinary power that suppresses individual agency in favour of the functional
needs of the organisation per se.  Substantively rational goals like, say, implementing
Social Democratic policies, are supplanted by structural ones concerned with supporting
and maintaining the organisation itself.  As a dimension of power it is therefore oriented
towards anonymous process rather than conflict.  It is intimately associated with control
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and obedience, but of an automated, mechanised kind.  As such, it is inequitable and
conservative because it supports hierarchy, and exclusionary because it rules out certain
voices, ideas and interventions.  I used this dimension to argue that power is immanent
in anonymous, depoliticised process, in which the structural logic and imperatives of
organisation suppress the individual’s capacity to act freely.
To identify Bureaucratic Control therefore I undertook an analysis that was focused on
the party at an organisational level.  I examined the development and functioning of key
party procedures, such as disciplinary regimes, and selection processes, how they
become proceduralised and formalised in ways that empower some and marginalise
others, and thereby entrench inequalities.  Furthermore, my analysis also accounted for
how the official activities that people participate in and the jobs they do for the party
actually restrict their capacity to participate in properly political action and discussion,
because their time is taken up by official routine and business.
I used two examples to illuminate this dimension of power: the first concerned the
oligarchal tendencies of bureaucracy as demonstrated by the party’s tendency towards
greater centralisation and administrative control; the second, how individual conduct is
governed by organisational imperative.  What the first example revealed was that as the
party becomes more sharply electorally focused, there is an increasing intolerance of
independent activity, especially of an unconventional or unorthodox kind.  As a result
there is a greater willingness on the part of the party leadership to intervene or interfere
directly in local party affairs, backed by new rules and procedures.  The processes
through which such discipline is delivered are effective because they are depoliticised,
related to organisational and procedural concerns rather than political ones.
Interventions are procedural; discipline is conducted for violation of organisational rules
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rather than ideological views.  This also has the effect of supporting existing
inequalities of power which underlines the conservative nature of this dimension of
power.  The second example showed how the mundane and rather prosaic activities of
party life direct the conduct and activities of party members.  The conduct of meetings,
the organisation of canvassing and the roles and tasks members are expected to fulfil are
depoliticised and bureaucratic, oriented more towards supporting the organisation’s
administrative needs than political imperatives.  This has the effect of suppressing
agency under routine tasks and administration and substituting political discussion with
official business.
My analysis of Bureaucratic Control thus demonstrated the sense in which power is not
always a matter of conflict, but one of process which carries individuals along and uses
them.  The effect of this is to reproduce and perpetuate inequalities whilst choking off
initiative.  It is an enlightening addition to my framework because it helps explain how
certain inequalities of power between leaders and members are reinforced and
perpetuated without the direct intervention of agents: individual behaviour is
constrained and disciplined not by the action of an ‘opponent’ but by anonymous
organisational processes; leaders are empowered and alternative, maverick voices are
ruled out or excluded not because an elite ‘wills’ it but because of the direction in which
the organisation functions.  It also shows how activists are overwhelmed by
organisational imperatives as they direct their energy and attention into functional roles
rather than political ones.  However, despite the insights this approach brings it still sees
power in a negative light, as almost exclusively potestas: a restrictive, repressive force
that undermines agents and does not account for the possibility that power might be
productive and constitutive too.  For this reason, a fourth dimension of power that could
address these more positive characteristics was necessary.
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Constitutive Power
Constitutive Power emphasises power’s positive side as potentia, which does not
suppress or restrict capacities but actually produces them.  This approach accounts for
how the everyday practices and rituals of party life constitute subjects with the kinds of
capacities and skills that enable them to be the kinds of effective agents that the party
needs.  This dimension of power is strongly influenced by Althusser’s understanding of
ideology as a material practice which constitutes individual subjectivity – the kind
needed to reproduce the current system (Althusser 2009 [1971]).  However, although
Althusser is concerned with the production of subjectivity per se, I extracted and
developed from his work the notion that practices construct belief through the habitual
repetition of everyday practices.  Thus I argued that Constitutive Power is characterised
by its immanence in the material practices of party life.  It exercises a very subtle level
of control through customary actions, patterns of behaviour, shared repertoires and
norms, but at the same time empowers individuals and endows them with the skills and
capacities to act according to its political objectives.
In order to uncover Constitutive Power I directed my attention towards the habits and
practices of everyday life in parties, including the repetitions of and in meetings and in
the way in which members are trained.  The point of this was to examine how these
different practices not only act as a subtle means of control but also as a way of
producing effective agents with useful capacities that support the party’s objectives.
Meetings, for example, are structured rituals of communication that reproduce through
practices the structure and relations of authority in parties.  They establish norms of
language and conduct and, through the configurations of practices and habits, constitute
participants in their particular roles.  This empowers agents because it provides them
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with the knowledge and skills to be effective political actors.  This dimension of power
is therefore structural, but it is not static: developments in political and technological
spheres are reflected in the way that practices change, allowing parties to produce new
kinds of subjectivity and new capacities.  This is demonstrated by my second example
which suggests that as politics has become more national and the organisation more
centralised and controlled, the means by which the party constitutes subjectivities also
changes.  Finally, my third example suggests that training is a means both by which
subtle control is exercised and by which the party builds capacity for itself at the same
time: moderate, pragmatic councillors are constituted not through command but by
instilling the habits and practices of decision-making congruent with party norms;
loyalty is forged, not to specific leaders (who may come and go), nor to particular rules,
but to the party as a culture and a way of life.
What the analysis in chapter five demonstrates is that Constitutive Power brings an
entirely new perspective which explains more than just control and discipline.  Parties
are voluntary organisations and so the extent to which force and repression can be
effective is limited.  What this dimension of power helps illuminate is how parties
constitute voluntarily loyal subjects who play a vital role in the party’s perpetuation and
development.  Loyalty to the party is not a pre-disposition nor are shared values a
priori: they are constituted in practices.  This dimension of power is especially valuable
in its elucidation of how activists and members are empowered with capacities and
skills that are useful to the party’s objectives.  In other words, it offers a more nuanced,
sophisticated view of power because it does not simply assume that being subject to it is
the same as being repressed, blocked or defeated. However, at the same time,
Constitutive Power acts as a very subtle form of control because as repetitive practices
become sedimented, subjects are imbued with the party’s priorities, its norms and
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modes of behaviour, and even appearance.  Individuals freely accept their subjection
because they experience themselves as being empowered and making choices, but they
are empowered only to the extent that they act within the party’s scheme and reproduce
its structures.  This dimension of power adds much to the overall framework,
particularly because it illuminates this positive and productive side that other
dimensions of power overlook.  However, its rather abstract, structural focus means that
what it lacks is a detailed account of exactly how these subjectivities are constituted at
the bodily level.  One final dimension helps fill this lacuna.
Disciplinary Control
Disciplinary Control, the fifth dimension of power in my framework, supplements and
helps complete the analysis.  It shares with Constitutive Power the idea that power is
present in the day-to-day activities of party life and is productive of effective agents,
and with Bureaucratic Control a concern with the consistent and regularised operation
of systems of control.  However its uniqueness lies in the micro-level of analysis which
focuses on how agents are trained, supervised and normalised by means of surveillance
and detailed organisation: subjects are thereby disciplined at a fine-grained level.  It is
characterised by a meticulous organisation of conduct and a focus on the body which is
trained and surveyed in fine detail and reconstructed and normalised so as to become
disciplined and effective.  These characteristics are drawn from Michel Foucault’s
notion of Discipline (Foucault 1977) which he conceives as a specific technology of
power.  Through organisation and surveillance, discipline reaches right into the detail of
the body, organising it in relation to space, time and other objects and reconstructing its
appearance, gestures and speech.
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I identified Disciplinary Control as operating on two different levels.  Firstly, my
analysis considered an example of the detailed, often mundane, practical problems of
organisation and the disciplinary effect of the kinds of solutions applied to them.
Secondly, I alighted on the question of how, in contemporary political life, bodies are
exposed to surveillance (in for example by news media and modern marketing
techniques) and thus marked out, disciplined, excluded and restructured in accordance
with the party’s imperatives.
I drew on two examples to support these points.  The first supports an account of how
useful subjects are produced by organising bodies in relation to time, space and specific
tasks and investing them with useful capacities through training.  It distributes bodies
carefully, monitors and measures them, adjusts and corrects them in accordance with the
party’s needs.  Bodies are invested with detailed techniques of continuous control that
ensure not a moment nor a gesture is wasted. Secondly, it enables an analysis of how
bodies are disciplined in fine detail and reconstructed to become useful subjects that
represent the party through their very constitution as agents.  The constant gaze of
colleagues, media and marketing marks bodies out and classifies them by how they
look, what gender they are, what clothes they wear, how they sound, what gestures they
employ and so on.  It marks out sick bodies, fat bodies or old bodies, and assesses
whether they ‘fit’ with the party’s brand.  It highlights how bodies are primed for
conveying messages that manifest the brand through reconstruction by homing in on
gestures, appearance and conduct.  In other words, it ‘normalises’ bodies by constant
adjustment, construction and reconstruction under the gaze of colleagues, public and
press.  It excludes those bodies that do not fit and keeps those that do under
surveillance, even (or perhaps especially) the party leader.
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The importance of this fifth dimension of power is that it accounts for aspects of
modern politics that would otherwise remain neglected in analysis.  It focuses on the
low level, minor and often banal details of day-to-day party life in which subjects are
constructed, disciplined and empowered to act effectively and obediently.  This
dimension therefore brings a more detailed microscopic eye which further emphasises
power’s constitutive side whilst providing detail of how subjects are subtly controlled in
fine-grained detail.  It also highlights how the kind of routinisation that was discussed at
an organisational level also occurs at a micro-level. As such, it completes the
framework.
The Framework as a Whole
Each dimension I have elaborated provides its own unique perspective which helps to
illuminate different aspects of power in political parties.  However, a question of some
importance to this thesis is whether it all works together as a framework, especially
given some of the ontological tensions present.  I stated at the outset that whilst I do not
expect to resolve the very deep controversies that underlie them, part of the task of this
thesis has been to use these tensions in a creative way.  My argument is that power in
parties should be understood as a multi-dimensional concept in which the agentic and
structural operate at different levels which are therefore not mutually exclusive. I
would summarise the exercise and operation of power in political parties, therefore, as
follows:
Power can be a means by which individuals can secure their preferences over others by
deploying resources.  These resources might include particular prerogatives (such as a
leader’s powers of patronage), knowledge or know-how, access to influential networks,
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social standing and so on.  Some individuals may also be able to strategically employ
organisational rules and norms in their favour so as to avoid challenge or conflict,
thereby securing and perpetuating positions of authority or advantage.  This may be
achieved by manipulating rules and norms in order to prevent certain issues from being
addressed, or to exclude certain voices from decision-making arenas.  Individual ability
to act freely and address political issues, however, may be suppressed by the
imperatives of organisation which removes power and initiative from individual
members by centralising authority and procuring obedience.  It also diverts political
energy into functional, administrative roles that serve organisational priorities rather
than political goals.  Even so, party members are not mindless automatons simply
awaiting commands and leaders are not omnipresent or omniscient beings able to
directly control the activities of individual party members in such detail.  At a more
subtle level, members are invested with the kinds of skills the party needs which they
are then empowered to use to the party’s benefit.  Through the practices in which they
participate and the habits instilled into them, members are constituted as loyal and
empowered subjects.  This is not, therefore, the same as obedience, but subjects
members to a very subtle level of control.  How this is achieved is through the detailed
disciplining of individuals at a micro-level in two particular ways: firstly, through the
specifics of organisation which disciplines bodies in relation to time, space and tasks;
secondly, through surveillance which examines and reconstructs bodies, turning them
into finely-tuned political actors that carry the party’s imprint and communicate its
brand effectively.
Thus agents are invested by discipline, constituted as effective subjects, repressed and
controlled by organisation but nonetheless capable of action and of securing influence
and control.  Through action, agents may gain victories which secure influence and
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authority and the means with which to deploy rules and norms that further consolidate
this position.  However, rules and norms eventually take on a life of their own and
become instruments of control detached from individual agents.  Such levels of control
are supported by the subtle constitution of effective and loyal political actors who are
disciplined into the party’s scheme.  The framework therefore recognises that whilst
power is all pervasive and inescapable, it has a variety of dimensions which both serve
the party’s imperatives and provide individuals with the capacity to act. In the next
section, I will demonstrate in outline how the framework as a whole can be effectively
applied to one particular example: the reforms that were made to the Labour Party’s
policy-making process in 1997.
Applying the Whole Framework: Reform of Policy-Making in the Labour Party
The Partnership in Power reforms of 1997 were the culmination of the long phase of
party reform from which this thesis has drawn its empirical material. Before this time,
the Party’s Annual Conference had been the central focus of policy-making.
Resolutions came up from constituencies and, after being subject to compositing, were
debated on the conference floor.  During debates, resolutions were moved and seconded
by delegates, opening speeches were followed by open debate and to close, a reply from
a Member of the NEC giving ‘guidance’ on which way to vote.  Finally, a vote was
taken (by hand or by card) and, if passed, the resolution would be accepted as party
policy.
The Partnership in Power reforms were designed ostensibly to ensure that policy was
well thought-out and discussed rather than simply constructed out of a range of local
party resolutions, but the initial proposals were very clear about their most important
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focus which was ‘to win power at the next general election and to hold on to it at
successive general elections’ (Labour Party 1997a, 33).  Party leaders were certain that
‘continuing modernisation of the party’s decision making and participative structures’
was central to this (Ibid., 14).  But reform was also about heading off and preventing the
kinds of conflicts that plagued Labour in the 1970s and 1980s and the reforms achieved
this partly by taking control over the agenda.  The role of the elite-dominated Joint
Policy Committees (JPCs) in setting the agenda and thus deciding what is discussed or
not discussed in the first place is a prime example of this (see Chapter Three). In this
respect, Partnership in Power demonstrates how Strategic Power was exercised in
response to what the leadership felt to be problematic displays of Individualistic Power:
by changing the process in order to exclude undesirable issues from the agenda. The
new National Policy Forum in which the representatives of ordinary members had their
say only came into play once the policy had already been defined, and although it could
amend and suggest alternatives, it had to work within the boundaries set by the Policy
Commission (who worked to the agenda set by JPCs). Furthermore, the effective
emasculation of Annual Conference also ensured that certain voices were effectively
excluded from the process of policy-making, some because they could either no longer
access the process, or because they no longer saw any reason to.
As much as they demonstrate Strategic Power in action, however, these reforms also
reflect the tendencies in the party towards centralisation underpinned by Bureaucratic
Control. The process was subject to control from above and reflected the greater
centralisation of the party in the 1990s. But the benefits to the party elite that ensued
also underline the dangers for the party as the reforms have set-in and become
routinised.  Although the concentration of internal power has been important to the
capacity of the party to achieve its electoral goals, the more controlled party that has
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emerged from the operation of Bureaucratic Control means that there is an associated
danger of a loss of vitality in party life, especially at a local level.  This is demonstrated
in the scepticism some activists and MPs feel towards the reforms.
However, despite this, the alteration of decision-making practices has some contribution
to make to the production of new kinds of subjectivity that a modern party requires.
Therefore, this is a point at which Constitutive Power can be uncovered too. The new
process, for example, is more deliberative and consensual, but also more controlled:
NPF meetings are conducted in a ‘workshop’ format, rather than adversarial debate;
they do not vote on or send authoritative resolutions to the next stage of the process, but
are observed by officials, who take notes of the discussion and forward them.  Some
suggest that what is sent through is ignored or not taken seriously by party elites. What
is certain is that it represents a big change in practices that has fundamentally and
irrevocably altered the party’s ‘traditional’ culture of policy-making and, therefore, the
kinds of people who enjoy participating in it. The new approach represented a more
professionalised, business oriented culture, reflecting a different world in terms of
communications and media.  Twenty-four hour news and the proliferation of visual
media make greater demands on the party’s decision-making capacities than ever
before.  Modern political decision-making is conducted under the constant gaze of
visual media which means that the way policy is discussed and presented in public, and
more specifically by whom, what they look like, sound like and act like is at least as
important as its content.  In other words, Disciplinary Control comes to the fore making
the kind of robust, open debate and participation that many of the activists I spoke to
seemed to appreciate, and even long for, all but impossible. It has been all but
supplanted by an approach to politics driven more than ever by the party’s
internalisation of media and marketing imperatives. The ongoing gaze of the news
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media, focus groups and the detailed strategies of brand marketing engender a
particularly pervasive, modern form of party power in which individuals are disciplined
down to their very gestures and appearance.
This brief example shows in outline terms how my framework of power might be
applied as a whole to a specific aspect of party organisation (i.e. policy-making).  It
allows for a truly in-depth and wide ranging understanding of the different dimensions
of power at work in the party at any one time and thus provides insights that less
developed approaches fail to offer.
Conclusion
In this final chapter I have demonstrated three things: firstly, how the framework that I
have developed throughout this thesis addresses the lacunae I identified in the literature;
secondly, I have summarised and assessed the effectiveness of each dimension of power
to the overall framework; thirdly, I have demonstrated how the overall framework might
be fruitfully applied to a particular issue or situation.
My thesis as a whole has demonstrated that power is a much more complex and multi-
dimensional phenomenon than mainstream approaches to political organisation assume.
My aim was to introduce some of the more nuanced and sophisticated insights of
political theory to the analysis of political parties without dismissing the benefits of
some of the more established ways of looking at power.    I have done this by arguing
that as well as being conceivable as a property of individuals or hierarchies, there are
also more covert forms of power.  For example, the manipulation of rules and the
dynamics of organisation itself can be important sources of power in parties.
Furthermore, positive, more productive dimensions of power can be identified in how
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the practices and rituals of party life, and the mundane duties and details of political
activity constitute effective party actors.  Thus the framework accounts for the
distinction that Spinoza long ago identified between power as potestas (i.e. in its more
negative sense of ‘power over’) and potentia (in its positive sense of empowerment).
Although there are analytical benefits for committing to one particular perspective, my
objective here has been to show how it is possible to make use of a diversity of
theoretical insights to analyse a problem from different points of view.  In this case, I
have brought diverse approaches to power together into a single framework in order to
address the question of how power is exercised in political parties.  I have demonstrated
that whilst power can be evident in action and in manipulation, it can also be revealed in
the functioning of organisations, buried in ritual and practices or hidden in the day-to-
day detail of organisational life.  The different perspectives I have drawn on may be
regarded as being in tension with one another, or even contradictory at times; but if they
are understood as different dimensions of power, these tensions can be used creatively
to provide an analytical richness that the existing literature on parties lacks.  My thesis
therefore adds to the sum of knowledge by providing a framework within which a non-
reductionist, multi-dimensional analysis of power can be carried out in these settings.
Finally, I would argue that the framework of power I have developed has wider
implications too.  Understanding how power works in organisation is an essential part
of understanding how it works in modern society more generally because as human
beings we are all participants in organisation, willing or otherwise: in work, where we
socialise, in our daily interactions with businesses and services and the way we
communicate, we move in and out of different organisations all the time, from one to
another.  In other words, organisation is everywhere and we are sometimes explicitly,
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sometimes subtly, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, subject to its power and
discipline.
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW SUBJECTS
Members / Activists
Stephen Beckett
An activist in Tower Hamlets, he came to the Labour Party via the trade union
movement, joining in 1979, inspired by the analysis of people like Ken Coates and
Tony Benn. He was a member of the constituency General Committee for a short
period, but for most of the time, he was a branch level activist, involved in local
campaigns on housing and anti-racism.  He became a councillor at his second attempt in
1994, but was excluded from the panel in 1998.  He successfully appealed and he ran
again (unsuccessfully) in 2002.
Jan Burnell
A former Hackney activist, now in Hertfordshire, she joined the party whilst at
university.  Moving to Stoke Newington, she (along with her husband John) became
active in the local party.  She became chair of the Local Government Committee in
1986 and was elected to the council in 1990, becoming Chair of Social Services.  She
was deselected in 1994.  Today, she runs her own business, a management consultancy
(mainly but not exclusively for the public sector).
John Burnell
John Burnell is a lifelong organiser in the Labour Party.  He joined at a very young age
and became an organiser in Kent before he had even finished university.  The family
moved to Stoke Newington in the 1970s where he and his wife Jan (see above) both
became actively involved in the local Labour Party.  In 1986 he became a councillor for
the first time (for two terms), and in 1987 he was Diane Abbot’s agent for her
successful election campaign in Hackney North and Stoke Newington.  He was
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deselected as a council candidate in 1994.   He remains involved in organising for his
local Labour Party in Hertfordshire where he and his wife now live.
Julia Coleman
Julia is a committed trade unionist who joined the Labour Party in Hemel Hempstead in
the 1980s.  She first stood as a candidate for Dacorum Borough Council in 1987 in an
unwinnable seat.  However, she stood again in 1991 and won, becoming Deputy Leader
of the Labour Group.  In 1995, they produced a stunning result by winning the council,
by which time Julia had by then become leader of the Group and therefore Leader of the
Council
Mike Davis
Mike Davis was a left-wing party activist who joined the party after leaving the
International Socialists in the 1970s.  He became an active campaigner within the party,
espousing a left agenda, but one which developed radically over time, from Trotskyism
to ‘new left’/ identity politics, pro-Europeanism and democratic reform.  He was a
member of the Labour Co-ordinating Committee and now edits Chartist.
In Hackney, he was involved especially in the Local Government Committee which was
suspended by the regional party in the 1990s. In 1996 he played a role in the campaign
to save Hackney Downs school which, combined with other problems, precipitated a
major split in Hackney Council Labour Group.
Phil Maxwell
Phil Maxwell originally joined the Labour Party whilst at college in Liverpool.  After
moving to London, he became active in Tower Hamlets, becoming a councillor in 1986
when the party was riven by splits, staying on until 1998.  He was leader of the Labour
Group for a period and became Chair of the Housing Committee after the party’s
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victory in the 1994 council elections.  He is no longer a member of the party, preferring
to concentrate on film-making and photography projects.
Marjorie Paling
Marjorie is a member of the Labour Party in Gedling in Nottinghamshire.  A former
Communist, she eventually joined the Labour Party after a divorce and became heavily
involved.  She is still active in her local party today.
Mark Taylor
Mark Taylor moved to Tower Hamlets in 1982.  He was a member of the Labour Party
but didn’t get especially active until 1990 over the poll-tax.  He was asked to run for the
council in 1994 to take on the mayor at the time, John Snooks, and he won.  He is best
known among Labour activists for writing increasingly sardonic reports to ward
meetings.  He is no longer active in the party but still a member.  He is also a Trade
Union activist and a school governor, which he says he would never have had the
chance to do had he not been a councillor.
Dennis Twomey
Dennis Twomey joined the party in Tower Hamlets after returning home from
university in the 1970s.  Having become a councillor in 1978, he lost his seat in the
Liberal victory of 1986, returning as a councillor for Blackwall in 1994.  He became
council leader in 1995 as the result of a coup engineered between left-wing and Bengali
councillor.  He is still a member but not active at all.  He was throughout, and is still
today, involved in local charitable and educational projects, including a school
governorship.
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Mike Tyrrell
Mike Tyrrell joined the Labour Party in Limehouse in 1981 after completing his A
levels.  In 1983 he became the ward agent (an innovation at the time).  He became
Branch Secretary of his local party, a GC delegate, and by 1985 Vice-Chair of the party
(in his early twenties) and was selected for a council seat in 1986.  He lost and Labour
lost control of the council to the Liberals.  He was agent for Mildred Gordon at the 1987
election. He eventually took a back seat in party affairs in order to concentrate on his
work in housing.  He is now Chief Executive of Tower Hamlets Community Housing.
Members of Parliament and Former Members of Parliament
Hilary Armstrong
Hilary Armstrong became MP for North West Durham at the 1987 General Election (a
seat her father had also held).  Between 1988 and 1992 she was Opposition
Spokesperson for Education and from 1992-94 she was Parliamentary Private Secretary
to John Smith when he was Party Leader. During this time she played a crucial vote in
securing the One Member One Vote (OMOV) reform to Labour Party elections.  She
held a variety of posts in Opposition and Government, eventually becoming a Minister
of State in 1997 and between 2001 and 2006, the Chief Whip
David Blunkett
In 1983, when still leader of Sheffield City Council, David Blunkett became the first
non-MP since Harold Laski to be elected in the Constituency Section of the NEC.  He
remained a member until 1998.  Although he initially allied himself with the Bennites,
he demonstrated his independence from them and emerged as a pivotal figure on the so-
called ‘soft-left’, seeing himself as a bridge with the leadership and the right.  He was
elected MP for Sheffield Brightside in 1987, soon becoming an Opposition Front-
bencher.  In 1992 he was elected to Shadow Cabinet, becoming Shadow Secretary of
State for Health and later Shadow Secretary of State for Education, a portfolio he was to
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take in Tony Blair’s first government.  He was later also Home Secretary and Secretary
of State for Work and Pensions.
Frank Dobson
Frank Dobson has been the MP for Holborn and St Pancras since 1979.  He has held a
variety of front-line posts including Shadow Leader of the House and Campaigns Co-
ordinator between 1987 and 1989.  In the latter position he played a key role in by-
elections and in 1986 he was Deirdre Wood’s ‘minder’ in the Greenwich by-election, an
experience which convinced him of the need for the NEC to take a more active role in
selections for such contests.  He was also Shadow Environment Secretary from 1994-97
(when he supported the decision to suspend Walsall District Labour Party), and
eventually Secretary of State for Health between 1997 and 1999, when he resigned to
seek the Labour nomination for Mayor for London.
Paul Farrelly
Paul Farrelly is MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme, before which he was City Editor of The
Observer.  He worked with John Golding (his predecessor but one as MP) on political
campaigns in the area.  Golding was a well known ‘fixer’ for the party’s right-wing and
Farrelly edited his memoirs, published posthumously in 2003.    In the 1990s Farrelly
was also an organiser in Hornsey and Wood Green.
Roger Godsiff
Roger Godsiff was a union activist (in APEX and the GMB) before eventually
becoming MP for Birmingham Small Heath in 1992.  He was selected under the aborted
electoral college system thanks to union votes which caused some controversy at the
time.  Before his time as an MP, he worked closely with John Golding and the St
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Ermin’s Group of moderate trade union leaders who were seeking to undermine the
position of the left on the NEC.
Mildred Gordon
Mildred Gordon was MP for Bow and Poplar between 1987 and 1997.  She had been a
left-wing political activist for most of her life and a teacher who grew up in a working-
class Jewish family in East London.  She was also the widow of Sam Gordon, a
founding member of the American Socialist Worker’s Party.  A surprise choice to
succeed Ian Mikardo, she was sixty-four at the time of her arrival in Parliament.
Sir Gerald Kaufman
Sir Gerald Kaufman is a former journalist and writer and has been an MP for more than
forty years.  He was a member of Harold Wilson’s informal ‘kitchen cabinet’ in the
1970s and a junior minister who wrote the widely consulted How to be a Minister in
1980.  He was a key figure in Labour Party reform, being convenor of the Policy
Review Group on Foreign Affairs and Defence which abandoned Labour’s commitment
to unilateral nuclear disarmament.  He held a variety of Shadow portfolios including
Environment, Shadow Home Secretary and Shadow Foreign Secretary, in which
position he formulated Labour’s response to the first Gulf War.
Michael Meacher
Michael Meacher has been MP for Oldham West since 1970.  A high profile figure of
the left, he drifted away from the Bennites in the 1980s, supported Kinnock and backed
OMOV by 1987.  He was a leading member of the ‘soft-left’ and a key figure on the
NEC (along with Blunkett and Tom Sawyer).  He argued for a top to bottom
reconsideration of the reason for the slide in Labour’s appeal after 1987.  He was
replaced as Employment Spokesman after tensions with the leadership over union
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rights.  However, he held a variety of other posts as a member of the Shadow Cabinet
between 1983 and 1997 and became an Environment Minister in Tony Blair’s
governments, a position he maintained until he was sacked in 2003.
Chris Mullin
Chris Mullin became MP for Sunderland South in 1987.  He was undoubtedly a figure
of the left, having been part of Tony Benn’s close circle of supporters.  He was (and
remains) a supporter of the mandatory re-selection of MPs and even published a guide
for activists on how to use their powers.  In the mid-1980s, he was a high profile
campaigner to free the Birmingham Six and also campaigned on other miscarriages of
justice.  After several failed attempts, he eventually became a member of the Home
Affairs Select Committee in 1992 and its Chairman between 1997 and 1999, resigning
to take up a junior ministerial post, the experience of which he has recounted in his
well-received published diaries.  He retired from the House of Commons in 2010.
Gavin Strang
Gavin Strang was MP for Edinburgh East between 1970 and 2010.  He had been a
junior minister in the 1970s and was a member of the Campaign Group of left-wing
MPs.  Between 1992 and 1997 he was an opposition spokesperson on agriculture, food
and rural affairs and was an elected member of the Labour Shadow Cabinet until the
1997 General Election. After Labour's victory at the election, he was appointed to the
Cabinet and was Transport Minister from 1997 to 1998.
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Party Officials
Charles Clarke
Charles Clarke worked as a researcher and then Chief of Staff to the Labour Party
leader Neil Kinnock from 1981 to 1992. He became MP for Norwich South in 1997
and was promoted to the Cabinet in 2001 as Labour Party Chair and Minister without
Portfolio.  He became Secretary of State for Education and Skills in 2002, and was
Home Secretary between 2004 and 2006.
Dianne Hayter
Dianne Hayter is a former General Secretary of the Fabian Society and between 1990
and 1996 was Chief Executive of European Parliamentary Labour Party.  She has been a
member of the NEC since 1998 and was made a peer in 2010.  She is the author of
Fightback! Labour’s Traditional Right in the 1970s and 1980s (Manchester University
Press 2005) which charts the rear-guard action of party moderates against the left’s
ascendancy at the time.
Joe Irvin
Joe Irvin was John Prescott's Chief of Staff in Opposition and, before that, Head of
Research at the TGWU for 10 years. He was later an adviser to Gordon Brown at 10
Downing Street.
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR PARTY MEMBERS
Interview Questions
Questions will not directly address the issue of power and / or discipline in political
parties (although there is one question that asks who they felt held the most power or
influence).  This is so that identification of the aspects of power in which I am interested
are free to emerge from the interviewees stories of general and specific aspects of party
life.
I will ask general questions about their involvement in their local party– regularity of
attendance at meetings, conferences attended, positions of responsibility held,
campaigning and electioneering activities, relations with the wider party.  The main aim
is to gather some knowledge of their experiences during the period in which I am
interested (1987-97).
More general statements will need to be probed for examples.  As a backup, I will
therefore keep a few prompts (such as times, places and key events) in mind which
might help interviewees to open up.  Useful areas for coverage in the interviews might
include:
> Selection meetings and processes
> Policy – passing and putting forward motions and so on
> Involvement (volunteering, stuffing envelopes, delivering leaflets etc.)
> Campaigning – level of organisation, information, guidance
> Best of times and worst of times
This is neither an exhaustive nor a restrictive list.  As far as possible, the aim will be to
allow interviewees to talk freely, using prompts and probing questions to explore useful
or interesting points and issues.
Analysis will be conducted post-interview and will take a critical approach, not merely
looking for evidence that supports the framework, but for that which undermines or
does not support it.
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Outline of Questions and Prompts:  Protocols
NB:  this list is for the interviewer’s guidance, rather than a comprehensive set of
mandatory questions.
1.  General / Membership
When did you first join the party?  What was it that led you to do so?
[may be, for example, something specific, may be a family thing, or more general
feelings about society, politics etc. – or a combination of all of these things]
When/how did you become actively involved?
[What would you say was the primary purpose of the party (pursuit of government,
implementing a world-view / fighting for particular policies; by whatever means at its
disposal; campaigning on local issues e.g. housing, environment, planning;
international issues and other)]
Are you still a member / still an active member?
Tell me about when you left/ when you stopped participating/what you went on to do
(instead, if anything)
2.  Activities / Meetings etc.
Tell me about what your involvement in / relationship was with the local party by
c.1987 onwards?
What kinds of things did you spend your time doing (esp. with any particular
responsibilities they might have had)? [NB: remember they may not have been doing
anything!]
[be useful to know if on the GMC, was a local officer?  Did you go to conferences –
national / regional]?
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How often did you go to meetings?  [Branch meetings, GC meetings, etc…]
What were they like?  Do you think they were run fairly (how ensured)? How much
were meetings about issues and how much about procedure?
Were you involved in local campaigns?
What activities did you enjoy the most / find the most satisfying?  What did you dislike
the most / find the most frustrating?
Greatest successes / failures / what most proud of / ashamed of (either as an individual
or as part of a group)
3.  Organisation
What relationships did you/the local party have with other parts of the party – e.g. local
and national trade union organisations, parliamentary party (esp. local MP), other party
affiliates / societies.1
(Did you take an interest in) Were you involved in any other political groups / internal
party organisations / pressure groups etc.?  (including trade unions, socialist societies,
tendencies, factions etc.); Read particular papers/publications/journals, attend
meetings etc.
→ how those groups then went about organising themselves (if at all)
Who / what people or groups (formal or informal) would you say had the most power /
authority / influence in the local party?  Can you give me examples of how this was
demonstrated?  How did this affect you?
What kind of influence did you feel that you had (as an individual or as part of a
group)?  The branch / the CLP had?
1 Remember what route they may have come through themselves (e.g. via Trade Unions)
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Did you feel you had much say or influence yourself?
Did the nature of campaigning (in elections mainly, but also on local & other issues)
change over time?
4.  Beliefs and Issues
What do you think the party stood for when you joined it?  Would you say what the
party stands for has changed over time? In what way?  Example?  [might be handy to
distinguish between local and national party for answering this question]
Would you say your own views / political beliefs have changed over time?
Do you think that the party represents those views (Still?  Did it ever?)
[What is your view of the apparent tension between ‘principle’ and ‘electability’?]
Some views on key developments in the party in the period:
> Clause IV
> Policy Review
> OMOV
> Re-branding ‘New Labour’
4.  Rules and Procedures
Party culture / atmosphere / the kinds of people / the way in which things are done (or
not done)
Were you aware of changes in party rules and procedures and how did they affect you /
the local party / the way things were done? [selection of candidates, the submission and
making of policy]
Do you think that business was always conducted fairly?  Do you think that rules get in
the way or actually help in making decisions about activity or policy issues?
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[Demonstration of how people and groups within the party used rules for selection,
policy, election of officers (at any level) or anything else in order to get a result for them
or against others (this might be through superior knowledge of the rule book, particular
advantageous interpretations of the rules etc., lack of knowledge of others / failure to
inform).]
5.  Behaviour and Culture
Can you tell me about any particular conflicts in the party you were aware of at the
time?  Between people / groups / officers and members / national and local parties etc.
How were (these) conflicts resolved?
How meetings were set up – when did people arrive, what happened before the meeting
started, during the meeting, when it was over and so on
How did people speak to each other?  How were meetings conducted? Formalities?
Was there much of a social scene?  (e.g. did people get together for a drink afterwards?
Who did and who didn’t) – Did you chat about things that had gone on in meetings,
issues, personalities etc.?
Notes for behaviour, interactions (formal and informal), language, protocols, dress
(officers, ordinary, elected representatives).
6.  Other
What would you say are the main differences between being a party member now (or
after 1997) and being a party member in the past [in (before?) 1987]?  What’s the
difference between ‘Old’ Labour and ‘New’ Labour?
How would you have described the typical Labour Party member / activist?
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APPENDIX 3:  MODEL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR MPs / OFFICIALS
1.  Opening Question
Overall, do you think the party by 1997 was a different party to the one you first
represented?  What were the key ways, do you think, that the party changed between
1987 and 1997?  [Policy, people, behaviour and culture, balance of power, party
structure, more disciplined / cohesive]
2.  [How Important Was] Policy Change
What were your feelings about the Policy Review in 1987-8?  Was it necessary / useful
/ effective ?
(Extra questions if participated)
3.  [How Important Was] Organisational Change
How important do you think were the organisational changes that happened in the party
(structure of the NEC, the NPF & Conference, OMOV, Trade Unions and so on)?  Do
you think that these made a meaningful difference, or did they just entrench changes
that had already occurred?
What were your feelings at the time about the reform of Clause Four?  How important
do you think that it was?
4.  [How Did] Your Own Views Change?
e.g. you were a member of the Campaign Group until 1989:  why did you join?  What
do you think the benefits of being part of such a group were?  The downsides?  Why did
you leave?
5.  [How Important Were] Leaders?
How were shadow cabinet meetings conducted?  What would you say was the
difference between the way decisions were made under Smith as compared to Blair?
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How did you deal with collective responsibility?  Can you give me an example of any
conflicts or disputes that arose as a result of Shadow Cabinet decisions?  How were they
resolved?
What’s the difference between being in a Shadow Cabinet by virtue of election by
colleagues and being in the cabinet itself by Prime Ministerial patronage?
Different questions if not a member, member of NEC, policy sub-committees etc.
6.  Loyalty and Discipline
How important would you say is the idea of loyalty in politics?  (and loyalty to what or
whom?)  [Personal loyalty, loyalty to ideals / principles, loyalty to groups, the party as
a whole.]
Is it possible in your view for an ambitious politician to both progress and maintain
independence in a party political setting?
What, in your experience, are the kinds of tools and tactics leaders use to get their own
way?  What, on the other side, can be used to effectively resist?
7.  Closing Question
If I were to ask you to nominate two events that were most important to these changes /
were key turning points, what would you say?  [also people or ideas]
Extra Questions
What about the social / clubbable aspect of politics: in party and in parliament?  How
important is that side of things and what was your attitude to it?
How important would you say have been some of the more ‘presentational’ aspects of
the way the party developed during this period?  e.g.  Branding (rose etc.) – what effect
did this have on the more ‘substantial’?
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APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEWEE RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION
For my interviews I targeted local activists and politicians or party officials who were
active between 1985 and 1997 and, given constraints of time and resources, reasonably
straightforward to contact.  I did this through a mixture of cultivating existing personal
contacts and writing letters of introduction to potential subjects.
Identifying MPs and Party Officials
I initially identified and wrote to Labour MPs who were elected on or before 1987 and
still incumbent in 2009 (when I carried out this stage of my research).  I gave preference
to those identified from my background research as having had some direct involvement
in debates, controversies and events associated with party reform between 1985 and
1997.  Where I could, I used a ‘snowballing’ technique to identify further interview
subjects:  asking MPs I had interviewed who else they would recommend I might
contact.  Three further subjects were recruited via this method, including two of the
party officials I spoke to.
Identifying Activists
In order to identify activists, I began with a contact from the local Labour Party in
Tower Hamlets (where I had lived and been an intermittently semi-active member of the
party for almost a decade in the 2000s), who passed on to me names and contact details
for individuals active in the party between 1985 and 1997 and some indication of what
kind of role they had played in the party.  Where I had postal addresses or e-mail
addresses, I wrote an introductory letter to them, explaining where I had got their details
and to request an interview.
From Prospects to Interviewees
Overall, from the initial contacts I made, I was able to conduct ten member / activist
interviews and  thirteen MP / official interviews.
In total, I wrote to 25 members and activists and 24 MPs and officials in two separate
tranches of between twelve and thirteen each. Where I had biographical information, I
included indications of why I was interested in what they might have to say.  This
demonstrated that I had some knowledge of their involvement in the party or particular
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events and served to give a clearer idea of what I wanted to ask them about.  As far as I
could, I attempted to achieve a reasonable balance between those who were broadly
regarded as being on the ‘left’ and on the ‘right’ of the   party.  Of course, this is to
some extent relative and changeable: many of those who came to be associated with the
‘right’ of the party in the form of the ‘New Labour’ project had once been regarded as
being on the left of the party.  Others, including a number of activists I interviewed,
claimed that they had become more left-wing in relative terms without actually
changing their position on very much since the party leadership had tacked so far to the
right.
I also attempted as far as I could to obtain a reasonable balance between male and
female subjects.  This was not straightforward, since there were relatively few (twenty-
one) female Labour MPs elected in 1987.  To tackle this, I extended my sample to
include some women elected in 1992 (or in byelections between 1987 and 1992).
However, of the nine women I wrote to, only three responded and only two were willing
to be interviewed.  As regards activists, I was somewhat limited by the contacts that
were given to me.  Through ‘snowballing’ I was able to ensure that at least a reasonable
minority of women were interviewed (three out of eight women contacted).
I have included in these appendices the tables that I used to keep track of my
correspondence with interview subjects (I have excluded contact information) and two
sample letters: one that was sent to MPs and one that was sent to activists.
357
SAMPLE RECRUITMENT LETTER SENT TO FORMER ACTIVIST
Danny Rye
School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet
Street, London, WC1E 7HX
d.rye@pol-soc.bbk.ac.uk
Mobile: 07847 897629
Home address:
91A Agar Grove, London, NW1 9UE
020 7209 0347
Mike Tyrrell
c/o Tower Hamlets Community Housing
285 Commercial Road
E1 2QA
13 February 2009
Dear Mr Tyrrell
I am writing to you at the recommendation of James Grayson from Tower Hamlets
Labour Party (Bethnal Green North), of which I was also a member until moving home
recently.  As well as being an officer once or twice in Bethnal Green North ward, I also
served on the GC for a year or so and have been involved in a number of local and
general election campaigns over the years.
The reason that I am writing to you is because, as well as my Labour Party activities, I
am also undertaking a PhD in Politics at Birkbeck College, University of London.  My
area of research is political parties and party organisation.  In particular, I am concerned
with the Labour Party between 1987 and 1997 and am especially interested in the
experiences of grass-roots members, activists and officers during that time.
I am therefore looking for people who were active in and around the Party (whether
locally, regionally or nationally) then and who might be willing to spare some time
share their experiences as a party member.   Since you were very active in the Party at
the time, I am certain that you would be able to shed a great deal of light on the realities
of party life.
I anticipate that any discussion will take no more than an hour, but whatever time you
can spare would be greatly appreciated.  I am willing to meet wherever is most
convenient for you.
If you would be willing to help, please contact me using the details above.
Many thanks for your consideration,
Danny Rye
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SAMPLE RECRUITMENT LETTER SENT TO MP
Rt Hon Frank Dobson MP
House of Commons
London
SW1A 0AA
22 June 2009
Dear Mr Dobson
I am writing to you as both a new constituent and long standing active member of the
Labour Party.  Before moving to Camden Town recently, I was a member in Bethnal
Green and Bow.  As well as being an officer once or twice in my ward, I also served on
the GC there for a year or so, and have been involved in a number of local and general
election campaigns over the years.
The reason that I am writing to you is because, as well as my Labour Party activities, I
am also undertaking a PhD in Politics at Birkbeck College, University of London.  My
particular area of research is political parties and party organisation and I am especially
interested in the Labour Party between 1987 and 1997.  It was, as you know, an
important time of transition for the party politically and organisationally, and I am keen
to explore the actual experience of MPs at that time.  Since you were Shadow Leader of
the House and then an Opposition Front-bencher throughout that period, I think your
insights and impressions of party life would be particularly interesting.
I understand that you are extremely busy, but if you could possibly spare a little of your
time for an interview to talk about your memories of that period in the party’s history, I
would be incredibly grateful.  Whatever time you are able to give me would be much
appreciated.
Yours sincerely
Danny Rye
E-Mail: d.rye@pol-soc.bbk.ac.uk
Mobile: 07847 897629
Home Tel: 020 7209 0347
Home address:  91A Agar Grove, London, NW1 9UE
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MPs, Former MPs and Officials
Name Constituency Biog Drafted Letter/ MailSent?
Response [Y=yes;
N=no; X=no reply] Follow-up Interview Date Notes
Mildred Gordon formerly Bow and Poplar
Bow and Poplar MP for 2 terms
to 1997.  Now active in the
Pensioners' movement.
Y m Y 19/4/09 @ 3pm -  ather home
aged 85 now
Paul Farrelly Newcastle-under-Lyme
MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme;
edited / compiled John
Golding's book
Y e Y 10/6/09 @ 2pm -Portcullis House
e-mail sent via researcher
Michael Meacher Oldham West & Royton
Leading former Bennite /
member of 'soft-left' on NEC,
Shadow Cabinet perennial,
minister
Y m Y e-mailed questionsto Monica Masson
14/7/09 @ 4pm -
Portcullis House
half an hour only
Gavin Strang Edinburgh East
Former Campaign Group
member,  Shadow Cabinet
1990s, briefly a cabinet minister
Y m Y Initial date cancelled -need to rearrange.
 10/03/10 @ 11am -
Portcullis House
Need to ensure get date and time from
office.
Chris Mullin Sunderland South
Ex-Campaign Group member &
campaigner, later Chair of Home
Affairs SC, diarist of Blair years
Y m Y 7/7/09 @ 10.30am -Portcullis House?
check with constituency office  on Mon 6th
for meeting place.
Roger Godsiff Birmingham Sparkbrook and SmallHeath
Former TU fixer / number
cruncher  alongside John
Golding and John Spellar
Y m Y 15/7/09 @ 11.30am -1 Parliament St
tell reception on arrival and RG will come
and meet me
Kate Hoey Vauxhall
Imposed' candidate for Vauxhall
after NEC intervention. Y m X
Mark Fisher Stoke-on-Trent Central
Spokesperson on various topics
during Kinnock years, briefly a
junior Arts minister under Blair
Y m X
Clare Short Birmingham Ladywood
Former Cabinet Ministerand
leading member of 'soft-left',
active in Militant expulsions.
Y m N
Harry Cohen Leyton and Wanstead
Member of Campaign Group.
Y m
responded after
completion of
process
Frank Dobson Holborn & St Pancras
Former Shadow Cabinet
member, Health Secretary,
Party campaigns co-ordinator.
Y m Y 13/07/09 @ 2.30pm -Portcullis House
Charles Clarke Norwich South
Kinnock's former Chief of Staff,
later Education Secretary ,
Home Secretary.
Y m Y 19/10/09 @ 3.00pm -Portcullis House
twenty minutes only
Sir Gerald Kaufman Manchester Gorton
Senior Shadow Cabinet member
throughout Kinnock's reforming
period, ran Defence Policy
Review
Y m Y
31/07/09 @ 2.30pm -
Palace of
Westminster
Two books worth looking at ahead:
How to be a Minister (1980)
Renewal: Labour's Britain in the 1980s
(1983)
Ann Clwyd Cynon Valley
Shadow spokesperson during
Kinnock and Smith period. Y m X
David Blunkett Sheffield Brightside
Former leader Sheffield CC,
NEC member, prominent 'soft-
left' figure, later Education,
Home Sec.
Y m Y 19/08/09 @ 2.30pm -by telephone
Book Paul Hirst seminar room;  twenty
minutes only.
Joan Ruddock Lewisham Deptford
Former CND chair and
Campaign Group member who
resigned at Benn's 1988
challenge,
Y m X
Patricia Hewitt Leicester West
Former Press Secretary to Neil
Kinnock became MP in 1997
and Cabinet Minister.
Y m X
Lynne Jones Birmingham Selly Oak
Left-wing, rebellious
backbencher elected as MP in
1992
Y m X
Says she is "an independent-minded
member of the Parliamentary Labour Party
"
Hilary Armstrong North West Durham
Former PPS to John Smith
when leader, member of MSF,
leading reformer.  Chief Whip
under Blair.
Y m Y 09/09/09 @ 3.00pm -Portcullis House
Alan Meale Mansfield
Backbench MP and former PPS
to John Prescott. Y m X
Graham Allen Nottingham North
Former member of Tower
Hamlets LP, became MP in
1987
Y m X
Ann Coffey Stockport
Former Opposition Whip; PPS
to Tony Blair in 1997. Y m X
Dianne Hayter N/A
Former CEO of EPP, NEC  and
NCC member and LP historian Y m Y 14/07/09 @ 5:00pm -her home
Joe Irvin N/A
Former adviser to John Prescott
and TGWU official. Y e Y 17/07/09 @ 12:30pm- 10 Downing Street
MPs an  P rty Officials: Contact List
360
Party Members and Activists: Contact List
